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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis assesses the impact of tense international crises on leadership perceptions, across 
enduring rival and non-rival dyads. Associated in the relevant literature with escalation and 
conflict, interstate militarized crises are systematically explored in order to ascertain their 
impact on perceptions. Cognitive theories of decision making suggest that rationality is 
compromised in crises, as emotional stress, time constraints and pervasive uncertainty 
intensify cognitive rigidities among policy makers. A strong possibility, therefore, exists 
that leaders will be oblivious to crucial information, which will either be neglected or 
erroneously interpreted. In that sense, crises are viewed with apprehension by analysts, 
fearing misperception and miscalculation that may lead to unintended war. Through a 
detailed assessment of severe crisis case studies (The Greco-Turkish Aegean Sea crisis of 
1996, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Cypriot S-300 missile crisis of 1998), this 
thesis suggests that crises may, contrary to expectations, shed light on long-running trends 
which were ignored or misinterpreted by decision makers, thereby “forcing” an accurate 
re-assessment of enemy and third party intentions and capabilities. Therefore, by posing a 
clarifying (shock) effect on leadership perceptions, cognitive mechanisms in crises could 
actually act supportively in drawing accurate inferences, bolstering objectivity. 
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  Chapter 1:  
 
Introduction: Rivalries  
and the Research Question 
 
What is the impact of tense international crises on leadership perceptions? More 
specifically, do decision makers’ perceptions across enduring rival dyads become 
more or less accurate due to international crises? The concept of rivalries was first 
articulated when scholars suggested that certain state dyads appeared to be 
systematically more war-prone than other antagonistic dyads.1 Rivals, however, 
have been the subject of inquiry for centuries. Indeed, from Athens and Sparta to 
the Cold War superpower duel, enduring rivalries have shaped our understanding 
of international affairs. Studies such as those treating the US-USSR2 or the Arab-
Israeli3 rivalries provided valuable insight on the historical development of 
individual cases, despite their limited contribution to theory development.  
This is because scholars have only recently conceptualized rivalries as a 
phenomenon in its own right, despite their ubiquity throughout the history of 
international affairs. A number of rivalry definitions have been suggested 
throughout the years, but rivalries can generally be conceived as “interstate 
conflicts in which the parties persistently perceive each other as protracted 
security threats and repeatedly engage in military disputes.”4 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
1 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (1992), “The empirical importance of enduring rivalries,” International Interactions, 
18:2, pp. 151-163. 
2 Nincic, M. (1989), Anatomy of hostility: The U.S.-Soviet rivalry in perspective, San Diego, CA: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich.  
3 Herzog, C. (1982), The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, London: Arms and Armour.  
4Mor, B. (2004), “Strategic beliefs and the formation of enduring international rivalries: Israel’s National 
Security Conception, 1948–56,” International Relations, 18:3, p. 311. Maoz and Mor were first to combine 
behavioral and perceptual elements in their definition of enduring rivals: Maoz, Z. and B. Mor (2002), Bound by 
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scholars have been unable to agree on a single definition, and as a result, the issue 
of rivalry definition remains contentious to this day.  
Disagreements regarding the definition of rivalries did not prevent the evolution 
of scholarly research. Rivalries have been used as a case selection mechanism in 
studies of phenomena such as deterrence5 or power distributions.6 Other, more 
ambitious clusters of research focused on recurrent behavioral patterns across 
rival dyads7 and researchers even embarked upon an effort to investigate intra-
rivalry dynamics.8 Research on rivals, however, was unable to shed light on the 
specific importance of the concept, with a number of scholars coming to question 
the very existence of the phenomenon, claiming that perhaps chance alone could 
account for rival belligerence.9  
Gartzke and Simon, specifically, suggested that the belief that certain conflicts are 
somehow related may actually be generated by a human tendency to see patterns 
in randomness. The so called “hot hand’ phenomenon owes its name to basketball, 
where a player “gets hot” if he scores a few shots in a row or “gets cold” when he 
misses a number of successive shots. Statistics indicate that the probability of 
                                                          
struggle: the strategic evolution of enduring international rivalries, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press.  
5 Huth, P. and B. Russett, (1993), “General deterrence between enduring rivals: testing three competing 
models,” American Political Science Review, 87:1, pp. 61-73. 
6 Geller, D., (1993), “Power differentials and war in rival dyads”, International Studies Quarterly, 37:2, pp. 173-
194. 
7 Brecher, M. and J. Patrick (1988), “Patterns of crisis management,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32:3, pp. 
426-456;  Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (1995), “The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of 
political shocks,” American Journal of Political Science, 39:1, pp. 30-52; Bennett, S. (1996), “Security, 
bargaining, and the end of interstate rivalry”, International Studies Quarterly, 40:2, pp. 157-183. 
8Maoz, Z. (1984), “Peace by empire? Conflict outcomes and international stability, 1816-1976,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 21:3, pp. 227-241; Maoz, Z. and B. Mor, (1996), “Enduring rivalries: the early years,” 
International Political Science Review, 17:2, pp. 141-160; Hensel, P. (1996), “Charting a course to conflict: 
territorial issues and interstate conflict, 1816-1992,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 15:1, pp. 43-73. 
9 See for instance Gartzke, E. and M. Simon (1999), “Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries,” 
Journal of Politics, 63:3, pp. 777-798. 
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scoring a shot is in no way related to previous attempts.10 Gartzke and Simon 
offered a similar critique to the rivalry research program, asserting that even 
though states with a history of enmity “are more likely to engage in additional 
disputes,” there is no reason to assume that “previous disputes are causal.”11 
Despite the presence of works that cast doubt on the validity of the phenomenon, 
a voluminous research produced on the subject indicates that the significance of 
rivalries is now widely acceptable and has been well documented. Diehl and 
Goertz, for instance, concluded that over fifty percent of rivals have been engaged 
in war at some point. Thompson suggested a different definition of rivalries 
according to which seventy-five percent of rivals experience war. 12 Enduring 
rivalries, moreover, account for a disproportionate fraction of other critical 
incidents, including violent territorial changes as well as international crises.13  
The study of rivalries represents a promising direction in the study of international 
conflict. Instead of analyzing the origins of armed conflict in isolation, the rivalry 
research program suggests that interstate conflict is somehow connected across 
time and space. The underlying assumption is that relations under this context 
operate differently compared to non-rivalry affairs and therefore, existing theories 
may not adequately account for rivalry dynamics. As Goertz and Diehl point out, 
“these repeated conflicts between the same dyad are related to one another” and 
therefore “explaining war requires understanding the relationship between these 
                                                          
10 Gilovich, T. et. al. (1985), “The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences,” 
Cognitive Psychology, 17:2, pp. 295–314. 
11 Gartzke and Simon, “Hot Hand,” p. 782. 
12 Colaresi, M. and W. Thompson (2002), “Strategic rivalries, protracted conflict, and crisis escalation,” Journal 
of Peace Research, 39:3, pp. 263-287.  
13 Hensel, P. (1998), “Interstate rivalry and the study of militarized conflict,” in F. Harvey and B. Mor (eds.), 
Conflict in world politics: advances in the study of crisis, war and peace, London, UK: Macmillan, pp. 162-204. 
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disputes.”14 While the literature has investigated in great detail the behavioral 
aspects of the phenomenon, such as rivalry onset, evolution and termination,15 a 
persistent uncertainty over the sources of hostility within rival dyads continues to 
inhibit theory development.  
This research project aims to investigate the impact of tense militarized crises on 
rivals’ perceptions, by comparing the impact of crises between rival and non-rival 
leadership perceptions. Perceptions were selected as the object of scrutiny, as the 
literature indicates that they may have a significant importance to rivalries, even 
though psychological dynamics within rivalries remain underexplored. Some 
scholars are already convinced, however, that psychological factors play a 
prominent role in rivalries. Thompson, a key figure in the study of the 
phenomenon, asserts that “….rivals deal with each other in a psychologically 
charged context of path-dependent hostility.”16 In other words, rivals determine 
present actions by referring to the past record of conflict.17 The (rather implicit) 
assumption here is that past conflictual events are somehow “internalized” by 
policy-makers, thereby altering their perceptions of the present.  
Assuming that previous encounters psychologically “charge” bilateral relations, 
crises can be reasonably expected to exacerbate misperceptions in enduring 
rivalries. Crises are situations characterized by a severe threat to important values, 
                                                          
14 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (2000), “Rivalries: The Conflict Process,” in J. Vasquez (ed.), What Do We Know 
About War?, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 222. 
15 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (1993), “Enduring rivalries: theoretical constructs and empirical patterns,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 37:2, pp. 147-171; Goertz and Diehl, “The initiation and termination of 
enduring rivalries”; Huth, P. et. al. (1992), “System uncertainty, risk propensity, and international conflict 
among the great powers,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:3, pp. 478-517; Vasquez, J. (1996), 
“Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: a quantitative comparative case study of the two 
paths to war,” International Studies Quarterly, 40:4, pp. 531-558. 
16 Thompson, W. (2001), “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 
45:4, p. 558.  
17 Colaresi M. et. al. (2007), Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 21. 
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a finite time for coping with the threat and a high probability of war.18 In this 
regard, the study of crises and their impact on perceptions appears to constitute an 
appropriate research locus, as crises are acknowledged to be the most intense type 
of militarized interaction, short of war. Thus, the research project is well-
positioned within the wider decision-making literature and the “psychological” 
narrative described above, regarding the impact of crises on decision-making, 
would fit with the prevailing “cognitive” paradigm in International Relations.  
Indeed, crises are believed to exacerbate misperception, posing a danger for 
miscalculation and conflict. Cognitive theories of decision-making suggest that 
rationality is compromised in crises, as emotional stress, time-constraints and 
pervasive uncertainty intensify cognitive rigidities among policy-makers.19 
Policy-makers may, for instance, fail to pay heed to information contradicting 
their previously held beliefs, undermining their capacity to receive and process 
new information. Consequently, erroneous perceptions are likely to arise, 
resulting in problematic policies, with inadvertent escalation and war constituting 
a strong possibility.20 In that sense, crises are viewed with apprehension by 
analysts, fearing misperception and miscalculation that may lead to unintended 
war. The causal importance of misperception for the outbreak of international 
conflict has been well documented, especially with reference to the World Wars.21 
                                                          
18 Brecher, M. (1980), Decisions in Crisis, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 1 – 6. 
19 See for instance Jervis, R. (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press; Janis, I. (1989), Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis 
Management, New York and London: Free Press. 
20 Snyder, G. and P. Diesing, (1977), Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System 
Structure in International Crises, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; Winter, D. (2003), “Asymmetrical 
Perceptions of Power in Crises: A Comparison of 1914 and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, Journal of Peace 
Research, 40:3, pp. 251-270. 
21 White, R., (1970), “Misperception as a Cause of Two World Wars,” in Nobody Wanted War: Misperception 
in Vietnam and Other Wars, Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, pp. 3-33; Christensen, T. and J. Snyder (1990), 
“Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, 
44:1, pp. 137-168; Winter, “Asymmetrical Perceptions of Power in Crises.” 
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Theoretically, however, there is no reason why an opposing narrative cannot be 
supported. Contrary to the prevailing view in the literature, this thesis explores 
the possibility that such incidents may actually enhance the accuracy of leadership 
perceptions. By “forcing” leaders to focus their attention on the “enemy,” and the 
strategic environment of the particular incident, crises could render leaderships 
aware of long-running trends that had been hitherto ignored. Crises, in that sense, 
could act supportively in making accurate inferences, bolstering objectivity. 
Under no circumstances, however, does this “rational”22 hypothesis, render 
uncertainty obsolete, as the latter is subject to a multitude of factors which can 
solely be ascertained in the battlefield. The goal of this research project, therefore, 
is to determine whether crises render leadership perceptions more, or less, 
accurate among rival and non-rival dyads. Thus, the main research question is: 
“Do decision makers’ perceptions across rival and non-rival 
dyads become more or less accurate due to international crises?” 
In accordance with the competing “rational” and “cognitive/psychological” 
narratives exposed above, the following hypotheses can be generated and tested:                        
Hypothesis 1a: Crises should render leadership perceptions more, not less, 
accurate.  
Hypothesis 1b: Crises should have a particularly clarifying effect on rival dyad 
perceptions due to the familiarity and accumulated knowledge of contestants.  
 
                                                          
22 Rationality is not used in an absolute, “substantive” sense (optimal decisions), but in a procedural sense, 
denoting behaviour “adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities 
of the decision maker,” indicating decisions are analytically based. See Simon, H., (1985), “Human Nature in 
Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review, (79:2), p. 294. 
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The null hypothesis is consistent with the “psychological/cognitive” narrative: 
Crises should heighten misperception across both rival and non-rival state dyads. 
We would also expect rival dyads to be particularly affected by misperception, as 
rivalries posit a decision-making environment ridden with hostility and 
exacerbated threat perceptions.   
The underlying logic of the “rational” narrative is that the capacity to adopt 
policies which are incompatible with existing perceptions is robust. Theoretically, 
there is no reason to discard the notion that crises may actually have a clarifying 
effect on perceptions. Cognitive mechanisms do operate in crises; however, they 
could actually act supportively in drawing accurate inferences, bolstering 
objectivity. Even when cognitive rigidities are pervasive, such as during crises, 
powerful stimuli may re-instate analytic rationality, forcing novel thinking in the 
face of imminent danger. The high stakes associated with militarized crises lead 
to a thorough re-evaluation and adjustment of preconceptions, enhancing leaders’ 
openness to new and potentially contradicting information.23 As a result, 
assumptions could be re-evaluated and if necessary, re-configured, with 
perceptions becoming more, not less, accurate.  
Rivalries could indeed be cases in which rationality is harder to reinstate, because 
prior interactions have established a negatively charged relationship. However, 
the capacity of leaders to perceive changes during crises could be enhanced due 
to the attention and resources devoted to the assessment of the “other.” Without 
prejudice to the case study assessment, one could suggest that mechanisms 
                                                          
23 See for example Raphael, T., (1982), “Integrative Complexity Theory and Forecasting International Crises: 
Berlin 1946-1962,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26:3, pp. 423-450; Mor, B. (1991), “Nasser’s Decision-
making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-choice Explanation,” Journal of Peace Research, 28:4, pp. 
359-375. 
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operating in enduring rivalries can accelerate the impact of rational “perceptual 
shocks.” Rivals, due to the high stakes associated with their antagonism and their 
history of tense interaction, possess extensive intelligence gathering capabilities, 
numerous channels of communication and a wide array of past experiences from 
which they can draw accurate inferences in times of crisis. During inter-state 
crises, the leadership’s “realignment” could take place swiftly due to these assets, 
leading to the enactment of sound policies and effective crisis management.  
Contrasting the aforementioned “rational” hypothesis, the null hypothesis adheres 
to the “cognitive” or “psychological” narrative of decision-making. The innate 
propensity of individuals to see information as confirming preexisting 
expectations “about how the world works and what patterns it is likely to present 
us with,”24 renders policy makers prone to distort or dismiss as unreliable 
incoming evidence or information which is incompatible with pre-existing 
beliefs.25 In crises, the effect should be even more pronounced, as the presence of 
emotional stress, time-constraints and pervasive uncertainty can intensify 
cognitive rigidities among policy-makers.26 Crises should generate threat 
perceptions which, in time, can create a “psychological atmosphere of fear and 
anxiety.”27 A strong possibility, therefore, exists that leaders will be oblivious to 
crucial information, which will either be neglected or wrongly interpreted.28  
                                                          
24 Jervis, R. (1985), “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in R. Jervis et. al., Psychology and Deterrence, 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 18.  
25 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 187-190. 
26 See for instance Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Janis, Crucial Decisions. 
27Senese, P. and J. Vasquez (2008), The Steps to War: An Empirical Study, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, p. 34. 
28 Jervis, R. (1968), “Hypotheses on Misperceptions”, World Politics, 20:3, p. 459. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Enduring Rivalries in 
International Relations 
 
2.1: Identifying Rivalries 
Before exploring the rivalry phenomenon, it is crucial to emphasize potential 
divisions and disagreements which could affect case selection and research 
outcomes. It is important to note at this early stage that there is no consensus on 
the specific dyads that constitute the rivalries population. Scholarly work 
frequently cites rivalries as a widely endorsed concept, but fails to mention that 
different scholars mean different things when they analyze the phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, a short list of popular rivalries which are unanimously accepted as 
such does exist and is illustrative of the potential impact of rivalries in the study 
of world politics. Dyads such as India and Pakistan or the two Koreas underpin 
the contemporary importance of enduring rivalries, a phenomenon which can be 
traced back to antiquity, starting with the Greco-Persian Wars.  
The archetypical rivalry between the Greek city-states and the Persian Empire is 
truly indicative of the repercussions these antagonisms may bear in international 
politics. The particular rivalry effectively (re)shaped the balance of power in the 
ancient international system until another rival dyad, Athens and Sparta, led the 
once dominant Greek world to an escalating spiral, culminating in the catastrophic 
Peloponnesian War. The rivalry phenomenon is thus not simply a constant 
throughout history, but is also associated with major changes in the international 
system. However, its presence is not limited in great power antagonism. 
19 
 
According to one definition, over 90% of armed conflicts occurring after the end 
of World War II were undertaken between enduring rivals.1 
While a consensus on the importance of rivals is gradually established in the 
discipline, agreement on most other assumptions regarding enduring rivalries 
remains elusive. For starters, the origins of rivalries have yet to be illuminated. 
While some authors claim that one should seek the “birth” of rivalry dynamics in 
psychological factors,2 other scholars disagree, suggesting that rivalries can exist 
outside a psychologically charged relationship.3 Operationalizing rivalries has 
proven equally divisive for scholars studying the phenomenon: A certain number 
of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) was suggested as a necessary 
precondition to identify a rival pair, though the precise numerical threshold was 
never agreed upon. Another group of scholars favored a qualitative, as opposed to 
a quantitative, criterion, maintaining that the examination of the historical record 
should identify persistently hostile dyads. The result is the fragmentation of the 
research effort. Across six major methodological approaches used to derive rival 
dyads from a total pool of 355 potential cases, only 23 dyads (corresponding to 
only 6.5%) are unanimously adopted as cases of enduring rivalry.4  
Even the dyadic nature of rivalries has been cast into doubt, with scholars 
suggesting that the concept should be expanded to include protracted hostile 
interactions between more than two actors. Diehl and Goertz presented a solid 
                                                          
1 Colaresi, M. et. al. (2007), Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 89. 
2 Vasquez, J. (1996), “Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: a quantitative comparative 
case study of the two paths to war,” International Studies Quarterly, 40:4, p. 553; Maoz, Z. and B. Mor (2002), 
Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries, Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, p. 5. 
3 Levy, J. (1999), “The rise and decline of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry, 1609–1689,” in: W. Thompson (ed.),  
Great Power Rivalries, Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, p. 174.  
4 Colaresi et. al., Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, p. 57. 
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case when they suggested that trilateral or multilateral competitions, such as the 
Cold War era USSR-China-U.S.A. and NATO versus the Warsaw Pact members 
respectively, could be classified as historical examples of rivalries.5 Diehl notes 
however, that what is perceived as a multilateral rivalry may be concealing a 
dyadic competition at its core.6  
On a more positive light, convergences on crucial rivalry traits do exist. The most 
important treatises concur that two fundamental elements distinguish rival from 
non-rival dyads engaging in isolated conflicts: The existence of a) a temporal 
dimension, and b) issue competition. The temporal dimension refers to the 
persistence of an adversarial relationship for a substantial time period.7 However, 
rivalries of short duration can also exist. The core issue with regards to the 
temporal dimension is not longevity, but the expectation that past events affect 
the present behaviour of rivals.8 Rival dyads at any given point are thus expected 
to be affected by the history and the future expectations of the conflict, so that one 
cannot view “specific conflicts as independent phenomena” or “extract them from 
their rivalry streams without distorting the context in which they occur.”9  
Issue competition, on the other hand, is what one usually refers to as “conflict of 
interest” and is the quintessential driving force behind rivalry dynamics. The 
presence of a contentious issue which is of high salience to enduring rivals is a 
necessary condition for the enactment and preservation of a rivalry in world 
                                                          
5 Diehl, P and G. Goertz (2000), War and Peace in International Rivalry, Ann Arbor, MI: University  
of Michigan Press, pp. 19–20 
6 Diehl, P. (1998), “Introduction: an overview and some theoretical guidelines,” in P. Diehl (ed.), The Dynamics 
of Enduring Rivalries. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, p. 5. 
7 Bennett, S. (1997), “Measuring rivalry termination, 1816–1992,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
41:2, pp. 227–254; Hensel, P. (1999), “An evolutionary approach to the study of interstate rivalry,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, 17:2, pp.179–206. 
8 Colaresi et. al, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, p. 21. 
9 Thompson, W. (1995), “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:2, pp. 195-223,  p. 197.  
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affairs.10 A wide variety of issue areas can fall in this category. Vasquez argues 
that rivalries characterized by a strong territorial dimension have a high propensity 
towards armed conflict.11 Rasler and Thompson, however, conclude that major 
powers are driven less by geography and more by “positional” concerns when 
escalating in the context of a rivalry.12 State leaders are concerned about “national 
status, whether their state’s prestige and ranking in the system (or some 
subsystem) is being threatened, and whether or to what extent they are able to 
influence events outside their borders short of territorial control.”13 This 
proposition appears compatible with Realist writings in International Relations 
citing the distribution of power as being critical to choices over war and peace. 
Research linking the distribution of power and rivalries has been limited, though 
at a systemic level, Levy and Ali suggest that the distribution of power did not 
seem to affect rivalry dynamics between the Netherlands and England.14  
In any case, issue competition, combined with the requisite element of time, 
provides the necessary context to the rivalry concept. In essence, therefore, rivals 
in international politics have antagonistic relations, characterized by a “persistent, 
fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states.”15 A 
secondary, though equally crucial, component to the temporal dimension is the 
shared belief that the adversarial relationship will continue to exist in the future.16 
                                                          
10 Hensel, “An evolutionary approach to the study of interstate rivalry”; Vasquez, J. (1993), The War Puzzle, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
11 Vasquez, “Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not.” 
12 Rasler, K. and W. Thompson (2000), “Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity 
in the Major Power Subsystem,” International Studies Quarterly, 44:3, pp. 503–530. 
13 Rasler and Thompson, “Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War,” p. 505.  
14 Levy, J. and S. Ali (1998), “From Commercial Competition to Strategic Rivalry to War: The Evolution of the 
Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609–1652,” in P. Diehl (ed.), The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, Urbana and Chicago, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, pp. 29–63. 
15 Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle, p. 2.  
16 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (1993), “Enduring rivalries: theoretical constructs and empirical patterns,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 37:2, p. 154. 
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An interesting implication of the aforementioned hypotheses is that feelings of 
hostility are not considered necessary for the identification of a rivalry. 
Nevertheless, perceptions of another state as a rival due to issue competition 
should be distinguished from animosity generated by psychological hostility.  
Prominent authors would argue that a deep-rooted psychological enmity lies at 
the core of rivalries.17 Thompson posits that “….rivals deal with each other in a 
psychologically charged context of path-dependent hostility.”18 However, 
scholars have also entertained the notion that rivalries may simply be related to a 
conflict of interests that lasts for a prolonged period.19 If this is the case, 
psychological factors may be unrelated to the observed belligerence of rival 
dyads. The ambiguous conceptualization of rivals does not end here, with scholars 
questioning the necessity of mutual perception of rivals as such.  
For an external observer, it would be hard to imagine a rivalry between two actors 
when one of them (or both) do not explicitly see a rival in the face of the other. 
Thompson’s conceptualization of strategic rivalries emphasizes the perceptual 
element and thus views the mutual identification as rivals as a necessary 
requirement. He elaborates further on this matter, asserting that state elites and 
leaderships in particular, irrespective of the general population or other interest 
groups, need to identify the “other” as a rival.20  
While Thompson’s case appears attractive to those familiar with historical 
examples of rivalries, a number of scholars offered interesting observations that 
                                                          
17 Vasquez, “Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not.”; Maoz and Mor, The Strategic 
Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries. 
18 Thompson, W. (2001), “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, 
45:4, p. 558.  
19 Levy, “The rise and decline of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry,” p. 174. 
20 Thompson, “Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics.” 
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should not go unnoticed. They suggested that competition between rivals may be 
ongoing at low intensity levels (Franco – German competition for influence in the 
EU after the German re-unification may be a solid example) and for a long period 
of time, without the explicit acknowledgement from participant states that they 
perceive each other in rivalry terms. In other instances, only one member of the 
dyad may perceive a rival in the form of the other member. Irrespective of these 
nuances, dyads should at the very least exhibit the fundamental characteristics of 
rivalries, in terms of a prolonged competition over contentious issue areas.  
 
2.2: The Impact of Rivalries in International Politics 
The evolution of rivalry research is indicative of persisting divisions but also of 
an increasing acceptance of the phenomenon as a distinct framework under which 
conflict can be studied. In this regard, assessing the impact of militarized crises 
on rival perceptions signifies an appropriate next step in the effort to understand 
why and how rivals affect the course of international politics. Scholars have 
already employed the rivalry concept for diverse purposes and in various 
approaches. Rivalries have been evaluated as an independent variable. By 
assessing the impact of rivalry on terrorism, nuclear proliferation and even 
democracy, researchers sought to ascertain the impact of a phenomenon, which 
appeared to have a discernible effect on conditions of war and peace.21  
Moreover, phenomena such as deterrence and arms races have been re-evaluated 
under conditions of rivalry, further pointing to a statistically observable role of 
                                                          
21 Gartzke, E. and D. Jo (2009), “Bargaining, nuclear proliferation, and interstate disputes,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 53:2, pp. 209–233; Conrad, J. (2011), “Interstate rivalry and terrorism: an unprobed link,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 55:4, pp. 529–555; Rasler, K. and W. Thompson (2011), “Borders, rivalry, democracy, 
and conflict in the European region, 1816–1994, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28:3, pp. 280–303. 
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rivalry conditions on the dynamics of hostile interactions.22 For example, a 
reputation of resolve built in past encounters seems to have a more powerful 
statistical effect in enduring rivalries.23 Huth and Russett, moreover, evaluated the 
possibility of a rival challenging the status quo and initiating a militarized dispute 
under a general deterrence framework.24 They concluded that both rational and 
cognitive factors can have an impact on the onset of crises between rival dyads.  
The inner dynamics of rivals have also been heavily scrutinized. How do rivals 
behave exactly when they are engaged in a rivalry? Two distinct theoretical 
models have been introduced with a view to accounting for state behavior in a 
rivalry context. The “punctuated equilibrium” model suggests that hostile 
behavior in rivalries fluctuates around a specific “lock in” level originating in the 
initial stages of the rivalry.25 While relations may temporarily escalate or improve, 
rivals have no discernible reason to become more conflictual over time.  
Reflecting structural Realist principles, this model suggests that only systemic 
shocks (such as wars or changes in the balance of power) could alter rivalry 
dynamics.26 Analyses such as the aforementioned imply that the analytical value 
of the rivalry phenomenon itself should perhaps be re-evaluated. Indeed, this 
follows Gartzke and Simon, who argued that rivalries may be epiphenomena, with 
                                                          
22 Huth, P. and B. Russett, (1993), “General deterrence between enduring rivals: testing three competing 
models,” American Political Science Review, 87:1, pp. 61-73; Gibler D. et. al. (2005), “Taking arms against a 
sea of troubles: conventional arms races during periods of rivalry, Journal of Peace Research 42:2, pp. 131-147. 
23 Huth, P. (1988), Extended deterrence and the prevention of war, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
24 According to Huth and Russett: “The analysis of general deterrence differs from immediate deterrence 
because it focuses on conditions under which military-diplomatic crises may arise, rather than on factors that 
determine the outcome of a crisis once it has erupted.” See Huth and Russett, General deterrence between 
enduring rivals, p. 61. 
25 Diehl, “Introduction,” in Diehl, The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, p. 7. 
26 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl (1995), “The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of political 
shocks,” American Journal of Political Science, 39:1, p. 36. 
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intra-rivalry disputes causally unrelated to one another.27 In essence, the 
punctuated equilibrium model suggests that adversarial interactions should not 
affect the trajectory of a rivalry in any meaningful way.  
A dynamic, or “evolutionary” model of rival behavior was suggested, instead, by 
Hensel, who anticipates rivalrous states to become increasingly violence-prone 
over time.28 State behavior should vary systematically over the course of this tense 
relationship, with “mature” rivalries showing stronger signs of event dependence. 
The current state of rivalry research allows a degree of certainty in asserting that 
event dependence is a well-established tenet. Back in 1989, for instance, 
McGinnis and Williams examined potential interconnections across events in the 
Cold-War U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry, offering valuable insight that could be 
generalized across rival relationships.29 They came to the conclusion that 
“military expenditures and diplomatic hostility of the United States and the Soviet 
Union form a stable system of interactions” and that this system appeared “very 
robust to exogenous shocks.”30 Subsequent research indicated that rival 
interaction is indeed somehow connected to the onset of major wars. Colaresi and 
Thompson agree with this proposition, suggesting that the conflict-proneness of 
rivals can only be attributed to a strong event dependence across rivalry disputes.31  
A final crucial point in enduring rivalries pertains to the role of domestic factors 
in the onset and evolution of rivalries. Vasquez notes in this regard that domestic 
                                                          
27 Gartzke, E. and M. Simon (1999), “Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Politics, 
63:3, pp. 777-798. 
28 Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry”; Maoz and Mor, Bound By Struggle. 
29 McGinnis, M. and J. Williams (1989), “Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry,” The American Political 
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30 McGinnis and Williams, “Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry,” p. 1118. 
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political processes in Japan were pivotal in the country’s expansionist 
undertakings in Asia and ultimately its confrontational path with the United 
States.32 Hensel, on the other hand, suggested that a democratic dyad is less war-
prone than a non-democratic pair.33 Rasler and Thompson, however, posit that 
democracy matters only outside the rival context, with the rivalry effect 
outweighing any pacifying effect attributed to democracy.34 
Finally, endogenous political shocks are cited as another force that may be 
important towards understanding the dynamics of rivalry evolution. The Anglo-
Dutch rivalry was examined by Levy and Ali for the years 1609-1652, who 
explored the underlying reasons for the transformation of a purely commercial 
antagonism that went on for half a century to a militarized affair that generated 
three wars in a short period of time.35 They suggested that England’s domestic 
instability inhibited the militarization of the rivalry in early years. Earlier, the 
death of Frederick Henry had led to a détente between another rival dyad, Spain 
and the Netherlands, creating the necessary conditions for the onset of the Anglo-
Dutch rivalry.36 Domestic factors can thus be considered influential in rivalry 
initiation, evolution and termination. Overall, research is converging towards the 
notion that rivalry conditions somehow affect decisions over war and peace. 
Assessing the impact of tense incidents on perceptions, which are pivotal to 
critical decisions in foreign policy, is thus a natural progression of rivalry 
research, building on existing approaches and reflecting current research trends.  
                                                          
32 Vasquez, J. (1998), “The Evolution of Multiple Rivalries Prior to the Second World War in the Pacific,” in 
Diehl, The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, pp. 191-224. 
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Chapter 3:    
 
Perceptions in International Relations 
 
3.1: The Absence of Perceptions from  
International Relations 
There is little doubt that perceptions should be accorded an important role in the 
study of international politics. This is because decisions, including those related 
to war and peace, are undertaken by individuals. Indeed, “statesmen, not states, 
are the primary actors in international affairs.”1 Perceptions are thus not only 
crucial towards understanding phenomena such as the belligerence of enduring 
rivals, but have proven to be of prime significance in evaluating a multitude of 
critical decisions related to international conflict and cooperation. Even scholars 
committed to the assumption of states as unitary actors acknowledge a role for 
perceptions. After all, “if power influences international relations, it must do so 
through the perceptions of those who act on behalf of states.”2 In examining 
Anthony Eden’s decision to initiate the Suez War in 1956, for instance, one must 
consider his belief that Britain had entered a period of relative decline and needed 
to act in order to preserve its status in the international system.3  
Evaluating perceptions is therefore hard to escape. Power, a fundamental concept 
of International Relations, is itself highly dependent on perceptual factors, as a 
consensus on its measurement remains elusive. “The corollary of a perceptual 
                                                          
1 Zakaria, F. (1998), From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, p. 42. 
2 Holsti, K. (1972), International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2nd 
ed., p. 158. 
3 Renshon, J. and S. Renshon (2008), “The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political 
Psychology, 29:4, p. 511. 
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approach to power is the realization that expectations inform policy.”4 In a similar 
vein to numerous other concepts, power means different things to different people. 
There are two dominant traditions in the literature with regards to power 
assessments.  According to Baldwin, the two approaches are “the elements of 
national power approach, which depicts power as resources, and the relational 
power approach, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship.”5  
The main deficiency of the “elements of power” approach, which focuses on 
relative numbers of resources available, is its inability to capture the extent to 
which these resources are actually translated to influence in the international 
arena. In the final analysis, the possession of resources means little to analysts and 
policy-makers alike, if these resources cannot be deployed to change or otherwise 
affect state behavior. The “relational power” approach, developed by behavioral 
political scientists, captures this crucial aspect of power,6 though the multitude of 
external and internal, state-level variables affecting its measurement render it 
contingent to subjective assessments and hence, vulnerable to misperception. 
Yet, perceptions remain absent from numerous analyses. Well-established authors 
assess decision-making processes with an implicit assumption that leaders 
understand well the core variables of their strategic environment, from the 
strength of allied commitments to enemy capabilities. This model, articulated in 
the seminal “Essence of Decision,” leaves little room for psychological 
deficiencies or personal traits affecting the decision-making process.7 Allison and 
                                                          
4 Wohlforth, W. (1994), “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, 19:3, p. 98.  
5 Baldwin, D. (2002), “Power and International Relations,” in W. Carlsnaes et. al (eds.), Handbook of 
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6 Lasswell, H. and A. Kaplan (1950), Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven, CT: 
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Zelikow assume, in their rational actor model, that states are consistent in their 
pursuit of “national security and national interests” in the face of external threats 
and opportunities.8 Friedberg notes that “assessment through rational calculation 
plays the part of a reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective 
change to adaptive behavior.”9 
Indeed, from Thucydides to Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz,10 prominent 
International Relations scholars have constructed models of international politics 
based on the premise that decision makers are in a position to accurately perceive 
parameters such as balances of power, selecting their responses on the basis of a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.11 Threats and opportunities emanating from 
the operational environment are therefore assumed to be perceptible and 
efficiently incorporated by leaders in their decisions. In many of these works, 
moreover, an assumption of perfect rationality is implied. This means that 
decisions are taken to maximize utility based on perfect information concerning 
all available options and their consequences. War would be a rare phenomenon, 
if this assumption were true, as actors would be in a position to predict outcomes, 
while losers would have a strong incentive to bargain in order to avoid conflict.12  
 
 
                                                          
8 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. 
9 Friedberg, A. (1988), The Weary Titan:  Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, Princeton, 
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3.2: Perceptions Come to the Fore 
Empirical evidence indicates that the real world functions quite differently, with 
accurate perceptions often being elusive in decision-making. This is surprising, 
considering the capacity of modern states to undertake assessments of enemy 
capabilities, but it seems that wars attributed to misperception are increasing, 
rather than decreasing. Using the Correlates of War (COW), Militarized Interstate 
Dispute (MID), and National Material Capabilities (NMC) databases, Lindley and 
Schildkraut found that the utility of wars is actually declining over time. Whereas 
initiators won 55% of the 79 major interstate wars between 1815 and 1991, their 
success rate has dropped to 33% since 1945.13 Despite the observed decline of 
successful war initiations, “states initiate wars at an increasing to steady (since 
1920) rate over time.”14 This implies that states miscalculate at an increasing rate, 
with leaders’ misperceptions being the prime suspect for this deficiency. 
Rational models, therefore, resort to simplifications that obscure decision-making 
analysis. This is hardly surprising. While variables such as the actual distribution 
of power and balances of capabilities assist in understanding broad, long-term 
historical trends, decisions are reached by individuals based on a set of informed, 
though ultimately subjective and uncertain, perceptions. Generally, perceptions 
refer to “the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognizing and 
interpreting what is processed.”15 Leaders, like all humans, possess a limited 
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capacity to process information and stimuli (their rationality is bounded).16 
Heuristics and cognitive filters are therefore employed in order to interpret 
incoming data, make inferences, manage uncertainty and generate threat 
perceptions.17 Eden’s perceptions of his country’s decline were undoubtedly 
accurate, though it has to be stressed that accurate perceptions do not inescapably 
lead to appropriate and effective policies. While the salience of perceptions is 
undeniable, there have been historical instances in which the possession of either 
accurate or erroneous perceptions simply did not make a difference.  
France and Britain, for example, underestimated Hitler’s belligerence prior to the 
outbreak of World War II. Scholars argued, however, that a timely military build-
up would have been inconsequential, with studies converging to the notion that 
the German leader would start a war irrespective of other actors’ actions.18 While 
counterfactuals are a risky undertaking, Schweller’s hypothesis involving Stalin’s 
perception of the distribution of power possesses an equally compelling logic: “it  
would  have  been  far  better  for  the  Soviets  to  have  balanced against, rather 
than bandwagoned with,  Germany. In that case Stalin would have presented 
Hitler with the prospect of a two-front war, seriously undermining the Fuhrer’s 
strategy and perhaps causing its abandonment. But because he mistakenly 
perceived Europe as a tripolar, not a bipolar, system with France and Britain as 
the third pole, Stalin expected a war of attrition in the West.”19  
                                                          
16 Jones, B. (1999), “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2:1, pp. 297-321. 
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At the same time, highly inaccurate perceptions can also lead to peaceful 
outcomes. A government, hypothetically, decides to appease a competitor because 
it erroneously believes that it has become too powerful to challenge. War can 
thereby be averted and misperception could actually contribute to the maintenance 
of peace. It goes without saying, however, that in the long-term, policies based on 
erroneous perceptions are unlikely to yield optimal outcomes. As Louis Halle, a 
former U.S. State Department bureaucrat suggests, foreign policies address 
themselves to “the image of the external world” as it is perceived in the minds of 
policymakers, an image which may, or may not, reflect real conditions. Halle 
warns that if “the image is false, actually and philosophically false, no technicians, 
however proficient, can make the policy that is based on it sound.”20 
The fear that perceptions of policy planners may not adequately capture reality is 
related to the association of misperceptions with conflict. Wohlforth compared 
measures of power with actual perceptions in the case of Russia before the advent 
of World War I.21 He concluded that the disparity between actual estimators and 
perceptions was surprisingly extensive.22 Leaders had grossly and systematically 
overestimated Russia’s power, leading to an unwarranted spiral of enhanced threat 
perceptions and escalation. While it is debatable whether an accurate depiction of 
Russian power would lead to peace in Europe, the pervasive misperceptions in the 
run up to the outbreak of the Great War acted as a catalyst towards escalation. 
Indeed, if Michael Howard is correct to suggest that the origins of most wars can 
be traced in “perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears 
                                                          
20 Halle, L. (1960), American Foreign Policy, London: Allen and Unwin, p. 318.  
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22 Ibid, p. 354. 
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for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own,”23 then the importance of 
perceptions becomes apparent, particularly in historical instances of increased 
uncertainty, as in the case of power transitions and shifting alliances.   
 
3.3: The Evolution of Cognitive Research  
in International Relations 
After the end of the Second World War, in an effort to shed light on this previously 
underappreciated factor and its impact on international politics, perceptions 
became the object of scrutiny by International Relations scholars. The study of 
perceptions, however, is only part of the wider “psychological” literature in 
international politics, which originated in the interwar period. Indeed, the 
cognitive literature can be traced as far back as the 1930s, when most 
contributions in the field came from social psychologists, rather than political 
scientists. Jack Levy reminds us that “following Freud’s emphasis on aggressive 
instincts as the root cause of war, (Einstein and Freud, 1932), there was 
considerable interest in applying psychoanalytic perspectives to the study of war 
(Durbin and Bowlby, 1939).”24 As a result, a number of psychological treatises 
investigated “nationalist” and “aggressive” attitudes, without delving deeper into 
the policy-relevant aspects of these societal-level traits. This shortcoming can 
potentially explain the relatively weak impact these initial efforts had on 
mainstream studies of war and peace.25  
                                                          
23 Howard, M. (1983), The Causes of Wars, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 18. 
24 Levy, J. (2003), “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in D. Sears et. al., (eds.), Oxford Handbook of 
Political Psychology, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 256.  
25 Einstein, A. and S. Freud (1932), Why War?, Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation; Droba, 
D. (1931), “Effect of various factors on militarism-pacifism,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 26:2, 
pp. 141-153; Stagner, R. (1942), “Some factors related to attitudes toward war, 1938”, Journal of Social 
Psychology, 16:1, pp. 131-142.  
34 
 
This is not to suggest that these forays in the political manifestations of the psyche 
were unhelpful. Alexander and Juliette George, for example, provided a highly 
detailed narrative in their quest to explain Woodrow Wilson’s self-defeating 
leadership style.26 Wilson’s non-rational personality characteristics, of which he 
was deeply unaware, were skilfully depicted and were shown to have allegedly 
played an important role in the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles.27 Lasswell’s 
“compensation” theory from the late 1940s was employed as a point of 
departure.28  Wilson’s struggle to compensate for his problematic self-esteem 
during childhood had led to the creation of an excessively uncompromising 
mindset which was activated in critical political battles with adverse results.  
George and George presented a compelling case, suggesting that Wilson’s 
unconscious battle against the memory of his overbearing father could actually 
have had an impact on world affairs.29 Similar psycho-biographical works were 
characterized by great detail and were ground-breaking for their time. However, 
their main weakness was that they could not generate widely applicable (and 
testable) theoretical propositions. In any case, they were successful in shifting the 
attention of political scientists to the workings of decision-makers’ minds. Maybe 
in part thanks to the stimulus provided by these efforts, the emancipation of 
cognitive psychology, with concepts and methods tailored to a policy-making 
context, would soon follow to firmly establish the political psychology discipline. 
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The subsequent “cognitive revolution” in political psychology brought a 
voluminous literature on decision making which directly addressed outcomes in 
foreign policy by examining the motives, preferences and values of policy makers. 
A crucial assumption of these contributions was the complexity of cognitive and 
affective processes which construct images and ideas. No predictions could be 
made about how the material world is perceived in the ideational world, with 
scholars encouraged to ascertain empirically how individuals perceive a situation, 
process stimuli and reach decisions.30 Gradually, more focused concepts such as 
“belief systems,” “images” and “perceptions” were incorporated in various 
analytical frameworks and applied to a diverse set of case-studies.31  
The proliferation of cognitive psychological studies affected political science in a 
profound manner. It emphasized that individuals systematically deviate from the 
abstract rational model they purportedly follow. An inner need to simplify reality, 
avoid dissonance and tackle uncertainty, “forces” decision-makers to employ 
mechanisms such as the processes of estimation and attribution which undermine 
their capacity to make rational choices, at least in an absolute sense.32 By shedding 
light on “the structures and processes within the individual’s mind that are said to 
play the major role in behaviour,”33 these undertakings offered valuable insight. 
For instance, the concepts of cognitive closure and consistency provided a 
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decision-making,” International Studies Quarterly, 13:2, pp. 190-222; De Rivera, J. (1968), The psychological 
dimension of foreign policy, Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill; Holsti, International Politics; Snyder, R. et. al, 
(eds.) (1962), Foreign policy decision-making: An approach to the study of international politics, Glencoe, IL: 
Free Press. 
32 Dawes, R. (1998), “Judgment and choice,” in D. Gilbert et. al. (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, New 
York: McGraw Hill, 4th ed., pp. 497-548; Kahneman, D. et. al. (eds.) (1982), Judgement under uncertainty:  
Heuristics and biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
33 Sampson, E. (1981), “Cognitive Psychology as Ideology,” American Psychologist, 36:7, p. 730.  
36 
 
plausible explanation in occasions where leaders insisted in supporting prior 
assessments in the face of contradicting evidence before,34 and even after, their 
predictions had proven to be erroneous.35 
Before analyzing the concept of perception, it would be useful to mention the role 
of images and beliefs in shaping perceptions. Initially, these concepts were not 
analytically distinguished, but as research progressed in political psychology, the 
concepts of perception and misperception were analytically decoupled from the 
more generic concepts of beliefs and images. There is a strong relationship 
between the latter. A “belief system” entails a “system of empirical and normative 
ideas about reality. The “belief system” concept thus denotes the complete world 
view, whereas “image” as used here refers to a part of this totality.”36  
In international politics, according to Boulding, the image of the “other” depends 
on two factors: 1) whether the country in question is an ally or an enemy 
(perceived threats and opportunities respectively and 2) the capabilities of the 
actor in question.37 Hermann et. al. built on the psychological concept of schema38 
and suggested that the aforementioned factors are not unrelated to the cultural 
dimension, but interact in meaningful ways, creating images that are drawn upon 
                                                          
34 Anderson, C. et al. (1980), “Perseverance of social theories: The role of explanation in the persistence of 
discredited information,” Journal of personality and social psychology, 39:6, pp. 1037-1049. 
35 Tetlock, P. (1998), “Social Psychology and World Politics,” in Gilbert et. al., Handbook of Social Psychology, 
pp. 868-912. 
36 Brodin, K. (1972), “Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy: A presentation of two alternative models 
for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making,” Cooperation and Conflict, 7:1, p. 97.  
37 Boulding, K. (1969), “National Images and International Systems,” in J. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics 
and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, revised ed., pp. 422-431.  
38 The “schema” concept is widely used in cognitive psychology and it refers to a “an abstract or generic 
knowledge structure, stored in memory, that specifies the defining features and relevant attributes of some 
stimulus domain, and the interrelations among those attributes…Social schemas may be representations of types 
of people, social roles, or events.” See Crocker, J. et. al. (1984), “Schematic Bases of Belief Change,” in J. 
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37 
 
each time the perceiver seeks to interpret an action undertaken by another actor.39 
The implication is that images provide cognitive structures describing sequences 
of events to individuals upholding them, irrespective of whether enough evidence 
exists to invoke the specific image.  
Scholars have demonstrated the potential impact of images on threat perception. 
The effects of “diabolical enemy images, “moral self-images,” and even “the 
image of the adversary’s image of oneself” have been the object of scrutiny by 
scholars such as Ralph White and Richard Lebow, who suggested that images 
affect leadership estimates of enemy intentions. Moreover, images affect 
calculations regarding potential repercussions of leaders’ own actions.40 Analyses 
of images across case studies indicates that they indeed affect outcomes in 
international politics and can affect decisively developments in critical events. 
Levy and Thompson provide a telling example during the Cuban Missile Crisis:  
“Kennedy believed that the sequencing of coercive and conciliatory behavior was 
critical in achieving his objectives. While Kennedy was quite willing to be 
conciliatory toward Khrushchev, the president also believed that it was essential 
to begin with coercive threats and actions at the onset of the crisis, in order to 
demonstrate his own credibility and reverse any image of weakness in the mind 
of the adversary – images that Kennedy believed, correctly, that Khrushchev had 
taken away from their June 1991 summit meeting in Vienna.”41 
                                                          
39 Herrmann, R. et. al. (1997), “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive 
Schemata,” International Studies Quarterly, 41:3, p. 408.  
40 White, R. (1970), Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars, Garden City, N. Y.: 
Anchor Books; Lebow, R. (1981), Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press. 
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The manner in which images affect beliefs is far from straightforward. During the 
Cold War, a number of scholars supported the notion that hostile images of the 
Soviet Union had a profound impact on American foreign policy beliefs, whether 
related to the USSR or not.42 Murray and Cowden focused on American elite 
belief change between 1988 and 1992 and found that after particular events, 
leaders were capable of updating their “images” of the USSR in specific domains, 
such as the strategy of containment and the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe. 
Nevertheless, wider beliefs about how the U.S. should conduct itself in 
international affairs were far more rigid, remaining largely unaffected.43 
Nevertheless, beliefs play an important role in the formation of perceptions about 
how the world works more generally and about conflictual interactions with the 
enemy, more specifically. This is because the perception of threats depends both 
on the actual conditions of the situation and the pre-existing beliefs of the decision 
maker(s).44 Beliefs have been employed in various approaches, with the 
“operational code” literature standing as the most influential. In George’s 
reformulation of Leites’ “operational code” concept,45 a set of “master beliefs” 
establishes a framework through which leaders make sense of the political 
world.46 These are philosophical beliefs on the nature of conflict and politics, as 
well as instrumental beliefs regarding the effectiveness of alternative strategies 
towards achieving one’s goals. In essence, the “operational code” paradigm tries 
                                                          
42 Hurwitz, J. and M. Peffley (1987), “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model,” 
American Political Science Review, 81:4, pp. 1099-1120; Hurwitz, J. and M. Peffley (1990), “Public Images of 
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44 Jervis, R. (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
45 Leites, N. (1951), The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York: McGraw Hill. 
46 George, “The Operational Code.”” 
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to isolate the most politically relevant elements of a leader’s “cognitive map” and 
derive a set of beliefs about politics. George’s article generated substantial interest 
in the academic community, with a large number of subsequent efforts attempting 
to identify the “operational codes” of various leaders.47  
Overall, the transposition of psychological concepts from the individual level to a 
policy making context was not without its problems. Notable scholars emphasized 
from an early point the shortcomings of these narratives. Alexander George, for 
instance, cautioned in applying the Operational Code paradigm48 in the study of 
international politics by asserting that “such a belief system influences, but does 
not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only 
variable that shapes decision-making behaviour.”49 Other scholars had also 
warned against a transposition of individual cognitive models to the interstate 
level. Katarina Brodin, for instance suggested that “the hypotheses generated by 
this type of model are of little interest, if the objective is trying to explain the 
action of states in foreign policy and testing them empirically.”50  
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Indicatively: Selim, M. (1979), “The Operational Code Belief System and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
The Case of Gamal Abdel Nasser,” PhD Dissertation, Carleton University; Walker, S. (1977), “The Interface 
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49 George, “The “Operational Code””, p. 191. 
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3.4: Towards Conceptualizing Perceptions 
Moving on to the concepts of perception and misperception, a crucial question 
concerns the distinctive types of perceptions that should matter to analysts of 
international politics. According to Levy: “Misperceptions are commonplace; but 
little attention has been given to the question of what kinds of misperceptions are 
most likely to lead to war, and to the specific theoretical linkages through which 
they operate.”51 The answer appears to be straightforward: when it comes to 
choices of war and peace, perceptions regarding the threat posed by another actor 
should be central to analyses. For Thucydides and many of his followers in the 
discipline, power (and military power in particular) was used as a measure of 
threat. Thus, according to Thucydides, who dedicated a substantial portion of his 
work assessing the relative military power of the two rivals, the rise of Athenian 
maritime prowess was considered to be an adequate threat indicator for Spartan 
generals. Spartans are shown to contemplate on the relative power trend, which 
clearly favoured Athens, and responded accordingly, by launching a pre-emptive 
strike before the relative gap became prohibitive to aspiring challengers:  
“To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account 
of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have 
to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such 
magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept 
out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired 
in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.”52 
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52 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, (Book I, ch. 23).  
41 
 
John Mearsheimer and the school of offensive realism insist that power alone 
should still define threat perceptions, as intentions can never be assessed with 
absolute certainty.53 While power and capabilities remain a pre-eminent yardstick 
in threat assessments, contemporary literature accords intentions an equally 
important role in defining threat perceptions. Scholars such as Stephen Walt 
present a convincing argument when they suggest that intentions are central to 
threat perceptions and can greatly affect decisions over war and peace.54 
Perceptions of third party intentions have also affected outcomes in international 
politics. Saddam Hussein was surprised to see the United States intervene after he 
annexed Kuwait in 1990 and was equally shocked by the opposition of other Arab 
states participating in the U.S. led coalition against Iraq.55  
An entire series of contributions analyzing concepts such as “deterrence” and 
“signaling” was borne out of a well-anchored understanding that perceptions of 
intentions, whether accurate or unfounded, are paramount in assessing threats in 
world politics.56 The same studies, however, established the difficulty of 
communicating (and therefore perceiving) intentions in an environment of 
pervasive uncertainty. “Deterrence theorists tend to ignore difficulties that might 
be associated with the actual signalling process…Everyone is thought to 
understand, so to speak, the meaning of fierce guard dogs, barbed wire and ‘No 
Trespassing’ signs. In practice, however, this may not be so.”57  
                                                          
53 Mearscheimer, J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, p. 31. 
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Despite the methodological difficulties, it is certain that there is no turning back 
with regards to the incorporation of perceptions in I.R. paradigms. Recently, 
perceptions were accorded a prominent position in Realist works, traditionally 
reluctant to delve into the “black box” of the state. The impact of power on foreign 
policy is now considered more complex than previously thought, because 
“systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit 
level,”58 suggesting specifically, that it is leaders’ perceptions of relative power 
that affect policy-making, not “simply relative quantities of physical resources or 
forces in being.”59 Zakaria noted that U.S. “statesmen's perceptions of national 
power shift[ed] suddenly, rather than incrementally, and [were] shaped more by 
crises and galvanizing events like wars than by statistical measures.”60  
In extreme cases, perceptual shocks render statesmen aware of cumulative effects 
of long-term power trends, forcing them to adapt to all new circumstances.61 
Similarly, Christensen described how Britain's collapse in 1947 forced the 
Truman administration to recognize the bipolar distribution of power and brought 
about the active containment of the Soviet Union.62 Thus, perceptions have now 
been accorded a central place in the literature, even though the specific 
mechanisms through which perceptions affect outcomes remain underspecified. 
On a final note, it is worth considering whether these developments actually 
contradict mainstream theories. At first glance, paradigms such as Realism would 
appear to be less than compatible with psychological narratives of international 
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politics. Upon closer inspection, however, an observer can discern the necessary 
“space” for the inclusion of perceptual factors related to decision-making. Even 
though he chose not to delve into psychological variables, Morgenthau declared 
that “our civilization assumes that the social world is susceptible to rational 
control conceived after the model of the natural sciences, while the experiences, 
domestic and international, of the age contradict this assumption.63 At another 
point he conceded that “the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological 
justifications and rationalizations. The deeper the individual is involved in the 
power struggle, the less likely he is to see the power struggle for what it is.”64 
Classical Realist prescriptions for prudence indicated that the school of thought 
did not consider international politics to be characterized by universal rationality. 
Early studies of the “security dilemma,” a core concept in International Relations, 
suggested in even clearer terms that interaction between actors at the international 
level could be marred by pervasive irrationalities.65 More recently, Waltz, 
responding to Keohane’s view that rationality is one of the key assumptions in the 
Realist research program, asserted that political leaders cannot be assumed to 
make “the nicely calculated decisions that the word 'rationality' suggests.”66 
Perceptions, therefore fill a carefully carved niche, located between systemic 
variables and actual foreign policy outcomes.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
Crises, Perceptions and War 
 
4.1: Crises and Misperception in International Politics 
Wars rarely arise out of the blue. They usually constitute the “final episode” in a 
process that begins with a conflict of interest, leading to disputes, crises and 
finally escalates to armed conflict.1 According to Vasquez, wars “do not break out 
unless there has been a long history of conflict and hostility between disputants.”2 
The underlying hypothesis is that suspicion and threat perceptions are enhanced 
due to crises. Bolstered by the increasing influence of hardliners domestically, 
conditions become ripe for the onset of hostilities. Crises, therefore, constitute 
instances where psychological variables cannot be ignored. Holsti suggested that 
cognitive approaches would be most useful when employed in situations 
characterized by stress, complex, ambiguous, or unanticipated circumstances, as 
well as for decisions made by individuals at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid.3 
If one or more of these conditions are met, decisions are likely to be heavily 
affected by the “cognitive maps,” the set of psychological predispositions of 
individuals.4 
Whereas what states do before the crisis is crucial towards understanding why 
crises occur, the actions of states during a crisis determine whether the incident 
actually escalates to open warfare.5 Possessing accurate perceptions, therefore, 
                                                          
1 Bremer, S. and T. Cusack, The Process of War, Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1995. 
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during a tense crisis can be paramount towards avoiding unwanted hostilities. This 
is easier said than done, however, considering the intrinsic characteristics of 
interstate crises. Political scientists have not reached an agreement on the 
definition of crises, but Lebow suggested three operational criteria for identifying 
crisis episodes, which appear to be satisfied across the majority of case studies in 
the relevant literature:6  
1) Policy-makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another 
international actor seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country’s 
bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in power. 
2) Policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part designed to counter this 
threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of war. 
3) Policy-makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints.  
Scholars are understandably pessimistic with regards to crises and the potential 
for rational thinking that could lead to de-escalation. This is due to the impact of 
stress, a fundamental characteristic of crises, on decision-making. Conditions of 
stress “increase cognitive rigidity, reduce the ability to make subtle distinctions, 
reduce creativity, and increase the selective filtering of information. Stress leads 
to a reduction in the number of alternative options that people consider. It also 
affects search, and results in the dominance of search activity by predispositions, 
prior images, and historical analogies rather than by a more balanced assessment 
of the evidence.”7 Empirically, supporting evidence has been provided by 
scholars, who suggest that successive crises between antagonistic states 
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“significantly increase international tension and expectation of war.”8 Analysts 
are justified therefore, to fear that crises can increase the probability for escalation 
and war.  
While research on stress and cognition has predominantly focused on the adverse 
effects of anxiety on learning, challenging conditions have also been shown to 
promote deep learning under certain conditions.9 An important caveat here is that 
optimal cognitive performance depends on the existence of an intermediate level 
of “arousal” (stress). Small levels of emotional intensity have little or no effect on 
the mental state of decision-makers, while excessive levels of stress have the 
opposite effect, compromising physical and mental self-control.10 This 
assumption lies at the core of the Yerkes-Dodson law, which stipulates that the 
relationship between arousal and performance resembles a bell-shaped curve.11 
Yerkes and Dodson calculated the rate at which mice learned to navigate a maze, 
observing that “learning” became optimal at levels of moderate stimulation. When 
stress induced exceeded a certain point, the capacity of mice to “learn” was 
impaired. Although psychologists still disagree on the correct specification of the 
Yerkes-Dodson law, the relationship has been subjected to multiple tests which 
verified its validity. A substantial number of these tests involved human beings.12  
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Indeed, this is one of the few relationships in psychology that have been accorded 
with the status of “law”.13 The arousal-performance relationship elaborated by the 
Yerkes-Dodson law is attributed by psychologists to the availability and limit of 
cognitive resources devoted to the task at hand.14 In short, low levels of arousal 
are associated with short attention spans, the persistence of biases and other 
barriers to optimal decision-making. In other words, individuals do not commit 
their cognitive processing mechanisms to gathering and properly processing all 
relevant information. Crucial details may thus be omitted and decisions may be 
reached based on pre-existing perceptions (which may or may not be relevant to 
the current situation). The capacity for problem-solving is improved when stress 
levels increase, as the individual intensifies the effort to gather and process 
information. Excessive levels, however, of stress have been shown to impair brain 
function, by posing an adverse effect on the decision-maker’s capacity to organize 
inferential thought processes, evaluate the relative merits of potential outcomes, 
and generally undertake a rational cost-benefit analysis.15 Extreme levels of stress 
may even lead to aggression or complete paralysis.16  
Early case study research indicated that stressful situations in international politics 
were characterized by severe misperceptions. Military historians, in particular, 
were the first to investigate misperception during crises and conflicts. Confronted 
with the recurrent inability of governments to respond effectively to warnings of 
an impending attack, scholars examined such instances as the Japanese attack on 
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Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Korean War to produce a voluminous 
empirical literature on intelligence failures.17 The ensuing literature on strategic 
surprise produced numerous insights on the intensity and impact of misperception 
during crises. In 1962, an inquiry appeared which sought to employ certain 
cognitive concepts in an effort to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
strategic surprise. Roberta Wohlstetter’s “Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision” 
focused on a single historical event.18 The core tenet was that the Pearl Harbor 
surprise occurred not because intelligence was absent, but because signals, 
although received, had been either ignored or erroneously interpreted. 19  
Wohlstetter’s work raised the level of discussion beyond the role of actors and 
agency, emphasizing the perceptual bases of decision making. More specifically, 
Wohlstetter tackled the psychological notion that decision makers operate within 
the context of predispositions that effectively function as a screen through which 
information is filtered.20 Policy makers, eager to fit new data into their pre-
existing convictions, were adamant that a Japanese attack on American soil was 
unlikely as long as the United States maintained overall military superiority vis-
à-vis Japan.21  
Crises, by definition, are decision-making environments which should be even 
more vulnerable to cognitive deficits.22 As a result, “ambiguous or  even  
discrepant  information  is  ignored,  misperceived,  or  reinterpreted  so  that  it  
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does minimum  damage  to  what  the  person  already  believes.”23 In 1940, British 
military planners were so certain that Germany would not challenge their naval 
superiority, that they ignored the information, coming from German soldiers 
themselves, that they were on their way to attack Norway.24 While the intelligence 
failure literature dealt with a specific form of misperception, the inability to detect 
the imminence of hostilities, a body of research on “non-rational” perspectives on 
security was born and had acknowledged, for the first time, a key role for 
(mis)perception in crises.25  
Lebow made an important distinction between motivated and unmotivated 
sources of misperception.26 Unmotivated (or cognitive) biases refer to the 
influence of an individual’s predispositions, independent of interests or emotional 
influences. Motivated biases, on the other hand, are generated by fears or desires 
and aim at maintaining self-esteem or advancing one’s goals. In critical instances, 
motivated biases constitute defensive mechanisms against risk and danger.27 
Motivated biases are clearly identifiable in interstate deterrence crises, for 
example. Confronted with pressing situations and acute dilemmas, policy-makers 
“force” themselves to regard their goals as attainable. As a result, they dismiss 
threat assessments and signals that contradict their miscalculations.  
In “Psychology and Deterrence,” Lebow attributes the onset of the Falklands War 
to “perceptual distortion” by both Argentina and the United Kingdom, concluding 
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that denial, selective attention and other cognitive shortcomings seem to be 
pervasive in critical instances, rendering rational deterrence an illusion.28 Various 
other treatises explored misperceptions in connection to the outbreak of major 
wars. Robert North, Ole Holsti and others, showcased that before the outbreak of 
the First World War, perceptions of hostile intentions were exaggerated by all 
sides.29 George and Smoke’s study of deterrence in American foreign policy 
indicated the pervasive difficulties in transmitting and interpreting signals during 
security crises, some of which arise from cognitive contexts created by cultural 
barriers.30  
Capabilities are equally vulnerable to misperception as they can only be 
accurately ascertained in the battlefield.31 Characteristics such as the quality of 
control and communications systems, morale and the ability to integrate 
effectively new weapon systems are particularly hard to assess outside the 
battlefield. The consequences can be grave. Blainey and Stoessinger identified 
military overconfidence deriving from the underestimation of the adversary's 
capabilities or over-estimation of one’s own capabilities as a plausible cause of 
war.32 Before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, for example, the Israelis 
downplayed the capacity of Egypt to successfully undertake offensive operations, 
by assuming that Egyptians would not resort to war unless they had attained air 
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superiority, or the capacity to support military operations on the ground with their 
air-force.33 Anwar Sadat, however, planned around the Israeli deterrent and 
undertook a limited ground strike along the Suez Canal, which was initially 
successful.  The existence of one type of misperception does not preclude the 
existence of another. In the last case mentioned, one has to note that the Israelis 
failed to evaluate the Egyptian motivation to change the status quo, which 
Egyptian leaders considered unacceptable.34   
Interestingly, misperception of one’s own capabilities may lead to calculations 
that not only fail in predicting the likely outcome of war, but also grossly 
underestimate its cost in economic terms. David Lake investigated U.S. and Iraqi 
attitudes before the 2003 Iraq war and concluded that both countries failed to 
update prior beliefs regarding intentions and capabilities of the other. Even more 
surprisingly, considering the quality and extent of resources available to American 
planners, “misrepresentation by the other side was far less of a problem than self-
delusion.”35 Saddam’s overconfidence in the capacity of his army to resist an 
American incursion was apparently matched by systematically baseless estimates 
in Washington about the military and economic resources necessary to attain 
victory.  
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4.2: Towards a Systematic Study of  
Misperception in Crises 
A shortcoming of the majority of forays exploring misperception in crises was 
that the narrative sought to explain outcomes in terms of the particular conditions 
of the case study under scrutiny. The need to integrate case studies into a broader 
theoretical framework would be satisfied by Robert Jervis, with his systematic 
study of the relationship between psychological variables and security policy-
making. Jervis’s departure signals the birth of a truly “political” psychology, 
taking into account the causal dimension of the political environment in which 
decisions are reached. In 1968, Jervis wrote an article under the title “Hypotheses 
on Misperception” which stressed the possibility that conflict can arise not only 
due to “greed” and aggression, which are of course existent in international 
politics, but because of a tragic turn of events, brought about by states that 
undermine their own security in their quest to enhance it.36 This is because leaders 
may see what they expect, or fear, to see when another actor takes an initiative 
aiming at solidifying the status quo, leading to misperception of other actors’ 
actions and intentions. 
Jervis’s effort reached a climax with his seminal book, “Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics,” in which he reiterates what has been 
known to psychologists all along: cognitive “filters” of information are not only 
endemic to international politics but also common in our daily lives. In a nutshell, 
Jervis suggested that misperception can have substantial explanatory power in 
decisions over war and peace.37 This is possible because leaders may be wedded 
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to their established views and thus oblivious to new information, which is either 
neglected or wrongly interpreted.38 Jervis’s influential contribution was among 
the first of many analyses that theorized on the importance of misperceptions, 
offering insight into the relationship between cognitive factors and policy-
making.39  
However, Jervis’s work reoriented the concept of misperceptions to fit a policy-
making context. Unlike the majority of cognitive contributions that downplayed 
the importance of external conditions, (the strategic circumstances in which 
decisions are reached), Jervis did not posit a causal role for either idiosyncratic 
characteristics or “ideas,” a departure which places his work firmly within the 
International Relations discipline. Cognitive psychologists, on the other hand, 
posit that psychological variables possess a causal status.40 In this regard, Jervis 
managed to “demystify” cognitive processes. In fact, he notes, “the world is so 
complex and our information processes so limited that in significant measure 
people must be theory [belief] driven.”41 Analogies, cognitive shortcuts and past 
experiences may well be employed to make sense of reality, particularly when 
uncertainty is pervasive. However, these psychological mechanisms remain a 
“transmission belt,” a mediating factor between structural conditions and 
decision-making.  
While Jervis was not the first author to qualify the applicability of psychology to 
the study of international politics, he was the first to offer a comprehensive 
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framework for assessing the impact of cognitive shortcomings in international 
politics.  In his most-cited article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” 
Jervis proceeded to exemplify this potential, when he suggested that the 
possession of nuclear weapons and an easily observable division between 
offensive and defensive weaponry can lead to an increased degree of certainty and 
the elimination of the “security dilemma.” It is no coincidence that a theoretical 
school of adherents to this perspective (defensive realists) maintain that credibility 
and intentions can be accurately signaled and perceived. Defensive Realists do 
not of course suggest that uncertainty can be eliminated. Schelling correctly 
emphasized that if all cases of deterrence were successful, international politics 
would resemble domestic politics. “But uncertainty exists…Not all the frontiers 
and thresholds are precisely defined, fully reliable and known to be so beyond the 
least temptation to test them out.”42  
Overall, Jervis’s work drew a line between “psychological explanations” of 
international politics, created by generalizing from individual-based cognitive 
theories and systematic appraisals of the impact of psychological factors. The 
implications were far-reaching. The notion, in cognitive narratives, that 
“psychological principles can be invoked in vacuo i.e., apart from their economic, 
political, or sociological context”43 was severely, and justifiably, qualified. 
Perceptions, therefore, should be regarded as a mediating factor through which 
information is filtered. For this reason, they do not a priori constitute a set of 
“distorting lenses” which condemn actors to sub-optimal choices.  
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On the contrary, Jervis suggests that cognitive mechanisms are the tools allowing 
humans to remain rational in the face of complexity and stress. “Our  environment  
presents  us with  so many  conflicting  and ambiguous  stimuli  that  we could  
not maintain  a  coherent  view  if  we  did  not  use  our  concepts  and  beliefs  to  
impose some order  on  it.”44 As Tetlock and McGuire admit, “reliance on prior 
beliefs and expectations is not irrational per se (one would expect it from a' good 
Bayesian'); it becomes irrational only when perseverance and denial dominate 
openness and flexibility.”45 The implication is that rationality can be 
approximated through a “recalibration” of perceptions, even under conditions of 
stress and ambiguity. Therefore, despite the danger that policy makers may avoid 
to critically scrutinize preconceived notions when placed under the threat of 
armed force,46 the potential for in-crisis rationality appears to be well-grounded 
in theory.  
 
4.3: Accurate Perceptions and Crises 
While the argument that crises may engender accurate perceptions was never 
systematically explored in the literature, scholars have already shown that 
accurate perceptions can coexist with escalation and even armed conflict. James 
Fearon indicated that in crises, one or both parties may possess private 
information, related to either relative power or the assigned value of the issue at 
stake.47 In this context, actors have to balance their desire to avoid a costly war 
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with their desire to ensure a favourable outcome in this bargaining process. As a 
result, one or both of the actors involved may have an incentive to withhold 
information, by misrepresenting for instance its resolve to fight for the particular 
issue, thereby increasing the probability for escalation and the outbreak of war.48 
This is because escalating steps, such as the mobilization of troops, may generate 
audience costs that render retrenchment excessively costly in political terms.49  
A related, though slightly different situation arises when states choose to bluff by 
concealing their capabilities in an effort to secure a tactical advantage before a 
conflict.50 Consequently, as the cost of indicating the real extent of capabilities 
increases, the danger of conflict is also exacerbated. Hiding intentions is also a 
possibility that generates strategic surprise. A state can acquire a tactical 
advantage by mobilizing or deploying its troops in secret, or calling up its reserves 
without sending a corresponding signal.51 The literature on strategic surprise has 
established firmly the possibility that misperception during crises may not be the 
result of cognitive shortcomings, but be part of a deliberate attempt to acquire an 
advantage which inadvertently increases the chance of armed conflict.52  
Instances interpreted as cases of misperception can be thus viewed under a 
different light. The American failure to detect the Japanese intention to launch a 
first strike during World War II has been interpreted as an instance of careful 
Japanese planning. The Japanese, well-aware of the substantial American 
advantage in the Pacific theatre and the capacity of the United States to block oil 
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supplies, executed this seemingly absurd offensive in an effort to consolidate their 
position in South-East Asia.53 The Japanese were successful in halting American 
advancements in the region for a considerable time, leading to the eventual loss 
of the Philippines and thereby rendering the entire American west coast 
vulnerable to further attacks. Only after the battle of Midway, in early June 1942, 
the Japanese advantage in the Pacific can be safely said to have been nullified.54 
In the case of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israelis could have had a better 
estimate of hostilities, had the Egyptians not deliberately downplayed their 
military capabilities, by “revealing”, for example, that their newly acquired 
weaponry from the USSR was incompatible with existing systems.55  
Overall, psychological narratives often argue that decision-making mechanisms 
are too complex to allow scholars to retain their faith in rationality. “First, many 
of our cognitive processes are inaccessible to us.  People do not know what 
information they use or how they use it.  They think some information is crucial  
when it  is  not  and report  that  they  are  not  influenced  at  all  by  some data  
on  which  in  fact  they  rely.  This makes it easier for them to overestimate the 
sophistication of their thought processes.”56 This may be so, but the argument 
should go both ways: In hindsight, it may be easy to label decisions made by 
leaders as irrational, but cognitive narratives often under-estimate the human 
capacity to deal effectively with demanding, complex situations.57 Psychological 
explanations should avoid broad generalizations and clarify when non-rational 
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factors affected decision-making. Moreover, cognitive narratives often imply a 
rational benchmark, which should also be clarified if scholars intend to generate 
a “systematic consideration of deviations from rationality.”58  
Scholars have produced accounts of decision-making which indicate that rational 
decision-making under stress and ambiguity is a plausible expectation. As early 
as 1961, Sidney Verba had concluded in an influential study that rationality may 
be more closely approximated in emergencies when important values are 
threatened and the time for deliberation is limited.59 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 
moreover, advocated the applicability of a rational, expected utility decision 
making model at the brink of war (though his analysis is not limited to crises).60 
The outcome of both the Cuban Missile Crisis61 and Nasser’s behaviour in 1967 
which led to the Six Day War62 have been suggested as instances of rational 
decision-making during tense interstate crises. Seeing past Nasser’s ultimate 
failure, Mor delved into the calculations of Egypt’s leader in 1967 which revolved 
around his desire to reclaim Egypt’s leadership position in the Arab world without 
escalating to war. Mor asserts that when attention “is shifted from Nasser's failure 
to his objectives and perception of the strategic context, the crisis decisions of the 
Egyptian leader can be shown to have been consistent with strategic rationality.”63 
It was thus neither Nasser’s cognitive deficiencies nor the loss of control in a 
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brinkmanship crisis that brought the Six Day War, which could be attributed to 
Israel’s inability to communicate effectively its red line to the Egyptian leader. 
The possibility that critical incidents may actually enhance the accuracy of 
cognitive mechanisms has also been entertained. Empirical evidence showed that 
crises have an ambiguous impact on escalation dynamics. According to Snyder 
and Diesing “Some crises embitter and worsen subsequent relations, others 
improve them.”64 In extreme cases, signals could even break perceptual barriers, 
forcing a rational “realignment.” Ben-Zvi, upon examining the Sino-Indian 
Border War of 1962, focused on the nature of perceptual discrepancies of Indian 
leaders. He came to the conclusion that before conflict erupted, intentions were 
well known to all sides. The assumption originally held by Indian policy-makers 
was that the Chinese would eventually be pressured by Indian firmness into 
accepting India's point of view regarding the disputed border area. This well-
established conviction was, however, partially abandoned in the face of incoming 
tactical warning signals.65  
By mapping the evolution of cognitive sophistication among Soviet and American 
policymakers, Theodore Raphael suggested that cognitive complexity may be 
reduced before crises, contributing to their initiation. However, cognitive 
complexity may well be reinstated during interstate crises with substantial 
benefits regarding the prospects for a peaceful resolution. Raphael showed that 
during the tense superpower crises in Berlin in 1946 and 1962, the capacity of 
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decision makers to undertake sophisticated analyses increased as the crisis 
progressed, contributing decisively to the eventual de-escalation.66  
Therefore, conditions of stress associated with the limited time horizon and the 
high stakes related to the issue at hand, may create an environment which 
enhances the capacity for rational decision-making. Levite accordingly concludes 
that: “strategic warning originating in reliable sources has a demonstrated 
capacity to overcome barriers to receptivity, force its way to and impose itself on 
policy makers, thereby potentially preventing [complete] surprise (although not 
unpreparedness) from taking place.”67 Overall, cognitive contributions may 
downplay the capacity of decision-making units to predicate their behavior on the 
actual conditions they face, overcoming deceptive tactics, noise and uncertainty 
in crises.68 Thus, despite the psychological dangers of stressful circumstances, 
there is ground for optimism. 
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Chapter 5: 
 
Research Design 
 
 
5.1: Methodology: Overview and Justification 
The nature of the variables to be examined renders a qualitative case study 
approach an appropriate avenue for the particular project. According to Gerring, 
a case study is an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding 
a larger class of (similar) units,” where a unit denotes a “spatially bounded 
phenomenon,” which is “observed at a single point in time or over some delimited 
period of time.”1 Although a number of scholars argue that case studies cannot by 
themselves test theories2 a consensus is gradually formed around the notion that 
a small number of case studies can successfully be employed to test any theory 
that generates specific hypotheses.3 In this project, a process-tracing methodology 
(a sub-type of case study research) will be employed to test the theoretical 
hypotheses regarding the impact of interstate crises on leadership perceptions.  
King, Keohane, and Verba define process tracing most simply as a 
methodological approach providing an account of causality through identifying 
causal mechanisms.4 “Thick description explores the unfolding of complex 
historical factors and contingencies and places a premium on selecting cases that 
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are clearly significant, even if singular.”5 Process tracing is thus a tool of 
qualitative analysis, aiming at identifying, validating and refining causal inference 
within case studies in a theoretically informed way. In a similar vein, George and 
Bennett defined process tracing as a “method [that] attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism- between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”6  
In selected case studies, diagnostic pieces of evidence, called causal-process 
observations, are examined as part of a temporal sequence of events in an effort 
to support or overturn explanatory hypotheses. Process tracing is widely used due 
to its “explicit focus on using the strengths of case studies - their rich detail, ability 
to chart the sequence of variables and sensitivity to the direction of causality.”7 
George and Bennett distinguish between process-tracing and historical narrative 
by asserting that process-tracing “requires converting a purely historical account 
that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in 
theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design.”8 
Numerous phenomena in the social sciences involve complex causal dynamics 
and this complexity may result in poor case selection and flawed inferences.9 
Unsurprisingly, international relations theories are almost never monocausal. 
Wohlforth points out that “the claim is rarely “A, not B, caused E,” but rather 
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“both A and B caused E but A was more important.”10 The use of process tracing, 
beyond its utility in adjudicating among alternative hypotheses, can yield a more 
nuanced descriptive understanding through the close engagement with cases, 
which eventually strengthens causal inference. In this regard, process-tracing will 
be employed to both establish and assess the severity and direction of the impact 
of crises on leadership perceptions. The selected methodology in this research 
project allows for a detailed narrative which aims at a) establishing causality, b) 
measuring the degree of change in dependent variables (leadership perceptions) 
and c) assessment of the direction of that change (more/less accurate perceptions).  
 
5.2: Addressing Rationality  
In a research project that aims to assess the rationality (or lack thereof) in decision-
making, defining what “rational” thinking is all about constitutes a fundamental 
obligation of a research design discussion. This becomes more important when 
one considers the lack of consensus among social scientists on the definition of 
rationality. An instrumental conception of rationality is an appropriate choice for 
the specific goals of the project, as it will allow analysis to focus not on what the 
policy goals of leaders are, but on whether decision-makers select the best means 
available to them, under constraints, in order to achieve their objectives. 
According to Stein, “the minimal, commonsensical requirements of rationality in 
foreign policy decision-making expect that policy makers can learn from history, 
that they can draw some propositions from the past and apply these propositions 
in an appropriate way to the future as they weigh the likely consequences of the 
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options they face.”11 This fundamental yardstick of rationality will be the implicit 
guide of analysis throughout the evaluation of selected case studies.  
Therefore, “the rationality assumption tells us nothing about how actors form their 
preferences, but rather shows how actors behave, given their preferences.”12 This 
approach is particularly suitable for evaluating decision-making under conditions 
of crisis. Due to the short time frame and specific issue area context of such 
incidents, the preferences of actors are, more often than not, clearly discernible 
and stable for the duration of the crisis. Analysis can thus focus on how decisions 
are reached, rather than on the evaluation of possible alternatives.  
In crises, states seek to maximize their interests and at the same time avoid an 
unwanted escalation. Uncertainty is exacerbated, due to factors such as severe 
time limits, the high stakes involved and the potential use of deceptive tactics 
undertaken by actors. Leaders should therefore not be expected to somehow see 
through the “fog of war”13 but think strategically, taking into account in an 
informed manner the capabilities and potential responses of their own forces as 
well as the capabilities and interests of adversaries and other third parties 
involved, such as allies and regional powers. Therefore, a rational management of 
a crisis by the state leadership could be indicated when statements and actions 
reflect the pursuit of goals under a probabilistic logic that incorporates uncertainty 
and possible interactions.14  
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Finally, a crisis rarely ends after a single action. Instead, international crises often 
consist of a series of successive interactions that either lead to the outbreak of war 
or to de-escalation. An additional benchmark of rationality should therefore be the 
capacity of actors to receive, process and adapt to new information derived from 
these interactions. According to Levy, “feedback from one decision should reveal 
information about adversary intentions (and perhaps the intentions of third states) 
and possibly about relative military capabilities as well.”15 After being “forced” 
to reveal additional information on motivations and/or capabilities during crises, 
actors have every interest in incorporating any new data in their calculations.  
 
5.3: Crises as an Independent Variable  
Another issue that needs to be addressed concerns the choice of the independent 
variable. Selecting crises, as opposed to “Militarised Interstate Disputes” (MIDs), 
as a focal point of this research deserves closer scrutiny, since MIDs are an equally 
important (if not defining) characteristic of rivalries. MIDs have indeed been 
proven useful towards identifying the root causes and origins of conflicts, but their 
inclusiveness also renders them inappropriate for the extraction of robust causal 
relationships from a few case studies. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions 
between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of 
military force, or actual uses of military force.”16  
For an interaction to qualify for inclusion in a MID dataset, the minimal 
requirement is that one of the states threatens to use force against the other. MID 
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collections, therefore, contain many low-level events that pose little risk for actual 
military hostilities. Oneal and Russett have even argued that such disputes pose a 
marginal security risk and should thus be excluded from attempts to explain 
serious conflict.17 Finally, the classification of an event as a MID remains a 
contentious issue, whereas the “International Crisis Behaviour” dataset applies 
specific, widely accepted criteria for a dispute to qualify as an interstate crisis.18  
Crises are strictly defined phenomena. For a dispute to qualify as an international 
crisis, leaders must perceive a heightened probability of military hostilities, a 
grave threat to national values, and a shortened and finite time within which to 
reach decisions.19 The choice of this project to focus on crisis rests on the premise 
of enhanced “visibility” of causal processes made possible by the study of crises, 
due to their intensity and finite duration, which render them highly distinguishable 
from other smaller-scale events. Psychological studies are most relevant when one 
or more of the following applies: 1) situations are not routine, 2) decisions are 
made by senior officials, 3) situations are ambiguous, 4) there is information 
overload, 5) events are unanticipated, 6) stress is great, and 7) long-range planning 
takes place.20 With the possible exception of the last condition, crises can be said 
to address these criteria in a comprehensive way. We could thus suggest that while 
MIDs may as well produce a similar effect on perceptions, deploying crises 
increases the potential for highly observable changes on the dependent variable. 
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5.4: Assessing Perceptions – The Dependent Variable 
Evaluating perceptions is a complex research undertaking. Initially, one has to 
specify the manner in which “accurate” perceptions will be identified. Arguments 
based on “misperception” are centered on the assumption that there is a standard 
which allows observers to distinguish accurate from inaccurate perceptions. This 
standard is usually elusive in international politics. For years after events 
unfolded, perceptions and their accuracy remain contentious for political 
scientists. However, a process tracing approach with its rich detail can shed light 
on both the change and relative accuracy of leadership perceptions. The goal here 
is not to establish how far or close exactly perceptions were against an abstract, 
fully objective reality, but to witness the evolution of the decision-making 
process, the movement of leadership perceptions over the rationality axis within 
the finite time constraints of a crisis. A detailed, qualitative analysis is arguably 
in a position to offer this kind of insight.   
Overall, the literature on misperception and conflict has converged to identifying 
the constituent elements of threat perception. Theory posits that two categories of 
perceptions A) perceptions of intentions and B) perceptions of capabilities, may 
lead to conflict and are thus important for the study of international politics.21 
These types of misperception are analytically distinct and amenable to empirical 
analysis. After all, “if the concept of misperception is to be a useful one, it must 
be defined and operationalized independently from the factors from which it 
arises.”22 As pointed out, the political psychology discipline is replete with 
                                                          
21 Levy, J. (1983), “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” 
World Politics, 36:1, p. 80. 
22 Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War,” p. 79. 
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analytical works emphasizing varying cognitive shortcomings that affect the 
quality of decision-making. In International Relations, however, these 
psychological deficits are analytically important when they affect the 
aforementioned two categories of perceptions through which they can 
subsequently affect decision-making.  
Ralph White’s “selective inattention,” for instance, should be best understood not 
as a misperception per se, but as a process that may generate misperception.23 
Similarly, as Levy pointed out, idealized self-images or “demonized” images of 
adversaries should not be treated as misperceptions in their own right, but instead 
as beliefs that may cause misperceptions.24 It is thus entirely possible to have both 
an erroneous enemy image and correct enemy perceptions, where other factors 
prevail upon the formation of leadership assessments. For this reason, focusing on 
the fundamental constituent elements of threat perception, i.e. the intentions and 
capabilities of parties involved, is a methodologically sound avenue.  
Another crucial question concerns the manner in which we can actually measure 
misperception because of problems associated with the nature and complexity of 
intentions and capabilities. Intentions can be conceptualised as a “state’s 
ambitions, how it is likely to act to achieve those ambitions, and the costs it will 
bear to realize those goals.”25 Parameters affecting intentions such as the 
adversary’s value structure, its definition of the situation, its expectations about 
the future and the domestic constraints on its freedom of action are particularly 
                                                          
23 White, R. (1970), Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars, Garden City, N. Y.: 
Anchor Books. 
24 Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War,” p. 80. 
25 Edelstein, D. (2002), “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” 
Security Studies, 12:1, p. 3. 
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difficult to evaluate.26 In conflictual relationships, intentions can be either 
expressed through statements or actions. In interstate crises, statements of interest 
include deterrent and compellent threats aimed at preventing the “other” from 
engaging in a course of action or coercing it to undertake unwanted actions 
respectively. But intentions can also be outlined through actions. Non-verbal 
signals in crises may take the form of displays of force (including the forward 
deployment of forces), military maneuvers and even political measures such as 
the withdrawal of diplomatic personnel. All these highly observable elements will 
be considered, scrutinized and evaluated. 
A major issue in evaluating an actor’s assessment of the intentions and capabilities 
of another party is the pervasiveness of uncertainty and deception in international 
politics. Even when actors are truthful about their intentions and goals, uncertainty 
can be caused by inadvertent dynamics, such as the operation of a “security 
dilemma,” in which states seeking to bolster their security undertake actions that 
are perceived as hostile by another state.27 Such dynamics may lead to escalation, 
particularly in interactions where offense and defence are hard to distinguish 
(possibly because a defensive weapon accords a decisive strategic advantage).28 
In many occasions, uncertainty has more deliberate origins. Leaders may possess 
an incentive to deceive and bluff regarding the extent of their capabilities or their 
resolve to follow a particular course of action. Saddam Hussein did not reveal the 
end of his WMD program to the international community, in a misguided effort 
                                                          
26 Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War.” 
27 Jervis, R. (1978), “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30:2, pp. 167-214; Glaser, C. 
(1997), “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, 50:1, pp. 171-201. 
28 Glaser, C. and C. Kaufman (1988), “What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it?,” 
International Security, 22:4, pp. 44-82. 
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to maintain a credible deterrent against Iran, Iraq’s historical rival.29 As a result, 
Iraqi ambiguity magnified threat perceptions in Washington during the sensitive 
post – September 11 period, contributing to escalation and the 2003 war. 
With regards to assessing capabilities, moreover, complex parameters such as 
morale, leadership and the quality of intelligence render their evaluation a 
challenging task in the absence of hostilities. The administrative and political 
capacity with which resources are transformed into effective military forces is 
particularly unpredictable.30 In World War II, Germany underestimated the ability 
of the U.S. government to divert resources from other sectors to the cause of war.31 
Overall, where crises do not lead to open warfare, the evaluation of both intentions 
and capabilities as “accurate” is probabilistic, as intentions and war-fighting 
capacity were not eventually put to the test. Nevertheless, the detailed assessment 
of case studies can still provide a solid estimate of both. Authors such as Jervis 
showed that even intangible qualities such as intentions can be measured, when 
he juxtaposed what the leaders perceived to what was actually meant by signals 
and statements across his case studies.32 A detailed comparison of pre and post-
crisis perceptions, evaluated against the historical record, should generate a sound 
estimate of both their change and relative accuracy.  
If perceptions can be measured, then the question shifts to whose perceptions 
analysis should focus on. A goal of this project is to escape the analytic pitfalls of 
individual-centred perspectives. The particular traits, preferences, mental 
                                                          
29 Lake, D. (2011), “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” 
International Security, 35:3, pp. 7-52. 
30 Knorr, K. (1970), Military Power and Potential, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, chs. 4-5.  
31 Iklé, F. (1971), Every War Must End, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 20-21. 
32 Jervis, R. (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
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strengths and shortcomings of individual leaders certainly matter in decision-
making and perhaps so in crises. After all, individual decision-makers possess 
varying personalities and belief systems which naturally lead to varying 
perceptions of threats and opportunities. But focusing on certain leaders would 
not allow for generalizations to be made regarding the impact of crises in 
international politics. Psychoanalytic perspectives offer little in terms of 
theoretical insight, even though their contribution to the study of particular 
historical figures is well-established.   
This present research assumes that a state, a collectivity, can be considered as a 
unitary actor, possessing a single set of perceptions, an analytically risky 
proposition. According to Goldsmith, “such state-level analysis is necessary if we 
are to try to understand foreign policy as more than an idiosyncratic phenomenon. 
Cognitive factors must be considered within the context of an organization if we 
are to understand subjects such as “U.S. foreign policy” as opposed to “Jimmy 
Carter’s foreign policy.” Without some conception of the state as the unit of 
analysis, there can be no generalizations about foreign policy, and no comparative 
study of foreign policy, as opposed to the study of foreign policy makers.”33 
Scholars have already examined perceptions at the unit (state) level.34 The 
possibility of learning at the state level has also been convincingly argued with 
organizational theory producing accounts which treat the state as a unitary actor, 
capable of learning.35 Whereas it is individuals who observe and learn from their 
                                                          
33 Goldsmith, B. (2005), Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies and Foreign 
Policy in Russia and Ukraine, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 31. 
34 For an overview see Rose, G. (1998), “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 
51:1, pp. 144-172. 
35 See for example Argyris, C. (1992), On Organizational Learning, Oxford: Blackwell Business; Cohen, M. 
and L. Sproull (eds.) (1996), Organizational Learning, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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environment, therefore, collectives may also possess the same capacity “to the 
extent that policy experiences become assimilated into organizational doctrine, 
structures, decision-making procedures, personnel systems, and organizational 
commitments.”36 Moreover, major incidents such as conflicts, often labelled 
“formative events”37 are particularly conducive towards engendering learning at 
the state level, as they affect the perceptual predispositions of a large number of 
members within a particular organization. According to Jervis, such lessons can 
subsequently “become institutionalized.”38 The underlying assumption is that 
individuals do not operate anymore as mere units. From a certain point onward, a 
specific set of perceptions is “internalized” at the highest levels of decision-
making, allowing for a unified understanding of the particular situation.  
In the case studies evaluated, a qualitative assessment of each crisis reveals the 
individuals responsible for managing the crisis and it is their common and shared 
understandings of the situation that will be of prime interest. State institutions, 
such as the armed forces ministries of foreign affairs should act in a consistent 
manner. At the same time, analysis will not be oblivious to differentiations and 
discrepancies in policy making observed in the course of the crises assessed. 
Individual perceptions and divergences will be highlighted, assuming they 
become discernible. The literature on perceptions has not yet settled on the debate 
between individual and group levels, so adopting a methodology that is able to 
                                                          
36 Lovell, J. (1984),  “'Lessons' of U.S. Military Involvement: Preliminary Conceptualization,” in 
D. Sylvana and S. Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making, New York: Praeger, p. 135. 
37 See Reiter, D. (1996), Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 35-37; Goldsmith, Imitation in International Relations, p. 11. 
38 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 238. 
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detect potential variances between the two would be an appropriate and 
methodologically sound approach.   
Finally, analysis will be centred on the perceptual changes in the weaker member 
of the antagonistic dyad. One can reasonably expect that the more powerful state 
will be less responsive or adaptive to actions and signals coming from its rival. 
The impact on perceptions, as a result, would be harder to measure, as policies 
enacted by the more powerful state may reflect a multitude of security concerns, 
due to the “luxury” it can afford to respond to the perceived challenge without 
drastically adjusting its behaviour. As a result, the impact of the dyadic interaction 
on perceptions should be more clearly observable across weaker members. In this 
manner, control for factors unrelated to bilateral affairs can be achieved.  
The aforementioned rationale raises the issue of whether there could be true 
competition between two states, in cases where power asymmetry prohibits one 
of the antagonists from actually inflicting a defeat on the other. While the 
existence of power asymmetry between rivals may appear rather implausible, 
asymmetry seemed to make little difference on the rivalry development between 
Great Britain and the Netherlands.39 The historical record contains a number of 
asymmetrical rivalries such as the China-Taiwan dyad and more notably, the India 
– Pakistan rivalry, with the phenomenon examined and well documented by 
scholars such as Vasquez.40 In a number of cases, tensions were exacerbated by 
the smaller member of the rivalry which tried to change the status quo. Escalation 
                                                          
39 Levy, J. and S. Ali (1998), “From Commercial Competition to Strategic Rivalry to War: The Evolution of the 
Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1652,” in P. Diehl (ed.), The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, Urbana and Chicago, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, pp. 29-63.  
40 Vasquez, J. (1996), “Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: a quantitative comparative 
case study of the two paths to war,” International Studies Quarterly, 40:4, pp. 531-558.; Vasquez, J. (1993), The 
War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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is indeed more plausible in symmetrical relationships, where the battle for 
preponderance can be conducive to war.41 In the final analysis, however, the 
existence of a rivalry framework implies that both members of the dyad, 
irrespective of relative capabilities, are to some degree dissatisfied with the status 
quo and actively seek to change it.  
Recently, scholars have come to recognize the pervasiveness of asymmetrical 
rivalries in world affairs, with data sets suggesting that asymmetrical rivalries may 
account for nearly 80% of all rival dyads.42 There is a number of possible factors 
that may render asymmetry inconsequential to bilateral dynamics. Alliances, for 
instance, have the capacity to decisively affect an asymmetrical balance of 
capabilities between rivals. Moreover, the more powerful state may be facing 
additional security threats that compromise its ability to coerce militarily the 
weaker member.43 Another possibility is that asymmetrical rivalries may be linked 
to symmetrical ones.44 Escalation by weaker members could therefore constitute 
a rational course of action.45 Overall, when dissatisfaction is combined with 
resolve around a particular issue of intrinsic salience to contenders, even minor 
powers can succumb to tense, long-term rivalry dynamics. 46 
                                                          
41 According to power transition theory. See Wayman, F. (1996), “Power Shifts and the Onset of War,” in J. 
Kugler and D. Lemke (eds.), Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger, Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, p. 147; Levy, J. (1987), “Declining Power and the Preventive Motive,” World 
Politics, 40:1, pp. 82-107. 
42 Klein, J. et. al. (2006), “The new Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns,” Journal of Peace Research, 43:3, 
pp. 331-348. 
43 Thompson, W. (1995), “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:2, p. 205.  
44 Diehl, P and G. Goertz (2000), War and Peace in International Rivalry, Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, p. 147. 
45 Because decision makers take into account the alternatives, preferences, and possible choices of other relevant 
actors. See Niou, E. et. al. (1989), The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
46 Diehl, P. et. al. (2005), “Theoretical specifications of enduring rivalries: applications to the India–Pakistan 
case,” in: TV Paul (ed.), The India–Pakistan Rivalry: An Enduring Rivalry, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 36-38. 
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5.5: Synopsis of Research Design 
 Research Question 
Do decision makers’ perceptions across rival and non-rival dyads become more 
or less accurate due to international crises?  
 
 Focus of research: 
Comparison and evaluation of leadership perceptions before and after the crisis 
under study. Research will focus on the relatively weaker member of the dyad to 
control for strategic and/or power calculations that vary across stronger and 
weaker sides. In essence, actions taken by the more powerful member of the dyads 
could reflect a number of considerations which are not directly related to the 
specific crisis and its perceptual impact. Therefore, one can reasonably expect the 
behaviour of the weaker member to be more revealing of its perceptual shifts. 
Operating under conditions of stressful interaction is crucial towards assessing the 
impact of the independent variable and there is a need to ensure that observations 
reflect the internal dynamics of the dyad, as opposed to external considerations.  
 
 Sources of evidence 
Evidence will be sought from policymakers’ statements, news pieces from the 
written and electronic press, government and military policy papers, and of course 
the detailed scrutiny of actions and adopted policies. Depending on case-selection, 
different sources of evidence may prove more, or less, important.  
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Chapter 6:  
 
Case Selection 
 
  
6.1: Overview and Rationale of Case Selection 
Selecting a small number of case studies presents a number of challenges, neatly 
summarized by Seawright and Gerring: “Consider  that  most  case  studies  seek  
to  elucidate  the  features  of  a  broader population.  They are about something  
larger than  the  case itself, even  if  the resulting  generalization is  issued  in  a  
tentative  fashion (Gerring  2004). In  case  studies  of  this  sort,  the chosen  case  
is  asked  to perform a heroic  role:  to  stand for (represent) a population of  cases  
that  is  often much larger than  the  case  itself.”1  In case study research, overall, 
a twin objective has to be achieved: 1) the selection of a representative sample 
and 2) the variation of case studies across relevant dimensions.2   
Three dyads were chosen (Greece-Turkey, Georgia-Russia and Cyprus-Turkey) 
which appeared most appropriate for the purposes of this research project. All 
three pairs experienced severe militarized crises between 1996 and 2008, with one 
of them (Georgia-Russia) escalating to a brief war in 2008. Moreover, the 
availability of data and my personal familiarity with two of the case studies 
(Greece-Turkey and Cyprus-Turkey) also contributed to the particular choice.  
The geographical scope of case studies selected is, to a certain extent, limited. 
Rivalries after all have been observed throughout the globe, from Latin America, 
(Brazil – Argentina) to the Asia Pacific (China – Japan). It would therefore be 
                                                          
1 Seawright, J. and J. Gerring (2008), “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options, Political Research Quarterly, 61:2, p. 294. 
2 Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research, p. 296. 
77 
 
interesting to see whether perceptual adjustments due to crises somehow differ 
across regions. However, the limited number of case studies in a thesis research 
project requires a case selection based on the prioritization of variance in the 
independent variable (severity of crisis), as well as in those qualities which could 
theoretically affect its impact on the dependent variable (degree of rivalry 
intensity and power symmetry), in addition to author familiarity with case studies. 
Overall, case selection was undertaken under the following considerations:  
1) Selecting rival and non-rival dyads: This is more complicated than it initially 
appears. The proliferation of rivalry research has led to multiple definitions and 
as a result, a qualitative analysis necessitates a theory-driven selection of 
nonrandom cases.3 Considerations are thoroughly analyzed in the upcoming 
section, but the underlying thinking was to include (table 6-A) dyads that are 
unanimously accepted as rivals (Greece and Turkey) and non-rivals (Georgia and 
Russia) by relevant scholarly works so that selection bias can be avoided.  
2) Variance in the independent variable: It is important to ensure that the 
possible range of crises is explored in order to maximize inferential leverage.  
Crises are not monolithic. The disadvantages of MIDs are thankfully not present 
in the study of crises, though crisis intensity can vary significantly. For this reason, 
a crisis that never escalated to the use of force (Cyprus – Turkey) and a crisis that 
culminated in open warfare (Georgia-Russia) are evaluated. In the case of Greece 
and Turkey, a limited use of force was undertaken, and de-escalation ensued.  
                                                          
3 King, G. et. al. (1994), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 124-128.  
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3) Symmetrical and asymmetrical dyads: The merits of focusing on the weaker 
side of the dyad were discussed in the previous section. However, bias may yet be 
inserted if dyads under scrutiny are all either symmetrical or asymmetrical, as one 
could assume that the perceptual impact of a crisis could vary between a 
“relatively weaker” and a “far weaker” member of a competitive dyad. For this 
reason, a symmetrical dyad, at least at the time of the crisis (Greece-Turkey) was 
included, along with two asymmetrical dyads (Cyprus-Turkey and Georgia-
Russia). Parity is assumed when neither competitor exceeds a 3:1 power ratio 
compared to the other state.4 This is the reason for labelling the Greco-Turkish 
rivalry symmetrical, even though there is a visible difference in capabilities 
between the two nations. At the time of the crisis in question (1996), however, the 
power ratio for the two countries was well within the suggested symmetry limits.  
4) The particularities of process tracing: A familiarity with selected cases can 
be helpful towards discerning causal relations in detailed case studies. 
Antagonisms in the international system are rarely isolated phenomena. Gerring 
notes that “case studies are not immaculately conceived; additional units always 
loom in the background.”5 “Background cases often play a key role in case study 
analysis.  They are not cases per se, but they are nonetheless integrated into the 
analysis in an informal manner.”6 The presence of other competitive relationships 
in the case studies (Russia vs the U.S./NATO in the Georgian case or Greece vs 
                                                          
4 Klein, J. et. al. (2006), “The new rivalry dataset: procedures and patterns,” Journal of Peace Research, 43:3, 
pp. 331-348. 
5 Gerring, J. (2004), “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?,” American Political Science Review, 98:2,  
p. 344. 
6 Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” p. 294. 
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Turkey in the Cypriot case) render causal inference challenging. Possessing an in-
depth understanding of case studies selected, therefore, can be advantageous. 
Table 6-A: Case Studies Selected, Symmetry, Adherence to  
Rivalry Definitions and Crisis Intensity 
 
 
 
6.2: Rivalry Definition and Case Selection 
The early (and mostly quantitative in nature) literature conceived rivalries in 
behavioural terms, focusing on what rival states do when they engage in such a 
relationship. Empirically, enduring rivalries were defined as a set of repeated 
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)7 between the same set of states over an 
extended period of time. Goertz and Diehl used a MID threshold to operationalize 
the competitiveness requirement, defining rivalries as those pairs of states with at 
least six MIDs within a period of 20 years.8 Proto-rivalries were further specified 
to be those dyads that experience up to five MIDs but fail to reach the enduring 
rivalry requirement within a 20 year period.  Isolated conflicts were termed to be 
conflicts that involve one or two disputes at maximum and hence do not escalate 
                                                          
7 MIDs are recorded by the “Correlates of War” project Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset, at 
www.correlatesofwar.org [accessed 16/11/2014]. 
8 Goertz, G. and P. Diehl, (2000), “The Concept and Measurement of Rivalries,” in P. Diehl and G. Goertz, War 
and Peace in International Rivalry, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 44-46. 
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to the proto or enduring stage.9 Definitions such as the aforementioned, assuming 
a rivalry emerges after a certain amount of disputes, present a disadvantage, as the 
existence of a rivalry that fails to meet the numerical threshold is possible.10 
Subsequent criticism of behavioural definitions yielded a different, discourse-
based perspective, which instead focused more on the perceptual elements of 
rivalries. Vasquez defined a rivalry as a relationship characterized by tense 
competition, usually accompanied by psychological hostility.11 Similarly, 
Thompson identified rivalries through a careful examination of the historical 
record, labelling as rivals those states that perceive each other as a threat without 
necessarily engaging in militarized disputes or conflict.12 Under this definition, 
Thompson identified a larger population of rivals (173 from 1816 to 1999).13 
While Thompson’s strategic rivalry variable is advantageous because of its 
reliance on historical analysis, the MID threshold definition includes low-level 
rivals and non-rival competitors, so that rivals can be tested against the two other 
categories of competitive dyads.  
Finally, Hewitt’s crisis-density approach combined behavioural and perceptual 
elements, identifying rivals as states involved in prolonged conflicts featuring 
recurrent crises. A crisis-based definition could contribute towards a more 
systematic appraisal of rivalries because it combines behavioural and perceptual 
elements, while maintaining a replicable method of classification. The perceptual 
dimension is supported by this approach, as for a dispute to qualify as a crisis, the 
                                                          
9 Ibid.  
10 Colaresi, M. et. al. (2007), Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51-52.  
11 Vasquez, J. (1993), The War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75-76. 
12 Thompson, W. (1995), “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:2, p. 201. 
13 Thompson, W. (2001), “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 
45:4, pp. 557-586.  
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ICB project applies specific criteria, including the perceived intensity of threat by 
foreign policy leaders.14 A crisis-density definition could thus be considered as a 
conceptual link between behavioural and perceptual definitions. 
Defining the concept of rivalries is a contentious issue, though it is a common 
occurrence in social sciences to have multidimensional concepts, leading to 
debates regarding which dimensions should be considered essential for their 
conceptualization.15 However, the issue of rivalry definition poses a real problem 
for case selection, with scholars associated with each approach developing unique 
sets of cases that fulfil their criteria. Depending on the number of disputes required 
to reach the rivalry threshold, the time period under analysis, or the role of 
perceptions, the number of rivalries varies from as few as 34 to as many as 290.  
This project proceeded to a case selection across definitional thresholds, adhering 
to diverse conceptualizations (table 6-A).  Three different rivalry definitions will 
be considered towards case selection: Hewitt’s crisis-density definition (threshold 
of crises within a specific time-frame),16 a dispute density definition (different 
thresholds of MIDs within a specific time-frame, various authors17) and 
Thompson’s discourse-based definition, a classification methodology based on a 
detailed examination of the historical record.18 In this manner, problems 
associated with concept construction can be avoided. This is important since a 
                                                          
14 Three conditions are stipulated: “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time 
for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher, M. 
and J. Wilkenfeld, (2000), A Study of Crisis, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, p. 3. 
15 Goertz, G. (2006), “Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide,” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 
6. 
16 Hewitt, J. (2005), “A Crisis-Density Formulation for Identifying Rivalries,” Journal of Peace Research, 42:2, 
pp. 183-200.  
17 Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry; Bennett, S. (1996), “Security, bargaining, and the 
end of interstate rivalry”, International Studies Quarterly, 40:2, pp. 157-183; Bennett, S. (1998), “Integrating 
and Testing Models of Rivalry,” American Journal of Political Science, 42:4, pp. 1200-1232. 
18 Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” pp. 557–586. 
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selected concept structure “interacts in various, usually hidden, ways with theories 
and hypotheses that researchers want to test.”19 By choosing particular 
populations for analysis, selected concept structures could bias the results.  
 
6.3: The Independent Variable and Case Selection 
In case selection, the independent variable assumes prime importance. Security 
crises are not monolithic. While the ICB project datasets have established widely 
accepted criteria, there is a high degree of variability within the crises population, 
which should be accounted for in case selection. While some crises escalate only 
as far as political rhetoric threatening the enemy with escalation, others go further, 
resulting in coercive policies such as troop mobilization or even the outbreak of 
hostilities. Scholars have identified five different levels corresponding to the 
intensity of crisis escalation:20 (1) no action (no escalation); (2) the threat of war; 
(3) the display of force; (4) the use of force; and (5) war (the maximum).21 
Analytically, the most important threshold is the use of force, as there is a 
“fundamental distinction between coercive behaviour where force is and is not 
employed.”22 For this reason, cases will be selected across this empirical 
boundary, with a representation of crises which ended without the use of force 
and crises which escalated to either a limited use of force or an all-out war.   
                                                          
19 Hewitt, J. and G. Goertz (2005), “Conceptualizing Interstate Conflict: How Do Concept-Building Strategies 
Relate to Selection Effects?,” International Interactions, 31:2, pp. 163-182. 
20 Carlson, L. (1995), “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
39:3, pp. 511-534; Geller, D. (1990), “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 34:2, pp. 291-310.  
21 What distinguishes war from the use of force is 1,000 or more battle fatalities: Gochman, C. and Z. Maoz 
(1984), “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 28:4, p. 589. 
22 Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” p. 303, footnote 18. 
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A question that follows from the case selection rationale would be connected to 
the analytical merits of case studies which actually escalated to open warfare. 
Would escalation in war indicate that a crisis led to exacerbated misperception? 
Not necessarily. It is important to stress that the outbreak of hostilities is not 
necessarily associated with faltering perceptions. International Relations theory 
posits that there are instances where rivals may be rationally “compelled” to 
escalate. Rivals could, for instance, find themselves in a position to detect 
“windows of opportunity” or threatening trends in relative capability terms which 
they could try to benefit from or tackle, respectively, before they cease to exist or 
became irreversible. In this manner, a declining state will have an incentive to 
prevent the rising state from acquiring more power and the rising state will be 
inclined to forcefully advance its interests.23  
After all, an improved “understanding” of the other does not eliminate uncertainty 
over the motivations and the capabilities of the “other,” rendering escalation a 
constant probability.24 In the final analysis, perceptions may not be related at all 
to particular cases of conflict. Even in instances where biases can be shown to 
have contributed to escalation, one cannot be certain that the crisis itself was 
causally related to exacerbated misperceptions. Only a thorough assessment of the 
case study can clearly delineate the purported links, but from a research 
perspective, there seems to be no reason why escalation cannot have taken place 
in spite of more accurate leadership perceptions. Including, therefore crises which 
culminated in conflict does not weaken the research framework of the project. 
                                                          
23 Gilpin, R. (1981), War and Change in International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 191.  
24 Fearon, J. (1995), “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, 49:3, pp. 380-381.  
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6.4: Selected Case Studies and Attributes 
Based on the logic and considerations presented in the previous section, three case 
studies were selected: A summary of the case studies selected is presented below.  
 
6.4.1: Greece – Turkey: The 1996 Aegean Sea Crisis 
In January 1996, Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies in South-Eastern Europe 
engaged in a militarized “bras de fer” over a set of uninhabited islets, called 
Imia,25 located in the Aegean Sea. When a Turkish merchant vessel, the “Figen 
Akat”, ran aground on one of these islets on December 25 1995, a set of events 
was set in motion that led the two countries to the brink of war in late January 
1996. A diplomatic exchange between Athens and Ankara took place first, aiming 
at advancing the legal argumentation of both sides with regards to the ownership 
of the islets. Within a few days, the dispute made it to the Greek and Turkish 
mainstream media, causing a sense of anxiety in the general population and 
providing an opportunity to activists on both sides to exacerbate tensions.  
During the crisis, journalists and citizens hoisted and removed the national flags 
of the two countries on the islets in highly sensationalized campaigns, broadcasted 
on state-owned television. It was only a matter of time before the crisis escalated, 
with the newly elected government in Athens eager to defend its claims. When a 
Greek Special Forces contingent was deployed on the largest of the Imia islets on 
January 28 1996, the final phase of the crisis was initiated. A major concentration 
of forces on the area brought the two fleets close to war, with Turkish troops 
landing on the smaller Imia islet. As Greece ordered a partial mobilization of 
                                                          
25 Turkey uses the name “Kardak” for the islets.  
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reserves, the tactical game in the dramatic, final hours of January 1996 led to the 
crash of a Greek helicopter and the death of its crew. The deadlock lasted until 
the morning hours of January 31, when a U.S. led mediating initiative allowed the 
two countries to remove all flags and forces from the operational theatre, 
effectively returning to the status quo ante.   
 
6.4.2: Georgia – Russia: The 2008 South-Ossetian Crisis 
On July 3 2008, Georgians and South Ossetians exchanged artillery fire after 
Dmitriy Sanakoyev, the head of the Georgian-appointed government in South 
Ossetia was injured by a roadside mine. The atmosphere was already tense in 
Tskhinvali, the de-facto capital of the secessionist Georgian province of South-
Ossetia, because of a bomb attack in the preceding days that had led to the death 
of a local police officer. A low intensity conflict soon erupted in South Ossetian 
villages, which, by the end of July, had escalated to frequent skirmishes between 
Georgian security and South-Ossetian paramilitary forces. Violent incidents soon 
expanded to Tskhinvali until August 7, when Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian 
President, ordered the country’s forces to launch a military operation in the break-
away province. The aim was clear: Georgian forces would reassert governmental 
control over the entire province. Initially, the Georgian foray was successful, with 
the Georgian government announcing the capture of Tskhinvali on August 8. 
In the meantime, however, Russia had launched a full-scale counter-offensive that 
soon expanded beyond the secessionist territory of South-Ossetia. Within a matter 
of days, Russian forces had pushed Georgian forces out of South Ossetia, opening 
a second front in the country’s other separatist province of Abkhazia. Georgia’s 
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defensive apparatus could not withstand the militarized pressure for long. On 
August 10, Georgia declared a ceasefire and begun withdrawing its forces from 
South Ossetia.  
By that time, the Russian army had conducted major operations deep inside 
Georgian territory, inflicting substantial damage and casualties across major 
population centres. Georgian military bases and assets were either captured or 
destroyed and the country’s infrastructure sustained heavy bombing by the 
Russian air-force. At the same time, more than 100,000 Georgians were displaced 
because of the conflict. The number of casualties on both sides remains, to this 
day, highly contested and unconfirmed. The war officially ended on August 12 
2008, with the mutually agreed “six point plan”, establishing a cease fire between 
Russia and Georgia with the mediation of the French President, Nikolas Sarkozy.  
 
6.4.3: Cyprus – Turkey: The 1998 S-300 Missile Crisis 
On January 4 1997, the governments of the Republic of Cyprus and the Russian 
Federation signed an agreement for the sale of the advanced S-300 PMU-1 
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system to Cyprus. A fierce reaction from Ankara 
set in motion a crisis that threatened stability in a geopolitically sensitive area for 
both the European Union and NATO.  The Turkish response was initially confined 
to threats and warnings, with Tansu Ciller, the Turkish Foreign Minister, openly 
declaring that the Turkish air-force would destroy the SAMs if they were to reach 
Cypriot soil. Diplomats and political leaders, concerned with the escalatory 
dynamics, increased their visits to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia. Nevertheless, the 
stalemate persisted over what appeared to be a casus beli for the Turkish military 
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planners, emphasized by the Turkish use of the Cuban Missile Crisis analogy. As 
the Cypriot government insisted in the deployment of the missiles Turkish and 
Greek forces increased their military presence and activities in Cyprus, escalating 
to mock dogfights between Greek and Turkish F-16s over Cypriot skies. 
Soon, large scale manoeuvres of Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish and Turkish-
Cypriot forces were taking place within the space of a few square kilometres, 
north and south of the de-facto border separating the two ethnic communities since 
1974. In the meantime, the Russian government appeared eager to support the 
Republic, providing all means necessary to defend the missiles from a Turkish 
incursion. On the diplomatic front, UN-backed discussions between the Greeks 
and Turks of Cyprus ended in a stalemate during the first half of 1998, opening 
the door to the final stage of the crisis. By that time, militarized incidents had 
expanded in the entire Eastern Mediterranean region, arousing fears of a regional 
conflagration between Greece and Turkey, exacerbated by the potential of 
Russian involvement. A further escalation was averted in late December 1998, 
when the Cypriot President announced that the SAMs would be deployed on the 
Greek island of Crete, as opposed to being hosted on the purpose-built sites 
already constructed in Cyprus.  
 
88 
 
Chapter 7: 
 
The 1996 Aegean Sea Crisis1 
 
 
7.1: Introduction  
In late January 1996, Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies with a long-standing 
history of conflict and on-going, simmering tensions, found themselves on the 
brink of war over a set of uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea. Widely regarded 
as problematic, choices made during the crisis by Greek policymakers are 
considered a strategic blunder which led to a Greek withdrawal from the islets and 
subsequently a retrenchment regarding maritime jurisdiction issues in the Aegean. 
Numerous explanations for the Greek miscalculations have been suggested, 
focusing primarily on either the impact of the local media, or domestic political 
motivations in Athens, where ruling PASOK party members battled for the 
premiership. However, the main discourse regarding Greek miscalculations 
centers on explanations that may not shed light on the true dynamics of the crisis.  
In this chapter, these predominant explanations are laid out and assessed, but a 
novel one is advanced. Specifically, I suggest that neither the sensationalist tones 
adopted by Greek media nor the belligerence of the nationalist faction within the 
Greek government can adequately account for the mismanagement of the crisis. 
To the extent that these elements were present, they may have only exacerbated 
the real problem, which was the extent of Greek misperceptions regarding 
Turkey’s increased capabilities and changing security strategy in the Aegean Sea. 
While Greek policy planners had been made aware of Turkish goals and priorities, 
                                                          
1 The Aegean Sea crisis is widely referred to in Greek and international publications as the “Imia” islet crisis. 
The two names will be used interchangeably.  
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they still operated under obsolete perceptions during the ensuing crisis, thereby 
rendering the observed unfavorable outcome highly probable.  
 
7.2: Historical Overview  
The Greek-Turkish rivalry has persisted in varying intensity since the 
establishment of modern Greece in 1830. The 20th century was a tense period for 
Greek – Turkish relations. In the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, Greece succeeded in 
expanding its territory vis-à-vis Turkey, whose retreat from the former Ottoman 
lands was de jure acknowledged by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. In its attempt to 
consolidate its control over Asia Minor and integrate the remaining Greek 
populations of the Ottoman Empire within the country, Greece subsequently 
launched a disastrous campaign in Asia Minor which ended in 1922 with the 
permanent extinction of the Greek presence (numbering around 1.5 million at the 
time) from the region and the signing of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which, to 
this day defines bilateral relations to a substantial extent.2 
Nevertheless, the two states remain in disagreement over a number of key issues 
including the delimitation of maritime borders along the Aegean Sea, minority 
rights and the Cyprus question which in 1974 brought the two NATO allies to the 
brink of full-scale war. Maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea appears to be the 
most contentious issue at present, with disputes and incidents revolving  around  
a maritime area with over 2,000  islands,  islets,  and  rocks,  mostly  uninhabited, 
though  important  for  defining  borders. Turkey, in this regard, rejects the Greek 
                                                          
2 Jacobides, M. (2007), “The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchy: 
 Lessons from a Near-War, Organization Science, 18:3, p. 460.  
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claim that islands in the Aegean are entitled to a continental shelf, as it considers 
these islands to constitute the geological extension of its Anatolian mainland.3  
Finally, Greece’s 10-mile long airspace is disputed by Ankara, leading to frequent 
dogfights over the Mediterranean skies. After the traumatic 1970s, which 
culminated in the partition of Cyprus, Greek policy makers monitor with concern 
what is perceived by Athens to be Turkey's revisionist approach, expressed 
through “violations of Greek airspace, refusal to submit the delimitation of the 
Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, threats of war in 
case of Greek extension of the territorial water limit from six to twelve miles and 
challenges of the Aegean status quo as codified by a number of international 
treaties.”4  
Irrespective of the legal, political and even geological argumentation presented by 
both sides, Greece’s sense of vulnerability is not unwarranted from a geostrategic 
point of view. The distinctive geographic formation of the Hellenic territory, 
comprising a predominately mountainous mainland and an extensive coastline 
with hundreds of islands and islets, bestows the country’s military planners with 
challenging operational parameters, while lacking the advantage of strategic depth 
enjoyed by Greece’s historical rival, Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, views 
Greek intentions with suspicion, as Greek islands, numerous and heavily 
militarized, are perceived to form a strategic “cordon sanitaire” around Turkey’s 
Mediterranean coast, arousing fears of encirclement which could deprive the 
country of what it regards as its legitimate interests in the Aegean Sea and the 
                                                          
3 Bahcheli, T. (1990), Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.130-32. 
4 Dokos, T. (1998), “Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era”, Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy 
Issues, Summer 1998, available at http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer98/security.html, [accessed 
03/02/2014]. 
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Eastern Mediterranean. After the end of the Cold War, Greek-Turkish disputes 
over the Aegean escalated to frequent diplomatic and militarised skirmishes, 
culminating in the 1996 crisis over the status of the Imia5 islets.  
 
Figure 7-A: The Aegean Sea 
 
             Source: Wikipedia 
 
 
7.3: Crisis Background and Greek Perceptions 
Greek-Turkish relations in the 1990s were characterized by volatility and political 
tensions, even though the two countries had not resorted to violence against each 
other since 1974. The advent of the post-Cold War period meant little for Greek 
strategists, as Turkey remained a prominent security consideration for Athens. 
                                                          
5 The Imia islets are called “Kardak” by Turkey.  
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Less than twenty years ago, after all, the two countries had fought over the island 
of Cyprus. In 1974, the political turmoil in Athens and the Greek defence 
apparatus reliance on land forces, in accordance with NATO operational 
priorities, rendered the country unable to muster an effective response against the 
Turkish forces deployed to Cyprus. The “Cypriot tragedy” as it is registered in the 
national narrative, acted as a catalyst for the democratization of the country. 
Within a few months, the Greek junta, which precipitated the Turkish operation 
in the first place, had been replaced by a democratically elected government.  
Greece’s security policy had to undergo an equally radical transition. Greek policy 
makers, shocked by the fact that a “NATO member, using NATO weapons, had 
taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to occupy another 
democratic European country,”6 moved to alter Greece’s security strategy by 
upgrading the country’s air and naval components, while emphasizing the forward 
deployment of forces in northern Greece (Thrace) and the Aegean islands. 
Greece’s disillusionment with NATO would imply that from that point on, the 
country would rely on its own capabilities for deterrence and defence purposes.  
Despite the effort to secure an adequate deterrent, the vulnerability of the Greek 
position persisted in the early 1990s, as the stalemate in bi-communal talks in 
Cyprus was leading to a consolidation of the Turkish military presence in the 
island with rising fears of an impending annexation of northern Cyprus by Turkey. 
At the same time, the existence of a sizable Muslim minority in Greek Thrace, in 
close proximity to the Turkish border, had created another potential flashpoint, 
which Athens proved fully incapable to control. More importantly, following the 
                                                          
6 Moustakis, F. and M. Sheehan (2000), “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War,” Contemporary Security 
Policy, 21:3, p. 96.  
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end of the Cold War, Turkey undertook an extensive military modernization 
program at a time when both Russia and Western powers were scaling back their 
defence budgets in an effort to benefit from the so called “peace dividend.”7 
Between 1990 and 1996, Turkey consistently devoted a higher percentage of its 
GDP compared to Greece to defence outlays, in spite of Turkey’s impressive GDP 
growth rate during that period. Athens was unable to keep up. The Greek-Turkish 
arms race in the 1980s had taken its toll on the ailing Greek economy (in the 
1980s, the average yearly growth rate of the Greek GDP had been 0.76 %.)8 In 
the same decade, Greek defence spending averaged 6.11% of the country’s GDP.9  
 
Figure 7-B: Greek and Turkish Defence Spending 1987-2000 
Source: SIPRI defence spending datasets 
 
                                                          
7 Dokos, T. and N. Protonotarios (1996), Turkish Military Power: The Challenge to Greek Security, (in Greek), 
Athens: Tourikis Publishers, 2nd ed. 
8 Eurostat data, cited in Nicolaidou, E. (2008), “The Demand for Military Expenditure: Evidence from the EU15 
(1961-2005),” Defence and Peace Economics, 19:4, p. 275. 
9 SIPRI data, cited in Nicolaidou, “The Demand for Military Expenditure,” p. 276.  
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Greece
Turkey
Defence Spending as % of GDP, 1987 - 2010
94 
 
Athens was painfully aware of the growing capabilities gap: Washington’s 
decision in 1995 to provide Turkey with KC-135 tanker aircraft and 120 army 
tactical missiles (ATACMs) was strongly protested by Athens, as it could further 
erode the 7:10 Greek-Turkish military balance in the Aegean, in existence since 
1974,10 in addition to increasing Turkey’s strike range capacity fourfold.11 In 
December 1995, shortly before the Imia crisis, the Greek delegation in the high-
level E.U. Intergovernmental Conference maintained that the Greek borders 
should be defended by the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, as they 
constitute the borders of the E.U. Athens had also requested (informally) from the 
U.S. government to guarantee the maintenance of the status quo in the Aegean, 
without securing a positive response.12  
While the stalemate in Cyprus persisted, in March 1995 Greece accepted the 
accession of Turkey in the E.U. Customs Union. This acquiescence did not reflect 
an improvement in bilateral relations, but was part of an intra-European 
negotiation between Greece and Brussels. Greece aimed at securing Cyprus’s 
membership candidate status at a time when certain E.U. member states expressed 
their reluctance to “internalize” what was in essence viewed as a frozen conflict. 
The Yugoslavian conflagration was casting a long shadow over the Maastricht 
vision of a common European foreign policy and E.U. leaders were 
understandably cautious of further weakening the Union’s credibility by being 
involved in another ethnic conflict along the continent’s frontier.    
                                                          
10 The 7:10 military balance referred to Greek vs Turkey naval and aerial assets and was a widely accepted 
cornerstone of Greek security policy following the 1974 Cyprus conflict.  
11 Athanassopoulou, E. (1997), “Blessing in disguise? The Imia crisis and Turkish-Greek relations,” 
Mediterranean Politics, 2:3, p. 78. 
12 Ibid, p. 79. 
95 
 
On May 31 1995, the Greek parliament ratified the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea which includes, under Article 3, the stipulation that “every State 
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 
12 nautical miles.” While both Greece and Turkey claim 6 nautical mile (n.m.) 
territorial seas in the Aegean, the prospect of Greece claiming a 12 n.m. 
continental shelf alarmed Ankara. In June 1995, Turkey’s parliament declared that 
it would consider a decision by Greece to extend its territorial waters beyond the 
six n.m. as an act of war (casus belli).13 That move raised the alarm, as it was a 
clear indication that Turkey was willing to escalate if Greece exercised its rights.  
From a strategic point of view, Turkey’s frustration was not unwarranted. If 
Greece were to expand its territorial waters to 12 n.m., Turkey’s share in the 
Aegean would increase from 7.5% to 8.8%, whereas Greece’s share would almost 
double, from 43.5% to 71.5% (figure 7-C). Moustakis and Sheehan correctly note 
that “The current situation creates three high-seas corridors across the Aegean that 
permit Turkish vessels departing east-coast ports, such as Ismir and Kusadasi, to 
reach the Mediterranean without having to transit Greek waters.”14 Considering, 
among others, that the Aegean Sea may be holding substantial deposits of 
hydrocarbons, Turkey’s policy makers viewed a potential application of 
UNCLOS provisions by Greece as a direct threat against the country’s interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 General Assembly of the Turkish Parliament, June 8 1995.The declaration cited the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as 
well as Turkey’s vital interests and authorised the government to take all necessary measures, should Greece 
unilaterally extend its territorial waters beyond six nautical miles.  
14 Moustakis and Sheehan, “Greek security policy after the cold war,” p. 98. 
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Figure 7-C: Comparison of 6 n.m.  
and 12 n.m. continental shelves 
  
                                                                                         Source: Foreign Policy Institute, Turkey, 2002
                                                           www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/stashan_130302_p.htm 
 
 
Turkish political and military figures made sure that the Greek leadership received 
a series of clear signals regarding their opposition to the expansion of Greece’s 
continental shelf. Officials reiterated the casus belli in numerous circumstances, 
while the commander of the Turkish navy, Admiral Erkayia, took a further step, 
indicating that should Greece proceed with an expansion of its territorial waters, 
Turkey would consider seizing some of the Greek islands adjacent to the Turkish 
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mainland.15 The message was deemed credible by Greek intelligence. In the 
second half of 1995, Admiral Lymperis, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
informed the Defence Minister of his estimate that Turkey was gradually adopting 
a more assertive military posture in the Aegean Sea, a stance connected with the 
issue of the delineation of the continental shelf between the two countries.16  
There is additional evidence that available intelligence provided a relatively 
accurate picture of Turkish intentions before the onset of the crisis. This is 
corroborated by retired Lieutenant-General Nikolaos Gryllakis, who on October 
1995, informed the Greek Defence Minister of his assessment regarding the 
current situation in the Aegean Sea. Gryllakis, acting as an unofficial advisor, 
suggested that the international climate did not favour a direct invasion of Greek 
islands, but the Turks would rather see, for the time being, an “economic partition” 
of the Aegean.17 It is safe to assume that Gryllakis referred to the maritime 
jurisdiction issues, as in public international law, the continental shelf concept is 
directly related to the exploitation of maritime resources.  
The Greek political establishment was apparently informed of Turkey’s strategic 
recalibrations and “Greek diplomats knew that in Ankara certain circles had been 
promoting the theory of “grey zones.”” Ankara would, according to the “grey 
zones” paradigm, attempt to challenge the sovereignty status of Aegean 
“geographical formations” (including islands, islets or rocks) not referred to 
explicitly in international treaties.18 Only a few days before the onset of the crisis, 
                                                          
15 “Tension Riding High in the Aegean,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8:3, p. 120. 
16 Lymperis, C. (2001), Steering Course in Turbulent Seas, (in Greek), Athens: Poiotita, p. 551. 
17 Assessment submitted to the Greek Minister for Defence, 19 October 1995, cited in Dimitrakis, P. (2008), 
“Intelligence for Crisis Management: the case of the January 1996 Greek-Turkish Crisis,” European Security, 
17:4, p. 458. 
18 Interview of Ambassador (ret.) Dimitrios Nezeritis, 8 December 2004; Interview with former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, cited in “The Files,” Mega Channel TV, (in Greek), aired on 06/02/2001.  
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a National Intelligence Agency (NIS) station intercepted a phone conversation of 
the Turkish Navy Chief, Admiral Erkayia, who allegedly asserted that the “grey 
zones” strategy was his idea from the days of his service as Chief of the Fleet, 
having assigned a special task force to substantiate Turkish claims over islets in 
the Aegean Sea.19 According to Greek intelligence, the admiral claimed that when 
he sent this study to the Turkish General Staff, “they adopted it instantly.”20  
The Greek government indicated that it understood the political and legal 
connotations of the Turkish strategy and tried to formulate an appropriate 
response. In November 1995, the Greek Ministries of Defence and of the Aegean 
introduced a joint development program aimed at uninhabited islands and islets.21 
While the economic and ecological dimensions of this initiative were not 
negligible, the political and legal dimensions of this undertaking were obvious. 
According to international law provisions, islands and islets capable of sustaining 
“human habitation or economic life” are entitled to a continental shelf.22  
As the end of 1995 approached, the Greek Defence Minister, Gerasimos Arsenis, 
indicated to various media outlets that Turkey could try to take advantage of the 
domestic political turmoil in Greece and commit a “provocation” around the 
scheduled appointment of the new Greek Prime Minister.23 Andreas Papandreou 
(the elected Prime Minister) had been hospitalized since November 1995 and his 
deteriorating condition had exacerbated uncertainty domestically, as the various 
factions of the ruling Socialist PASOK party battled for the premiership.  
                                                          
19 “What Happened during the Imia Crisis Night,” To Vima Sunday ed., 13/11/2005.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ministry of the Aegean, “Islets Preservation and Protection Project,” 1995, cited in Dimitrakis, “Intelligence for Crisis 
Management,” p. 456.  
22Article 121 of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). 
23 Dimitrakis, “Intelligence for Crisis Management,” p. 456. 
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The power vacuum in Athens was relatively short-lived. Papandreou’s resignation 
on November 15 paved the way for Costas Simitis, a moderate former Law 
Professor to become Greece’s new Prime Minister, a position he held until 2004. 
Simitis won the party nomination by a narrow margin, with Gerasimos Arsenis, 
the Defense Minister as the third runner-up. Simitis secured the majority of party 
votes and formed a new government on January 21, 1996. Gerasimos Arsenis 
retained his office, despite simmering tensions with Simitis and persisting distrust 
among all premiership candidates. The almost seamless transition to a new 
government, a historically rare phenomenon for the country, would coincide with 
a major security incident. The new government would soon be called to manage 
a crisis that would set the tone in Greek-Turkish affairs for the following years.  
 
7.4: The Crisis 
On December 25 1995, the Turkish merchant vessel Figen Akat ran aground on 
Great Imia, the biggest (18 sq. miles) of the three Imia group of islets in the south-
east Aegean Sea. The Great Imia is an uninhabited islet that lies 2 nautical miles 
from the Greek islet of Kalolimnos and 3.65 nautical miles off the Turkish coast. 
The Turkish captain refused any assistance from the Greek coastguard, arguing 
that the ship was in Turkish territorial waters where Greek authorities had no 
jurisdiction. He also added that had the right to seek the help of Turkish tractors 
for the detachment of his boat. The following day, the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was informed of the incident which did not receive publicity.24 On 
December 27, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted the ship to be 
                                                          
24 Jacobides, “The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchy,” p. 461.  
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towed by Greek tractors, but emphasized to Greek diplomats that the incident 
warranted further discussion.25 Two days later, the Turkish MFA delivered a 
verbal note to the Greek ambassador in which it stated that “… the Kardak islets 
constitute a part of the Turkish territory.”  
The response of the Greek embassy came on January 9, suggesting that there was 
nothing to discuss: the legal status of the islet was clear, postulated by the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne and a 1932 agreement between Italy and Turkey which settled 
the status of the Dodecanese islands (ceded to Greece).26 In Article 15 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey surrendered to Italy “all  rights  and  title  over  the  
following  islands: Stampalia, Rhodes,  Calki,  Scarpanto,  Casos,  Piscopis,  
Misiros, Calimnos, Lipsos,  Simi,  and  Cos,  which  are  now occupied  by  Italy,  
and  the  islets  dependent  thereon.”27 With the 1947 Treaty following the end of 
WWII, Italy ceded sovereignty over the twelve Dodecanese islands and adjacent 
islets to Greece. The next few days saw an intense diplomatic exchange between 
Athens and Ankara which made its way to the Greek press on January 20 1996, 
the eve of the inauguration of the newly appointed Greek government.28 The 
preceding day, the Greek General Staff had ordered high ranking officers to 
review existing contingency plans “towards re-capturing the islets.”29 
In the following days, the Imia issue became sensationally publicized in both 
countries, causing a sense of anxiety in the public sphere and providing an 
opportunity to a number of journalists, political figures and activists from both 
                                                          
25 Kourkoulas, A. (1998), Imia: A Critical Approach of the Turkish Factor, (in Greek), Athens: Sideris, pp. 28-
29. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Hurewitz, J. (ed.) (1956), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. 2: 1914-56, 
Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, p. 120. 
28 Jacobides, “The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchy,” p. 460. 
29 Lymperis, Steering Course in Turbulent Seas, p. 540. 
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countries to exacerbate tensions. A Greek flag was placed by a group of Greek 
citizens on the Great Imia only to be replaced two days later by the Turkish flag 
when a Hurriyet (Turkish daily newspaper) crew landed on the islet on January 
27. The broadcast of this incident ignited sentiments among Greeks in the run up 
to the final phase of the crisis which begun the following morning, when a Greek 
patrol boat was ordered to remove the Turkish flag and (re)hoist the Greek flag in 
its place. A Greek Special Forces detachment was deployed concurrently on the 
Great Imia to ensure that the flag was not removed. The following evening 
(January 29), the Turkish National Security Council was convened, during which 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller demanded the evacuation of the Greek forces from 
the islets and the lowering of the Greek flag, asserting that Turkey was ready to 
use force if Greece did not remove all troops and flags from the islet.  
The Greek military had already begun to increase its presence around the islets at 
that point.30 The operational aspects of the crisis were handled primarily by 
Admiral Lymperis, an influential figure in the Greek military establishment who, 
on January 29, insisted that a naval task force be dispatched to the area, a request 
endorsed by the Greek Defence Minister. On January 30, the Greek MoD reported 
that “the entire Greek fleet is sailing in the Aegean”.31 The Greek task force, 
comprised of frigates, destroyers and submarines constituted admittedly a 
disproportionate response relative to the Turkish forces present in the area, risking 
further escalation. On the same day, Greek infantry units in northern Greece (near 
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the Greek-Turkish border) and the Dodecanese islands were put on alert while 
reservists from nearby islands received draft notices.32  
According to reports coming from Nicosia, Turkish Cypriot armed forces were 
ordered to assume positions close to the Green Line, the de-facto border 
separating the two communities.33 While the Greek Army requested the Cypriot 
National Guard to order a general mobilization, the Cypriot President did not 
proceed accordingly, as he feared that this would destabilize the situation in the 
island.34 In the main operational theater around the Imia islets, Turkey positioned 
a substantial naval force, (reports suggest that as many as twenty ships in total 
from both countries were in proximity, including frigates, corvettes and missile 
boats), though there were no signs of a troop mobilization underway in Turkey.  
When information regarding an impending Turkish takeover of another islet 
reached Greek authorities (from a Greek American lobbyist in Washington) in the 
early morning hours of January 31, Admiral Lymperis assessed the conditions to 
be “favorable for a military counter-surprise” and at 01:02 (Athens time), ordered 
the Navy General Staff “to acquire targets among the Turkish Fleet vessels in the 
Aegean.”35 In the meantime, Greek forces had been ordered to respond only if 
fired upon or in case of an attempt by Turkish forces to land on any of the Imia 
islets. At 4.59am, a Greek AB 212 reconnaissance helicopter confirmed that a 
Turkish commando team had been deployed on the (unguarded) smaller Imia islet. 
A Greek contingent was scheduled to be deployed on the same islet earlier but 
failed to do so for technical reasons.  
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A few minutes later, the Greek helicopter reported mechanical failure and the 
Greek frigate Navarino notified Athens that it was unable to locate it. The 
wreckage of the helicopter was spotted later on the same day. The Greek Ministry 
of Defence finally decided not to dispatch the commandos on the small Imia so as 
to avoid escalation.36 By 6.00am, Greek and Turkish forces had agreed to 
disengage and remove all flags from the islets following a series of telephone 
discussions initiated by Washington in which disengagement was agreed, mainly 
through the mediation of Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
Richard Holbrooke and Greek-American lobbyist Philip Christopher. The mutual 
withdrawal was complete within two hours.  
 
7.5: The Origins of Greek Misperceptions 
There is a strong consensus shared among analysts that the Greek political and 
military establishment mismanaged the crisis. A low-level incident led to an 
escalation by the Greek military and the deployment of a major naval force in a 
flashpoint that could have led to open warfare between two NATO allies. Greek 
defence planners, moreover, failed to anticipate the Turkish initiative to seize the 
adjacent islet, appearing confused as to what the Turkish actions would be 
throughout the crisis. A further escalation was averted, mainly due to the 
mediation of external actors, but the fact remains that this incident registered 
Turkish claims in the Aegean Sea and compromised the credibility of Greek 
deterrence. After the crisis, the understanding was that the extension of the 
country’s continental shelf would not be feasible in the current environment. The 
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rather inexplicable nature of Greek actions during the crisis render an assessment 
of Greek in-crisis perceptions necessary and analytically useful.  
Interestingly, the Greek political and military leadership maintained a set of 
perceptions which appears to be consistent with pre-crises assumptions. On 
January 29, the Greek General Staff concluded that “the Turks are raising the 
stakes in the Imia dispute, an issue added to the rest of the challenges. Their goal 
is to force us to bilateral negotiations.”37 It is important to note that this estimate 
came at a point when the press across both sides of the Aegean was playing the 
nationalist card. In spite of sensationalist tones adopted by mainstream media, 
however, Greek decision-makers did not adopt the more alarmist beliefs regarding 
the aims of the Turkish side. On January 26, the Greek Foreign Minister 
Theodoros Pangalos asserted that Turkey did not aim at seizing Greek territory, 
but would use the status of an islet in a calculated way to acquire foreign policy 
gains.38  Nevertheless, questions regarding the counter-productive management 
of the crisis by Greek policy makers remain. Why did Greek political and military 
leaders choose to escalate during a situation which necessitated restraint and 
caution? It is no coincidence that even members of the Turkish government were 
wondering why Athens appeared so keen to escalate the crisis.39 
A simple answer may have been provided by another influential Greek military 
figure of the 1990s: Major General Dimou asserted that Admiral Lymperis’s 
initiative (to dispatch the fleet near the Imia islet flashpoint) was consistent with 
the Greek Navy’s operational doctrine of “deploying a superior force in a 
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particular time and place”, suggesting that the Greek Navy sought to acquire first 
strike capability within its operational theatre.40 On the early hours of January 31, 
admiral Lymperis asserted to senior officers present in the command center: “We 
are very close to confrontation. Prepare for war. I declare a condition of 
preparedness for surprise attack”.41 The very fact that Greece had ceded the 
management of the crisis from January 28 to the Navy (as opposed to maintaining 
it under the control of the less militarized Coast Guard) was a sharply escalatory 
step which admittedly sent a clear and resolute signal to Turkey. The deployment 
of a substantial naval force and the ensuing partial mobilization of reserves 
completed the picture of an almost automated response, all in spite of accurate 
intelligence and converging assessments of Turkish security policy priorities.  
Indeed, the Greek Navy’s response was compatible with the wider Greek security 
strategy which had been articulated in official policy documents. Admiral 
Lymperis admitted that “We had, in 1995, a scenario in our crisis handling 
handbook about an invasion on uninhabited islets; this provided for recapturing 
the islet, taking off the foreign flag, and hoisting the Greek flag”.42 The political 
leadership was not unaware of the military’s operational philosophy. In the 1995 
Ministry of Defence White Paper, it is clearly stated that the “ultimate goal” of 
the Greek security strategy is to provide the Greek armed forces with the capacity 
to not only undertake defensive operations when attacked, but to also be able to 
“transfer the war in the enemy’s territory”.43  
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Overall, it is entirely possible that the Greek political and military apparatus may 
have been aware of changing priorities in Ankara. The two long-term rivals, after 
all, commit a substantial amount of resources in acquiring and analyzing 
information and intelligence from the other side of the Aegean. Nevertheless, for 
some reason this information did not appear to have been properly evaluated and 
operationalized by Greek policy planners. As a result, Greece produced a response 
which was more appropriate to bilateral crises in the 1970s and 1980s and which 
ultimately proved ineffective.  
 
7.6: Managing the Previous Crisis? 
The Greek security strategy before 1996, as suggested, placed an emphasis on 
escalation and the demonstration of resolve which would prevent (or revert) any 
territorial gains by Turkey in the event of conflict. The rationale was that in case 
of war, Turkey would be in a position to acquire further territorial gains in Cyprus, 
nullifying any successful undertakings by Greek forces in the Aegean and/or 
Thrace.44 However, a successful deterrence strategy, particularly in cases where 
there is little scope for “deterrence by denial,”45 requires the challenger to perceive 
the deterrer as both capable and willing to retaliate.46 With a widening capabilities 
gap, Greece’s deterrence credibility had been steadily eroding throughout the 
latter half of the 20th century, necessitating increasingly robust demonstrations of 
resolve. The existence, in geostrategic terms, of multiple possibilities for a fait-
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accompli by Turkey, combined with the near-absence of potential territorial gains 
by Greek forces in the event of conflict47 complicated the projection of deterrence 
credibility. Greek deterrence was further weakened as Turkey’s economic growth 
enabled it to overhaul and expand its military capabilities. By the mid-1990s, 
Turkey was in possession of NATO’s second largest armed forces.  
However, demonstrating the country’s preparedness to escalate if necessary had 
become the pillar of Greece’s security posture and had proven effective when put 
to the test. In early 1987, a Greek-Turkish war was only averted when the Greek 
Prime Minister publicly committed to sink Sismik, a Turkish survey vessel, if it 
continued its route towards Greek territorial waters.48 In what was the most 
dramatic Greek-Turkish crisis between 1974 and 1996, the entire Greek naval 
fleet was deployed in a demonstration of resolve, aimed at deterring the Turkish 
fleet from crossing into Greek territory.49 The particular crisis, considered to have 
been successfully managed by the Greek government, was a catalyst for a 
temporary détente between Greece and Turkey, spearheaded by Greek Prime 
Minister George Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal, embodied 
by the Davos declaration, signed in January 1988 at the World Economic Forum.50 
Therefore, while Greek perceptions of Turkey’s intention to establish its claims 
over the Aegean Sea were accurate, crisis management in Athens was still 
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operating under an obsolete set of calculations. The preceding crises of 1974 
(culminating in a brief Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus) and 1987 (when 
Greece threatened openly with war should Turkey proceed with its seismic 
exploration activities in the Aegean Sea) depended upon the notion that deterrence 
was contingent on escalation and robust demonstrations of resolve. A reputation 
for resolve provides leverage in crises, as threats by previously resolute leaders 
are unlikely to be dismissed as bluffs, making enemies more likely to capitulate.51 
In the Imia crisis, the new Greek Prime Minister probably hoped to take advantage 
of Greece’s post-1974 track record, which indicated that the country was prepared 
to escalate. However, this strategy could no longer be effective; the capabilities 
gap, on the one hand, had reached a historical high point, providing Turkey with 
a degree of confidence regarding its prospects in the event of a full-scale conflict. 
On the other hand, the complex nature of the maritime dispute with Greece had 
opened the door to a new operational approach by Ankara, emboldened by the 
increasing technological and training sophistication of its armed forces. 
Issues of jurisdiction across maritime routes mattered greatly to Turkey, a country 
that regarded itself as a rising Eastern Mediterranean naval power, which sought 
the acknowledgement and recognition of its neighbours, rather than the 
acquisition of a Greek island or islet.  The new Turkish understanding of its rivalry 
with Greece implied that a direct invasion (a long standing concern among Greek 
policymakers) was giving way to a politico-military attrition strategy aimed at 
gains in the diplomatic arena. Moreover, Turkey had just agreed to join the E.U. 
Customs Union (December 31, 1995) and at that point sought vigorously to be 
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nominated an accession candidate country.52 Following years of negotiations and 
adjustments, it now relied on Greece’s green light as well (each E.U. member 
possesses veto powers in core issue areas such as E.U. membership) in order to 
take the next step in its engagement with the Union, including the release of much 
needed structural funds from Brussels (Turkey’s per capita GDP stood at 5,682 
USD (PPP) in 1995, which classifies it as a low to mid income country).  
It is safe to assume that a Turkish attack on an E.U. member state would put an 
end to its prospects to join the Union, adversely impacting the country’s 
modernization momentum. This would also come at a moment when Turkey faced 
a number of serious security threats; the Kurdish question, the rise of Islamism 
within the country as well as ongoing tensions with Syria, had created a heated 
atmosphere in Ankara, threatening to derail the country’s recently impressive 
political and economic track record.  
Overall, while there is no evidence that the “grey zones” paradigm was an official 
Turkish security doctrine in 1996, Greek policy-makers shared a common (and 
accurate) conception of changing Turkish priorities. Both intelligence and 
political estimates in Athens converged on the nature of Turkish goals. 
Nevertheless, the nuanced and systematic manner in which these would affect 
Turkey’s military conduct in the Aegean were not properly assessed before the 
1996 crisis. As a result, Greece’s response to the crisis was contradictory, 
reflecting obsolete considerations and resultantly compromised Greek interests.  
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7.7: The Relevance of Domestic Factors 
The Aegean Sea crisis was both initiated and escalated as soon as the press 
exposed the ship and flag incidents respectively. The role of the press in the crisis 
provided for an alternative explanation, one that renders nationalistic media on 
both sides of the Aegean responsible for the escalation, if not for the creation, of 
the crisis.53 Indeed, the advent of the “CNN effect” in the late Cold War period 
enabled political scientists such as Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow to suggest 
that the media may bear an impact on decision-making.54 And this particular crisis 
was an instance where the media undoubtedly affected crisis dynamics, with 
Turkish journalists lowering the Greek and hoisting the Turkish flag in Imia.  
Both governments, moreover, appeared to be vulnerable to media and popular 
pressure at the time. When the crisis erupted, the Greek government was newly 
appointed, following months of political limbo during the hospitalization of 
former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. The new government, led by the 
moderate academic Costas Simitis, was trying to establish itself in the domestic 
political scene, while Turkey was recovering from an inconclusive national 
election held in December 1995, with competing parties unable to agree on a 
coalition government. Finally, a number of researchers examined media and 
political attitudes during the crisis, concluding that “except for few and ineffective 
calls for calmness, democratic actors, especially the media and opposition parties, 
asked for tougher military measures against the other country.”55  
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Bayar and Kotelis examined the Greek press in depth, citing popular centre-left 
(To Vima) and center-right (Kathimerini and Eleftheros Typos) newspapers and 
suggested that “The immediate involvement of the media contributed to the sharp 
escalation of the crisis. The reports on the news were blended with nationalism 
and chauvinism that exacerbated enemy images and portrayed the other side as a 
villain state. Subsequently, an impression was created that the crisis was a zero-
sum game and that even the slightest tactical retreat would mean significant gains 
for the other side.”56 This depiction of the Greek press is adequately accurate, with 
media on both sides of the Aegean emphasizing the aggressiveness of the 
“other”57, though a small number of Greek media (such as the left-leaning 
Eleftherotypia) downplayed the severity of the crisis, emphasizing the importance 
of diplomatic efforts underway and a resolution based on international law.58   
Nevertheless, this line of thinking cannot account for the change of Greek policy 
after the end of the crisis, despite the escalation of aggressive media offerings. 
Indeed, if “aggressive” and “chauvinistic” media played a pivotal role in shaping 
leadership perceptions during the crisis, then one can only wonder why this was 
not the case in the aftermath of the crisis. The Greek media’s reaction following 
the disengagement of the Greek Navy and the withdrawal of the Greek flag was 
fierce. The popularity of the new Greek Prime Minister dropped from 80% only 
two days before the crisis to 36%.59 However, Greece’s cautious posture towards 
Turkey in the ensuing months did not give in to either popular or media pressure, 
despite being initially supported by a minority of the electorate and treated with 
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scepticism, if not hostility, by mainstream media. Finally, it was already suggested 
that the perceptions of the Greek leadership appeared largely unchanged regarding 
the specific political and legal motivations of Turkey. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Greek decision makers viewed Turkey’s goals under a different prism 
at any stage during, or in the aftermath of, the Aegean Sea crisis. 
Another plausible explanation for the mismanagement of the crisis by the Greek 
side is related to the country’s domestic political dynamics. This explanation 
would render the particular crisis an episode of brinkmanship. According to 
Thomas Schelling, brinkmanship is “a technique of compellation which creates a 
usually shared risk.”60 While the new government in Athens was led by moderate 
Costas Simitis, his cabinet was largely controlled by hardliners who were not only 
suspicious of Turkish activities, but also sought an opportunity to overthrow 
Simitis and assume control of the party and the government. Led by Defence 
Minister Gerasimos Arsenis, this block allegedly hijacked the decision-making 
process, bringing about an escalation aimed at serving the political interests of the 
nationalist PASOK faction.61  
Finally, one could also entertain the possibility that Simitis himself would benefit 
from an escalation in Greek-Turkish affairs. Weak administrations are also 
considered vulnerable to the temptation of brinkmanship crises which may be 
employed to consolidate their hold on power.62 The diversionary war hypothesis, 
more specifically, suggests that leaders who face problems domestically may 
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undertake adventurous foreign policies that they would not otherwise pursue.63 
Even if their adventurism fails, the logic posits that leaders may still be tempted 
to pursue such a course of action, as long they anticipate that they will be removed 
from office anyway. The diversionary war paradigm implies that domestic 
political considerations drive the formation of foreign policy but the relationship 
may be more complicated. In fact, leaders may both “care” about state interests 
and their own political survival.64 For this reason, a leader could benefit from a 
crisis he did not himself initiate to advance his personal goals.  
There is little supportive evidence for any of the aforementioned scenarios. A 
detailed scrutiny in the aftermath of the crisis revealed that the main political 
decision makers during the crisis were the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister 
and the Defence Minister, as verified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.65 At no point did any of the protagonists indicate disapproval of the steps 
taken to escalate the crisis. More importantly, all initiatives taken by the Greek 
side were in accordance with existing military plans, which had been endorsed by 
the previous administration. In fact, hard-liners or nationalists within the PASOK 
government had little to do with the steps that escalated the crisis. Initially, it was 
the Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, who publicly confirmed the 
standoff in the Imia islets during a radio news interview on January 26.66  
Pangalos’s rhetoric had been far from diplomatic in certain instances but it can be 
safely said that his standing in the government and the ruling party was, in the 
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context of the new administration, firm and satisfactory on a personal level. At 
the same time, Pangalos exerted strenuous diplomatic efforts in an attempt to 
defuse tensions, while during the course of the crisis he tried to publicly downplay 
the seriousness of the incident.67 In the final hours of the crisis, it was Pangalos 
who suggested the withdrawal of Greek warships and subsequently the 
withdrawal of the Greek flag.68 Furthermore, there is no evidence of any kind of 
debate between “hawks” and “doves” or any disagreement for that matter among 
Greek actors prior to the dramatic hours that led to the resolution of the crisis. 
Meanwhile, the moderate Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis handled the crisis 
in an assertive manner, reflecting a consensus among cabinet members. On 
January 29, Simitis stated that “Greece’s response will be strong, direct, and 
effective. Greece has the means and will not hesitate to use them.”69  
This was not mere rhetoric: the partial mobilization on the evening of January 29 
could not have taken place without the consent of the Greek Prime Minister. The 
press conference held in Athens on the following day took place after a cabinet 
meeting led by Prime Minister Simitis. During the press conference, the Greek 
government sent a clear signal that it was ready to further militarize the dispute 
with Athens rejecting any proposals for mediation by the EU, the UN or NATO.70 
Throughout the crisis, the Greek military handled the situation in accordance with 
procedures and parameters set by the political leadership. In the final hours of the 
crisis, Admiral Lymperis suggested to dispatch troops to engage the Turkish 
commandos who had landed in the smaller islet. This is when the Greek political 
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leadership diverged from the course set by the Greek military, indicating that the 
options presented by Lymperis and his staff were politically unacceptable.71  
 
7.8: The Aftermath: Adapting to a New Environment 
The prospects for stability in Greek-Turkish relations looked grim following the 
end of the Imia crisis. Not only did the incident end in a stalemate that further 
undermined the status quo in the Aegean Sea, but it also engendered an aggressive 
media coverage and a political furore in Athens. In his excellent timeline of the 
crisis, Jacobides explores some of the headlines in the Greek mainstream press on 
the following days: “And now? What do we do if Turkey strikes again?” 
wondered the pro-government Eleftherotypia, whereas Kathimerini bitterly 
commented on “Small (leaders) in vital times: No one felt the obligation to resign 
after the national defeat they led us into.”72  
The reputations of the political and military leadership were tarnished. The Greek 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was unceremoniously dismissed while 
questions were raised in the Greek parliament and media regarding the lowering 
of the Greek flag in Imia and the non-military response to the Turkish incursion 
on the smaller islet. Opposition leader Miltiades Evert asserted that that the 
withdrawal of the Greek flag constituted an abandonment of national territory and 
should be considered an act of treason.73 The Greek government also viewed the 
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EU’s neutrality critically, threatening to reopen the issue of an EU customs union 
accord with Turkey and block Union funds earmarked for Turkey.74  
However, contrary to expectations that the aftermath of the crisis could lead to a 
tense security dilemma, Athens adopted a conciliatory diplomatic approach 
towards Ankara (with NATO, EU and US encouragement), initiated through 
military confidence building measures, including a hot line between military 
commanders and the exchange of dates when major military exercises would be 
undertaken so as to avoid scheduling conflicts (measures proposed by NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana and endorsed by both governments). In 1997, 
during a NATO meeting in Madrid, the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and 
the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis adopted a joint declaration affirming the 
two countries’ intention to abstain from unilateral actions which could lead to a 
conflict and committed to the peaceful resolution of bilateral issues.75  
The settlement of disputes based on international law provisions became a 
cornerstone of Greek foreign policy and the Greek MFA requested Turkey to have 
all issues “dealt with by legal means provided for by international law and 
specifically the International Court of Justice (ICJ).”76 Greek overtures were not 
limited to the effective acknowledgement of Turkish interests in the Aegean,77 but 
took an unprecedented turn in the following years, culminating in the December 
1999 (during the Helsinki EU Summit) relinquishment of the Greek veto to 
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Turkey’s bid for EU accession. 78 The latter initiative, considered to signify a 
critical juncture in modern Greek-Turkish relations, sought to internationalize 
Greek security concerns and constrain Turkish behaviour within EU “rules of the 
game.”79 Indeed, the endorsement of democratic norms and values was viewed by 
Greek elites as a potential catalyst for the abatement of Turkish assertiveness.80 
Nevertheless, the novel Greek stance did not originate from a desire to surrender 
or to submit to Turkish objectives. On the contrary, from that point on, all Turkish 
activities aiming at challenging the status quo in the Aegean or Greek positions 
regarding maritime jurisdiction were to be answered through a more elaborate 
politico-military strategy. The doctrine of “flexible response,” adopted by the 
Greek military almost immediately after the Imia crisis,81 was indicative of the 
new understanding among Greek policymakers regarding the future of the Greek-
Turkish militarized rivalry. Emphasizing joint operations, an increased reliance 
on rapid reaction forces and the procurement of modern weapon systems, the 
updated Greek posture envisaged a proportionate reciprocation of hostile actions.  
The concept of flexible response emerged during the Cold War, when the 
conventional forces in Europe of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries were 
in relative parity, thereby negating the need for an American reliance on the 
“massive retaliation” doctrine which rendered a nuclear exchange a rather 
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plausible crisis outcome.82 Flexible response allows forces to adapt and react to 
the specific circumstances posed by a threat or attack. At the same time, flexible 
response requires a degree of situation awareness and gradual escalation which 
are only made possible through the procurement of technologically advanced 
systems and the creation of highly mobile forces. As a result, the adoption of this 
strategy entails increased defence spending levels and advanced organizational 
capabilities which would allow, for instance, the undertaking of complex joint 
operations. The American experience in the early days of the Kennedy 
administration (under McNamara’s guidance) was characteristic of the financial, 
organizational and operational challenges associated with this doctrine.83 
By replacing the prior deterrence doctrine based on the threat of escalation and 
unpredictability, Greek strategists hoped to respond effectively in future crises, 
without facing the daunting dilemma of retreat or an all-out war. The underlying 
logic in the Greek case was that in the event of hostile takeover of, for instance, 
an islet by Turkish forces, Greek forces would respond at an equal or comparable 
level, so that Greece would attain leverage towards returning to the status quo 
through negotiation.84 In the following years, the flexible response doctrine 
became a cornerstone of Greek security thinking. Athanasios Tzoganis, the new 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the application of flexible 
response in future crises in the Aegean as early as 1997.85 And according to the 
2000 “White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces,” three elements constitute the 
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basis of Greece’s defence planning: defensive sufficiency, flexible response, and 
the joint defence area (Greece’s extended deterrence coverage to Cyprus).86 
This shift was indicative of a major perceptual change. While Greek intelligence 
on Turkish intentions appeared to be accurate before the onset and during the Imia 
crisis, it was only after the crisis that these motivations were properly assimilated, 
reflecting the new tactical realities that the Greek military had to face. Indeed, in 
his memoirs, then Prime Minister Costas Simitis repeatedly asserts that he 
understood the Imia crisis as a manifestation of the Turkish aim to challenge the 
legitimate Greek rights in the Aegean.87 That was an accurate assessment, 
rendered more important by Simitis’s sound objective which was to “avoid 
confrontation and troops amassing.”88 The flawed Greek response, however, 
indicates that misperceptions of Turkish tactics and capabilities were pervasive, 
leading to a crisis mismanagement that almost led the two countries to war.  
The Greek strategic realignment following the Imia crisis appeared to be a natural, 
well-calibrated response to Turkey’s behaviour. However, one has to point out 
that for years after its adoption, this shift was far from uncontroversial among 
Greek strategy thinkers. Two years after the Imia crisis, the perception that 
Turkey’s real goal was to crush the Greek armed forces and seize Greek territory 
was existent and frequently expressed across Greek media, for instance.89 
Prominent analysts and academics suggested that Turkey had acquired a first 
strike capability in the course of recent years and for this reason was willing to 
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engage Greece in militarized crises. Therefore, Greece should, according to this 
line of thinking, follow suit and acquire strategic weapons that could provide its 
armed forces with a first strike capability.90 
While assessments such as the aforementioned were present in the Greek political 
discourse, successive Greek governments were confident that they would have to 
face a low intensity, attrition-based campaign by Turkey, aimed at establishing 
legal and political claims in a sensitive maritime area. As the 1996 crisis faded 
from memory, an assumption among Greeks prevailed that Turkey would not seek 
an all-out war between the two countries but “a series of low level threats in a 
number of issue areas.”91 And the doctrine of flexible response appeared to be a 
highly compatible policy response to this new page of the centuries-old rivalry 
between the two countries. However, the new strategy also required new 
armaments and capabilities previously unavailable to Greek armed forces despite 
consistently high defence spending levels. This was a necessity, so as to acquire 
advanced technological capabilities and create highly mobile forces.92  
Thus, while in the diplomatic front and the tactical level Greece emphasized de-
escalation and diplomatic engagement, the Greek Prime Minister announced in 
1996 a five-year, USD 17 billion military overhaul program, the biggest 
procurement program in the history of the Greek armed forces.93 It was calculated 
that this initiative would singlehandedly increase Greece’s public debt from 30% 
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to 40% of its GDP.94  At first glance, an overhaul of this magnitude could act as a 
catalyst for further crises, particularly when the domestic political atmosphere 
could render a revanchist stance a highly tempting choice among Greek voters. 
Moreover, this procurement program would send a signal to Ankara which could 
also be viewed with apprehension. However, the ensuing stability in bilateral 
relations indicates that Greek perceptions were now better aligned with the 
realities of the rivalry, adapting to the Turkish operational conduct in the Aegean, 
even though disputes between the two countries remain, to this day, unresolved.  
It has to be noted that this stability was achieved in spite of challenges posed by 
Ankara. Following the Imia crisis, the Turkish military would regularly dispute 
the status of inhabited islands (for the first time after 1923), in an effort to force 
Greece to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of maritime jurisdiction issues. 
In May 30 1996, during the planning of NATO exercise “Dynamic Mix 1996”, 
the Turkish representative asserted that the inhabited island of Gavdos, located 
south-west of Crete, is another “grey” area for Turkey.95 In the following years, 
Turkish officials have repeatedly reiterated the existence of “grey zone” areas in 
the Aegean Sea, usually in the form of islands, islets and rocks not specifically 
mentioned in international or bilateral treaties. 96  
Of course, there is always a possibility that even a low level incident accidentally 
leads to an escalation. On October 1996, a Turkish F-16 crashed in the Aegean 
after a tense dogfight with a Greek fighter jet, with Turkish authorities claiming 
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that it was shot down by the Greek Air-Force.97 In the following years, a number 
of similarly tense incidents took place. In May 2006, a Greek and a Turkish F-16 
collided during a mock dogfight resulting in the destruction of both planes and the 
death of the Greek pilot.98 According to the Greek Air-Force General Staff, in the 
decade 2000-2009, the Greek Air-Force scrambled 19,888 aircraft in order to 
intercept Turkish fighter jets over the Aegean Sea.99 Minor incidents involving 
the two coastguards and navies are equally frequent but the emphasis on 
proportionate response and de-escalation has enabled Greece to avoid a 
conflagration that would put the country’s leadership in an adverse position.  
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Chapter 8: 
 
The 2008 South-Ossetia Crisis 
 
 
8.1: Introduction  
On August 7 2008, after a series of militarized incidents that had taken place 
during the preceding days, the Georgian army launched a military offensive aimed 
at reasserting control over the secessionist province of South Ossetia. The 
following day, the Georgian government announced the capture of Tskhinvali, the 
South Ossetian capital, which was devastated by rocket and artillery fire.1 In the 
meantime, however, Russia, South Ossetia’s long-term ally, had launched a full-
scale counter-offensive against Georgian forces located in both the secessionist 
territory and other parts of Georgia. In the ensuing days, Russian forces succeeded 
in not only driving the Georgian military out of the province, but also in opening 
a second front in Georgia’s other separatist province of Abkhazia.2  
Before their eventual withdrawal in late August, the approximately 20,000 
Russian troops who had taken part in the operation had advanced deep into 
Georgian territory, inflicting heavy damage and casualties in the cities of Gori, 
Poti and Senaki. Assets of the Georgian military and civilian infrastructure were 
destroyed, including the railway connection between the eastern and western parts 
of the country. While figures remain unconfirmed, some 238 Georgians were 
killed, almost 1,500 were wounded and over 100,000 Georgians were displaced 
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due to the conflict.3 In South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch puts the death toll in 
the lower hundreds, but the exact number of casualties has yet to be verified.  
This chapter will forego the wider repercussions of Russia’s first military foray 
into another sovereign state since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; instead, it 
will mainly focus on Georgia’s strategically absurd decision to attack what was in 
essence a Russian protectorate, obliterating a Russian base and targeting its 
personnel in the process. While in retrospect there is little doubt that Georgian 
calculations were highly erroneous, leading to a grave strategic blunder, the 
source of these calculations has thus far remained unclear. 
This chapter suggests that the Georgian strategic blunder could be attributed to 
misperceptions engendered during preceding crises in 2003 and 2004. While other 
factors may have also influenced decision-makers in Tbilisi, their expectations 
appear to have been decisively shaped by prior events and the dynamics of the 
environment in which they had transpired. In 2008, however, Georgian policy 
planners failed to take into account a series of powerful signals coming from 
Moscow in the run-up to the conflict, in addition to significant geopolitical shifts 
that should have been properly assessed by policymakers. As a result, Georgian 
perceptions remained inaccurate during the crisis, leading to a catastrophic war 
which undermined the security of both the country and the wider region.  
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Figure 8-A: Georgia and the Secessionist Provinces 
  
                                                                                                                                             Source: Wikipedia 
 
 
 
8.2: Historical Overview  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caucasus has been one of 
the focal points of post-Cold War conflicts, with violence erupting as a result of 
persistent differences over borders and the reassertion of dormant ethnic 
identities. The country of Georgia has mainly existed as part of the Russian 
Empire since the early 19th century, while Ossetians joined the Russian empire as 
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an independent unit in the 1750s. During Georgia’s short-lived independence 
from 1918 to 1921, it incorporated in its territory the provinces of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. In the Soviet years, Stalin, first as Commissar for Nationalities and 
later in his capacity as the General Secretary of the Communist Party, granted 
(nominally) South Ossetia and Abkhazia the right to secede from Georgia,4 a right 
exercised by both provinces following Georgian independence in 1991. Shortly 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Ossetians had already declared a 
status of autonomy (September 1990), abolished by the Georgian Supreme Soviet 
on December 11, 1990. This denial led to tensions, which escalated to armed 
conflict by early 1991.5 Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s (the first post-Soviet Georgian 
President) campaign to reassert Georgia’s authority over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia through military means came to an end in December 1991, when he was 
overthrown by former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze. 
In May 1992, a peace agreement ended hostilities and effectively acknowledged 
the de facto independence of South Ossetia, whose ethnic communities continued 
to share the Ossetian territory.6 The province, however, remained part of the 
Georgian state. In the following years, relations between Georgia and its 
breakaway regions were tense but relatively stable, showing the trademark signs 
of “frozen conflicts.”  Effectively, since the 1992 “Agreement on the Principles 
of the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict between Georgia and Russia,” 
no military confrontations had occurred in the disputed region.7 Indeed, the joint 
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peacekeeping operation can be considered a success between 1992 and 2003, with 
a stable security outlook and unhindered trans-border movement and trade.8 
In 2003, the “Rose Revolution” brought Mikhail Saakashvilli to power. 
Saakashvili was the lead figure of the peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi against 
Shevardnadze’s “Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG)” party efforts to force a 
fraudulent election result.9 Protestors managed to secure Shevardnadze’s 
resignation and in January 2004, the newly elected Saakashvili promised to 
restore Georgia’s territorial integrity within his first term.10 For Georgia, 
reintegrating its separatist provinces was not simply a matter of national pride. 
The porous borders of these regions facilitated illicit trade and the proliferation of 
asymmetrical threats, compromising the nation’s security.  
Moreover, Russia’s encroachment on Georgian sovereignty through the provision 
of financial incentives, paramilitary personnel and equipment, along with 
passports to Ossetians and Abkhazians, cast a shadow on the prospects of the 
small Caucasian democracy to take control of its own destiny in international 
politics. In short, the frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia undermined 
the Georgians’ desire and effort to secure a candidate status with both NATO and 
the European Union, organizations they aspired to join.  
Initially, the new Georgian leadership appeared conciliatory towards Russia, 
especially after the former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s positive 
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contribution towards resolving the Georgian political crisis by “encouraging” 
Shevardnadze to resign.11 The vibe was definitely positive when President-elect 
Saakashvili attended a Kremlin summit on February 2004. Concrete steps were 
taken by the Georgian government, which initiated a crackdown on Chechen 
separatists operating in Georgia, with Russia reciprocating through economic and 
energy-related rewards.12 Improving bilateral relations was regarded as an 
important factor in securing a settlement in Georgia’s frozen conflicts, as Moscow 
maintained a peacekeeping force in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and was 
widely viewed as the guarantor of their security.13 Events between 2004 and 2008 
will be described in detail, after the examination of the 2008 crisis and war.  
 
8.3: Crisis, Escalation and War 
On the night of July 3 2008, Georgians and South Ossetians exchanged artillery 
fire after a roadside mine injured Dmitriy Sanakoyev, the head of the pro-
Georgian government in South Ossetia (not recognized by Ossetians). A few days 
earlier, a local police officer had been killed by a bomb attack and the atmosphere 
was already tense in Tskhinvali. The skirmishes that ensued in South Ossetian 
villages between paramilitary forces of both sides escalated during the last week 
of July with shellings and shootouts between Georgian and Ossetian positions in 
the province. On August 1, a roadside bomb attack on a Georgian vehicle 
triggered a further escalation and an exchange of fire between Tskhinvali and 
positions in the Georgian-controlled villages to its south, during which six 
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Ossetians died.14 On August 4, the South Ossetian self-proclaimed leader, Eduard 
Kokoity, issued an ultimatum to Georgia, demanding that all armed forces be 
withdrawn, warning that Ossetians would “take the most decisive measures in 
order to resolve this problem for good,” should Georgians fail to comply.15 
On the evening of August 7, Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire and 
reaffirmed the official position that South Ossetia would be granted increased 
autonomy within the Georgian state.16 Georgian troops had already advanced 
inside South Ossetian territory in the days preceding the conflict, assuming 
control of strategic points around Tskhinvali, while the Georgian peacekeeping 
force had returned to Georgia, in anticipation of the major offensive.17 At 11:35pm 
the Georgian military initiated a large-scale offensive, responding to an alleged 
shelling of Georgian villages in South Ossetia18 (the Georgian government argued 
that it began its attack only after Russian tanks had crossed the Roki Tunnel 
connecting Russia and South Ossetia.)19  
Russia’s response came swiftly. On August 8, Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev asserted that the previous day, “Georgian troops committed what 
amounts to an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian 
population in South Ossetia.”20 Medvedev referred to the attack against the 
Russian Peacekeeping Force in Tskhinvali which was undertaken by Georgian 
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forces in the morning of August 8. By noon, Russian peacekeepers manning the 
base had sustained their first two casualties.21 The Russian President further 
characterized Georgian actions as a violation of international law as well of the 
mandate accorded to Russia in the peace process.22 
In the following hours, some 20,000 Russian troops entered South Ossetia and 
rapidly spread into the other secessionist province of Abkhazia. Opening a second 
front was a deliberate move, with Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia assisting 
local forces in executing offensive operations in the Kodori valley (the only part 
of Abkhazia still controlled by Georgian forces) and the border city of Gali. 
Reinforcements arrived by sea, with the Russian Black Sea fleet securing 
positions along the Georgian coastline and establishing a naval blockade in order 
to secure Abkhazia’s coast. Russian ships quickly engaged the relatively small 
Georgian naval forces (Russian forces later took full control of the Georgian naval 
base of Poti, where they sunk four Georgian vessels).23  
Russian units then moved beyond the two enclaves, expanding their operations 
deep inside Georgian territory by August 10, occupying the towns of Gori, 
Zugdidi and Senaki, while the Russian Air-Force (backed by Su-24s Fencer and 
Su-27 Flanker fighter jets as well as Tu-22 Backfire bombers) destroyed targets 
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in Gori, Rustavi and Tbilisi.24 On the same day, Georgia declared a ceasefire and 
begun withdrawing its forces from South Ossetia.25  
The war ended on August 12 with the mutually agreed “six point plan,” 
establishing a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia with French mediation. 
Nevertheless, Russian forces attacked the Georgian city of Gori on August 13 and 
for the next week, they appeared reluctant to disengage from positions within 
Georgian territory.26 The agreement was finally signed on August 16, stipulating 
that Russia and Georgia should withdraw their forces to the positions they held 
before the onset of hostilities. The Russian government announced that the goal 
of coercing Georgia to peace had been achieved and its operations were 
concluded, with Georgian forces pushed out of both South Ossetia and the Kodori 
Valley, the sole part of Abkhazia Georgian forces controlled before the crisis.27  
 
8.4: Non-Perceptual Factors 
There is little doubt among analysts that dispatching Georgian forces in South 
Ossetia was a miscalculation by Mikhail Saakashvili. However, miscalculation in 
international politics does not equal misperception. Saakashvili and his 
administration may have been well aware of Russian intentions and Moscow’s 
capacity to threaten Georgia, but may have still chosen to go down the path of 
escalation. How can we ascertain that erroneous perceptions were in fact directly 
relevant to the mismanagement of the 2008 crisis? A widespread explanation, for 
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example, wants the Georgian leader to have fallen victim of his own ambition and 
confrontational character.28 A related scenario views the conflict through the lens 
of a “diversionary war” narrative. According to its proponents, Georgian 
nationalist sentiments were manipulated by Saakashvilli and members of his 
party. The potential rationale is eloquently exposed by Cooley and Mitchell:  
“The Georgian government was coming off a six-month period which had seen a 
government crackdown on street demonstrations, followed by a state of 
emergency and two elections, held in January and May of 2008. The elections 
themselves strengthened Saakashvili and UNM’s formal grip on power, though 
the elections were assessed as being less than democratic by international 
monitors and even more critically by domestic observers. Even though economic 
development in Georgia was good overall, the benefits had not yet trickled down 
to ordinary Georgians, and still came far short of the unrealistic expectations set 
by the Georgian government. The political support of the administration, 
therefore, continued to weaken even as its formal power grew. Tbilisi’s strategy 
for remaining strong in the face of these unmet expectations and political turmoil 
was to raise expectations again-this time over the future of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.”29  
Saakashvili’s democratic credentials were being eroded, giving way to totalitarian 
practices, even though his reformist rhetoric had remained intact. The Georgian 
leader did not hesitate to expose his sense of domestic insecurity, asserting for 
instance that “Georgia doesn’t need a European model, we want a Singapore or 
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Dubai model here.”30 While it is difficult to measure the extent to which 
personality traits and domestic calculations affected the decision to launch an 
operation in South Oseetia, the impact of such characteristics does not necessarily 
contravene a misperception-based explanation. After all, personality deficits in 
leaders render decision-making even more prone to misperception, creating the 
base for irrational cost-benefit analyses. Finally, one has to consider the 
possibility that the Georgian leadership was in fact coerced into a conflict it did 
not seek. In other words, it is worth exploring the possibility that Georgia was 
either attacked or faced an imminent attack by Russian forces, a situation that 
would substantially limit available options to the country’s decision makers.   
Indeed, a consensus among the Georgian elite posited that Russia was already 
assimilating the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with some 
analysts going as far as suggesting that Russia had decided long before August 
2008 to deploy its military in order to consolidate position.31 Scott Horton, an 
expert in the law of armed conflict at Columbia University provided such a 
narrative: “I think he [Saakashvili] knew the Russians were looking for an 
opportunity or a pretext to seize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He felt he had a last 
opportunity to consolidate South Ossetia because the Russian plan was already 
laid.”32 A related account sees Russian preparations to invade Georgia, and even 
enforce a regime change in Tbilisi.33 While the imminence of a Russian attack has 
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not acquired much credence in the relevant literature, these explanations insert an 
element of necessity in Georgian actions that is worth evaluating.  
Upon a closer inspection, however, the “necessity” of Georgian choices can only 
be questioned. Besides the fact that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had enjoyed a 
form of de facto independence for almost two decades, the imminence of a 
Russian attack seems unsupported by evidence. Russian military manoeuvres 
were held in proximity to South Ossetia for years, while the balance of power 
between Georgia and the separatist provinces had shifted dramatically to 
Georgia’s favour after 2004, without a Russian response. Thus, neither a Russian 
attack nor a status quo change appeared more probable in 2008. By that year, the 
South Ossetian tank strength had been reduced to about 10 obsolete T-55s, barely 
capable of competing with the newly procured Georgian battle tanks.34 Other 
types of weaponry such as heavy artillery and rocket systems were also limited 
with ammunition stocks at low levels in both secessionist provinces. And while 
South Ossetia hosted a contingent of Russian peacekeepers (about 2,300), the 
lightly armed force was in no position to pose a threat to the Georgian army.35  
 That is not to say that Russia was not aiming at increasing its influence on both 
provinces. The “creeping assimilation” thesis remains plausible, but the Georgian 
leadership was far from “forced” to act. Russian troops were only deployed in the 
early hours of August 8, seven hours after the Georgian operation was initiated.36 
A NATO intelligence officer, when asked whether unusual Russian troop 
                                                          
34 Pukhov, R. (ed.) (2010), The Tanks of August, Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 
p. 39.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Antonenko, “A War without Winners,” p. 24. According to the Tagliavini Report (the commonly known 
name of the report by the Council of the European Union’s Independent International Fact Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia) “open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military operation against the town 
of Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas, launched in the night of 7 to 8 August 2008” (Vol. I, p. 19).  
135 
 
movements had been detected prior to the outbreak of hostilities, admitted that 
there were “none whatsoever. And that’s the honest truth.”37 Russian soldiers 
“reacted with surprise to the Georgian attack that followed—as though their own 
intelligence  did not alert ground forces during the days and hours leading up to 
it.”38 Finally, the historical record indicates that countries initiating wars usually 
have their leaders coordinating actions from the capital. It is unlikely that Russia 
was planning to start a war when the both President and the Prime Minister were 
away from Moscow; On August 7, Putin was in Beijing for the 2008 Olympics 
opening ceremony, while Medvedev was on a working trip to the Volga region.39  
While Moscow’s capacity for strategic deception is indisputable, there is a 
growing consensus, even among Western analysts, on the course of events in 
2008: Georgia initiated a large scale operation in order to “capture the city in the 
shortest possible time and to hand over nominal control of the territory to a pro-
Georgian administration.”40 Thus, in the dramatic summer of 2008, the Georgian 
government had at the very least a few alternative courses of action, rendering the 
scrutiny of perceptions useful to our analysis. But shedding light on Georgian 
perceptions in 2008 requires us to closely examine their evolution since the 
preceding crises of 2003-2004, which set the tone for events occurring in 2008.  
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8.5: The 2003 - 2004 Ajaran and South Ossetian Crises 
From the early days of the “Rose Revolution,” Mikhail Saakashvili and his Prime 
Minister, Zurab Zhvania, pledged to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity, 
committing that this would be achieved within the new government’s first term. 
On July 20 2004, Saakashvili adopted a more assertive tone, stating that the 
Dagomys Accords that ended the early 1990s war between Georgia and South 
Ossetia would be renounced if the Georgian flag did not fly over Tskhinvali.41 He 
was undoubtedly emboldened by his first success which had come earlier, when 
the leader of Ajara capitulated to an ultimatum set by Tbilisi in 2003. 
 Ajara, a secessionist Georgian province (populated by ethnic Georgians), had 
retained its status of autonomy after the collapse of the Soviet Union within the 
newly independent Georgian state. In April 2000, the Georgian Parliament 
officially granted Ajara the status of an autonomous republic.42 The specific 
division of powers, however, between Tbilisi and Ajara was not clarified. Ajara’s 
fortunes were predominantly determined by the ambition of the region’s head 
figure, Aslan Abashidze, who took advantage of the central government’s disarray 
to assert his authority, thwarting all opposition to his rule. After establishing a 
series of administrative, political and judicial institutions that de facto removed 
most Ajaran matters from Tbilisi’s jurisdiction, Abashidze officially declared 
himself President in 2003.43  
Reintegration could not be achieved by decree. Abashidze had ensured that most 
of the state structures he created were run by, or closely linked to, the President’s 
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family and powerful supporters.44 The Ajaran leader had also moved to establish 
a firm political presence in Tbilisi, with his “Democratic Revival Union” party 
playing an increasingly significant role in Georgian politics. With Saakashvili’s 
declared intent to strengthen the cohesion of Georgian governance structures, it 
was only a matter of time before Ajara’s relations with Tbilisi deteriorated. 
In March 2004, Ajaran soldiers prevented the newly elected Georgian leader from 
entering the region. Tbilisi responded by imposing an economic blockade, while 
Abashidze warned that tensions could escalate to an all-out conflict. On April 19, 
the commander of the 25th Motor-Rifle brigade, based in the Ajaran capital of 
Batumi, General Dumbadze, declared that his soldiers “answer only to Aslan 
Abashidze, our supreme commander.”45 On May 2, responding to large-scale 
manoeuvres by the Georgian military near the province border, Abashidze’s 
forces blew up two bridges and damaged the railway link connecting Ajara to 
Georgia.46  
For the first time in years, Tbilisi responded assertively, providing a ten day 
ultimatum to the Ajaran leader for the disarmament of his militias. Escalation 
appeared likely at that point. Abashidze enjoyed the support of both his cronies 
and Moscow, similarly to the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Moreover, under a mandate from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Russia had also deployed troops across Ajara’s land and sea 
borders.47 Specifically, Russia’s military base in the Black Sea town of Batumi, 
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the capital of Ajara and a major regional commercial centre, was of particular 
strategic significance. Nevertheless, Tbilisi’s gamble was successful. Abashidze's 
position weakened when members of his cabinet and security forces switched 
sides, joining the pro-Tbilisi demonstrations already taking place in Ajara.48 More 
importantly, Russia removed its support from the separatist leader, allowing 
Georgia to reassert its authority over the province. After consultations with 
Moscow, and the personal mediation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
Abashidze and his associates departed from Ajara in the early hours of May 6 
2004, allowing the central government to regain control of the province.   
Following the swift reintegration of Ajara, Saakashvili’s administration would 
move to “unfreeze” the South Ossetian conflict, through the implementation of a 
“carrot and stick” strategy, consisting of financial incentives and increased 
militarized pressure. In January 2004, the Georgian government offered South 
Ossetia broad autonomy within Georgia under a federative framework. 
Concurrently, Tbilisi began financing new social projects with the aim of winning 
the “hearts and minds” of South Ossetians.49 For South Ossetia’s reintegration to 
be successful, however, the parallel, ad-hoc, economic structures established by 
secessionist authorities had to be disrupted. Saakashvili ordered the closure of the 
Tskhinvali “Ergneti” marketplace (where smuggled goods from Russia were 
traded, among others), which operated under the control of Eduard Kokoity, the 
separatist South Ossetian “President.”50 Tension was almost certain to ensue.  
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On May 31, Georgia deployed several hundred Interior Ministry troops along four 
checkpoints within the South Ossetian conflict zone (though only one of them was 
inside the province.)51 On June 11 2004, amidst accusations that Russia was 
supplying weapons to South Ossetia, Georgian forces confiscated the content of 
two trucks belonging to Russian peacekeepers.52 A day later, the South Ossetian 
militia retaliated by detaining some fifty troops in police uniforms in the ethnically 
Georgian-populated village of Vanati. By late July, tensions had escalated with 
exchanges of gun and mortar fire in many villages across the province. The 
conflict deescalated in late August, but only after a second ceasefire agreement 
was signed on August 18, 2004 by the Joint Control Commission (JCC) co-chairs 
and the Georgian Prime Minister Zhurab Zhvania.53 
 
8.6: Impact on Georgian Perceptions 
The aforementioned crises had a profound impact on Georgian perceptions. 
Moscow’s stance during the Ajara crisis was rather surprising, considering its 
interests in the region. Besides indirectly exercising influence on the province 
through Abashidze, Russia maintained a military base in the strategically located 
Black Sea port city of Batumi, whose status would surely be (at the very least) 
questioned as soon as Georgia reinstated control over the province. After all, the 
question of Russian bases had long caused bitterness between Tbilisi and 
Moscow, often escalating to threats of sanctions or force. Nevertheless, the 
promotion of Russian business interests in Georgia and Moscow’s desire to build 
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rapport with Saakashvili may have contributed towards an “amicable” resolution 
of the Ajaran crisis. The US-Russian détente at the time appears to have also 
played a positive role, with negotiations between the American government and 
Russia reportedly taking place at the highest level during the crisis.54 
However, the specific internal and external conditions which allowed for the 
peaceful resolution of the particular crisis were not carefully evaluated by 
Georgian officials, who referred to Ajara as a model for the future resolution of 
the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.55 Coercion through the use of 
both diplomatic and military means had proven effective, while Western support 
appeared unequivocal throughout the crisis. It has to be noted though, that not all 
foreign analysts shared the Georgian leaders’ newfound optimism regarding the 
future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
A 2004 International Crisis Group report, for instance, accurately noted that Ajara 
“never sought independence based on national self-determination, and its people 
are ethnic Georgians, unlike the Ossetians and Abkhazi. Russia played an 
ambiguous but apparently not unhelpful role in the peaceful resolution of the May 
crisis. With Moscow's perceived security interests much more deeply engaged in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, however, Tbilisi's new round of brinksmanship is 
putting it in direct confrontation with its giant northern neighbour.”56  
Russia’s stance during the 2004 crisis in South Ossetia remains equally puzzling. 
While Georgia eventually withdrew its forces from the region, Georgian troops 
had made advances inside the province, capturing strategic points from which 
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they did not disengage during the withdrawal (figure 8-B).57 And despite 
indications that Russian mercenaries reinforced South Ossetian militias,58 there 
were no signs of a looming Russian counter-offensive, such as troop mobilizations 
or the transfer of heavy weaponry to the Ossetians via the Roki tunnel. On August 
11 2004, the city of Tskhinvali came under heavy fire from Georgian forces and 
on the following days, open warfare appeared imminent (August 13-14); again, 
no evidence of a Russian mobilization.  
Figure 8-B: Georgian-controlled areas (shaded areas) in  
South Ossetia 2004-2008 
 
Source: ICG Europe Report 159, p. 28. 
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Furthermore, all operations in South Ossetia were solely undertaken by Georgian 
forces against South Ossetian militias and possibly paramilitary reinforcements 
from the Caucasus. In critical instances (as in August 14), Russian peacekeepers 
preferred, in fact, to cede control of the situation to Ossetian militias.59 And while 
statements coming from Moscow warned Georgia that Russia would respond to 
any military incursions in South Ossetia,60 Vladimir Putin himself stated that the 
crisis would not evolve into a conflict between Georgia and Russia. “It is not like 
this, and it cannot be like this,” he asserted.61 Nevertheless, the Georgian operation 
was unsuccessful. By mid-August, Georgian positions in villages and strategic 
spots across South Ossetia appeared unsustainable in the face of fierce militia 
resistance, leading to their eventual withdrawal on August 19, 2004.  
 
8.7: Georgian Perceptions between 2004 and 2008 
The crises of 2003 and 2004 in Ajara and South Ossetia had a profound effect on 
Georgian perceptions as well as Georgian strategy. The country’s security policy 
after the summer of 2004 focused on coercive diplomacy towards Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, bolstered by a military component which aimed at bringing 
concrete results, should negotiations fail. One thing was clear: that the 
reintegration of both provinces was a priority for Tbilisi and was now deemed 
achievable. The Georgian government quickly stepped up its rhetoric vis-à-vis 
Russia. Givi Targamadze, the Georgian Parliament Chairman of the Defence and 
Security Committee stated that “from now on, our whole strategy will be built on 
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the notion that the army, the Georgian armed forces, should get ready to repel 
Russian aggression.”62 Saakashvili echoed this view asserting that “the 
[Georgian] population must be prepared” for a Russo-Georgian war.63 The 
Georgian leadership did not try to hide its growing impatience with the apparent 
stalemate: “The status quo cannot continue. I am not going to wait for the next 
100 years to resolve these problems. Therefore, we will be very aggressive in 
seeking peace,” Saakashvili said on July 9 2005.64  
Georgia’s strategy would feature a political component. In January 2005, Georgia 
offered Ossetia broad autonomy with the launch of a highly publicized campaign 
towards achieving a negotiated solution.65 In early July 2005, Georgian officials 
followed up with a conference aimed at accelerating the reunification process 
through a detailed “roadmap”. However, the fact that the Ossetian leadership did 
not receive a formal invitation combined with the highly symbolic choice of 
holding the conference in Ajara undermined the prospects for success. 
After all, it was clear that the Ossetian elite favoured integration with Russia at 
the expense of cutting ties with Tbilisi, while Ossetians viewed any Georgian 
initiative to change the status quo with suspicion. As Dmitri Medoyev, South 
Ossetia’s representative to Russia said in a July 10, 2005 interview, “Our train left 
Georgia 15 years ago and [it] is now heading towards Russia.”66 In an 
unrecognized 2006 referendum, South Ossetians reaffirmed their “independence” 
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and subsequently re-elected Kokoity as their “President”. Meanwhile, displaced 
Georgians from South Ossetia organized their own ballots, electing pro-Georgian 
Dmitriy Sanakoyev as governor (he exercised authority on Georgian controlled 
parts of South Ossetia since 2006) and calling for the preservation of Georgian 
territorial integrity.67 
At the same time, the “carrot” of political and economic incentives was often 
combined with the “stick” of exercises by the Georgian army.68 As the political 
stalemate between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali persisted, the military component of the 
Georgian strategy increased its potency. The lessons learned from the 2004 crisis 
were paramount in shaping Georgian security policy after 2004. In the 2004 crisis, 
Georgian military planners concluded that it would be “impossible for Georgia to 
restore its territorial integrity militarily.”69 Its security planners had realized that 
Georgia did not possess the necessary superiority in capabilities to regain and 
retain their secessionist provinces. According to Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Tbilisi’s 
former ambassador to Moscow and confidant of President Saakashvili, “at a 
meeting chaired by President Saakashvili in the summer of 2004, launching a 
large-scale operation in South Ossetia was discussed, but the majority of the 
participants objected to it because the army was not ready for such an operation.”70  
In military terms, Ajara was undeniably an easy target, as it possessed a minimal 
force loyal to Abashidze which could not pose a challenge to Georgian troops. 
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The fact that Georgia chose to turn its attention to South Ossetia as opposed to the 
richer, strategically located province of Abkhazia, (which was also of intrinsic 
psychological value to Georgians) is telling. At that point, South Ossetia appeared 
to be a more “manageable” target. However, the harsh realities of asymmetrical 
warfare in South Ossetian villages would prove Tbilisi wrong, culminating in the 
2004 Georgian retreat. The inability of the Georgian army to handle the situation 
in South Ossetia may also explain the reinforcement, on August 9 2004, of the 
already deployed Interior Ministry troops with a better trained contingent, 
specialized in counter-terrorist operations.71 In the coming years, Georgian 
security policy would undergo a real transformation driven by these experiences. 
A number of Georgian officials, such as the former Defence Minister Irakli 
Okruashvili (2004-2006), have actually stated that the Georgian leadership began 
planning the reintegration by military means of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
in 2005.72  Georgia adopted a military doctrine based on quick offensive 
operations, coupled with an armaments build-up which would ensure local 
superiority vis-à-vis the separatist provinces (including stationed Russian forces). 
Thus, since 2004 and by means of an ambitious military modernisation program, 
Georgia tried to pursue the -sometimes contradictory- goals of interoperability 
with NATO forces (with small, flexible units) and self-sufficiency (including the 
creation of a Reserve force and the build-up of air defences).73 To achieve these 
targets, the Georgian government would have to ignore NATO recommendations 
for the reduction of the size of the Georgian army by 2015.74  
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Moving in quite the opposite direction, the Saakashvili administration proceeded 
to increase both the manpower and the capabilities of the armed forces, citing the 
country’s contribution in Iraq as well as the deterioration of relations with Russia 
as reasons.75 Georgia’s defence spending pattern between 2005 and 2008 is 
indicative of a major arms build-up (Figure 8-C). Large orders for Western 
weaponry were placed (a first for a post-Soviet country in the CIS), made possible 
by an unprecedented increase in defence spending, which exceeded 8% of the 
country’s GDP.76 In 2007 and 2008, in particular, defence outlays accounted for 
approximately 30% of total government expenditure. Moreover, the Georgian 
armed forces undertook an organizational transformation as well, through the 
phasing out of conscription and the adoption of intensive training programs.  
 
Source: SIPRI datasets on defence expenditure 
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This build-up, although noticed by analysts for its potentially destabilising 
repercussions,77 was touted by Georgian officials as a long overdue modernisation 
and professionalization initiative, in compliance with the country’s aspirations to 
fulfil NATO membership criteria.78 However, weapons procured weighed heavily 
on offensive operations in the two secessionist provinces, with official Georgian 
documents confirming that renewed hostilities in the breakaway provinces 
constitute the most probable security challenge for Georgia in the 2007-2012 
timeframe.79 T-72 tanks, heavy artillery and attack helicopters were procured in 
large numbers, while exercises focused on offensive operations.80 An emphasis 
on counter-insurgency operations was also given, in preparation for potential 
unrest in the separatist regions once their regular forces had been defeated.  
In 2004, Georgian military planners had faced a war of attrition by the Ossetian 
militia which proved an insurmountable obstacle to Georgian forces. After all, 
asymmetrical warfare poses a set of specific requirements in terms of training, 
equipment and doctrine.81 Indeed, in 2008 the Georgian army proved capable of 
quickly (re)capturing South Ossetia. A highly trained and well equipped 12,000 
strong Georgian force,82 consisting of ten light infantry battalions, assisted by 
special task forces and artillery, overwhelmed Ossetian forces within hours, 
avoiding the repetition of the 2004 stalemate. That lesson was well-learned.  
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Nevertheless, Georgian forces were unprepared for defensive operations, with the 
exception of an effective air defence umbrella. The most striking evidence of this 
unpreparedness was the apparent absence of provisions towards either securing or 
blocking the Roki tunnel (the only ground route from Russia to South Ossetia) 
through which Russian reinforcements had to be deployed in the event of war. In 
August 2008, the Georgian artillery lacked the equipment with the precision and 
range to cover the exit of the tunnel.83 Therefore, while the 2004 crises were well 
assessed by Georgian military planners, one can only wonder about the apparent 
lack of preparedness for an active Russian involvement in future encounters.  
Georgia’s emphasis on air defences indicates that Russian fighter jet incursions 
were in fact anticipated, though the possibility of a full scale assault by Russian 
troops was absent from their calculations. Indeed, throughout core Georgian 
policy texts, such as the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) documents, the potential for a large scale offensive by 
another country against Georgia is explicitly mentioned as a low probability 
scenario.84 More specifically, throughout the NSC document, which describes 
Georgia’s grand strategy, hostilities in the secessionist provinces are assessed as 
very likely, while a direct Russian attack is considered unlikely.85  
The NSC document was completed in 2005 and updated in 2007, without any 
meaningful amendments regarding the source, or the intensity of security threats 
Georgia faced. Finally, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) document, adopted 
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in November 2007, outlines Georgia’s future security challenges and describes 
the country’s defence priorities and needs. In the risk assessment part, a large scale 
military intervention is, once again, deemed a low probability scenario (Table 8-
A). After the end of the 2008 conflict, Georgian deputy Defence Minister Batu 
Kutelia admitted to the Financial Times that there had been no planning for facing 
a potential Russian involvement in the conflict.86 
 
Table 8-A: Threat Categories and Risk Assessment,  
Georgian Strategic Defence Review, November 2007 
 
 
                 Source: Pataraia. 2010, p. 16. 
 
The lack of diversity in assessments and estimates among the Georgian leadership 
is surprising, considering the risk associated with this strategy. A reason, perhaps, 
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for this unproductive consistency of expectations can be sought in the composition 
of the decision making elite. Other than Saakashvili, the undisputed protagonist 
and main decision making figure of the crisis, Irakli Okruashvili, a hardliner who 
was Minister of Interior during the 2004 crisis, was appointed Minister of Defence 
in December 2004. From 2006 until December 2008, the position of Defence 
Minister was occupied by Davit Kezerashvili, a young and inexperienced 
politician, who essentially carried out Saakashvili’s instructions. Moreover, Ivane 
Merabishvili used to be Saakashvili’s National Security Advisor until June 2004 
when he was appointed to the position of Minister of State Security. In December 
2004, the Ministry of State Security was merged with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of which Merabishvili was placed in charge, a position he retained until 
2012.87 Overall, individuals in charge during the 2004 crisis in South Ossetia were 
either present or upgraded in the 2008 war, creating a cohesive group of actors. 
Military leaders were equally oblivious. The Georgian Chief of the Joint Staff, 
Brigadier General Zaza Gogava, informed a Georgian parliamentary commission 
set up to investigate the war that the country’s intelligence “was not 
comprehensive enough to indicate that such a large scale Russian military 
intervention was to be expected.”88 This lack of preparedness became evident in 
the summer of 2008. After approximately 72 hours of combat, Georgian troops 
were retreating in a highly unorganized manner, abandoning operational 
equipment (including 44 T-72 tanks) in the process.89 The belief that Russia would 
not attack could possibly account for the fact that Georgian forces were “taken 
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completely by surprise by the arrival of the Russians.”90 In one of the most 
detailed scrutinies of the 2008 war thus far, Wivel and Mouritzen converge on the 
view that the Georgian leadership underestimated Russia’s capacity and 
willingness to respond through the application of large scale force.91  
The Georgian assessment, while extremely biased and unfounded in retrospect, 
can be traced back to the 2003-2004 crises which shaped Georgian expectations. 
What would have happened had Georgia captured South Ossetia in 2004? One 
can only speculate, but the truth is that most signals and indications pointed to a 
moderated Russian response at the time. Between 2004 and 2008, however, a 
series of powerful signals coming from Moscow were ignored by Tbilisi. At the 
same time, Georgian policy makers did not appear keen to reassess the wider 
geopolitical changes underway during that period. Georgian perceptions gradually 
became less accurate, as they were not informed by strong signals and major 
international developments that could (and should) have been noticed and 
analysed by the country’s leadership. As a result, Georgian actions in 2008 were 
doomed to fail, as they were informed by a set of obsolete assumptions.  
 
8.8: Signals from Moscow 
Before one ascertains that Georgian policy makers operated under misperceptions 
in the 2008 crisis and the ensuing war with Russia, the clarity of Russian signals 
through statements and actions needs to be assessed. After all, Russia has used 
ambiguity in the past in order to attain its strategic goals. Thus, a plausible 
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explanation of the Georgian blunder in 2008 would be to suggest that Saakashvili 
merely “took the bait” and started a confrontation sought by Moscow. At first 
glance, Russian signals in the run up to 2008 were ambivalent indeed. From the 
onset of the joint peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia until 2008, Ossetians 
often criticized Russian peacekeepers for being overly passive towards ceasefire 
violations.92 In an International Crisis Group interview, Russian diplomats 
indicated their preference for moderation by citing that the cornerstone of their 
strategy was “a long history of respect to the peacekeeping role of Russia in the 
Caucasus.”93 Meanwhile, the South Ossetian JPKF registered 1707 ceasefire 
violations between October 1 2006 and April 1 2007 alone, the majority of which 
were committed by Georgia.94  
Other clues may have also imbued the belief that Russia would not openly 
intervene in case of hostilities. On May 31 2005, Georgian Foreign Minister 
Salome Zourabichvili and her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, signed an 
accord for the closure of two Russian bases in Georgia, (at Batumi and 
Akhalkalaki), effectively ending a long-term presence of the Russian army in 
Georgian soil.95 This retrenchment of the Russian presence in Georgia followed 
Moscow’s conciliatory stance during the Ajara crisis in 2003, in which it 
reluctantly accepted the end of Russian involvement in a strategically located 
Georgian province. Finally, Russia’s tacit acceptance of the widening capabilities 
gap between Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one hand and Georgia on the 
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other, could only amplify Georgian expectations that Moscow would not be 
directly involved in what was viewed in Tbilisi as Georgian internal affairs.  
However, Moscow’s ambivalence gave way to a firm stance indicating its 
opposition to unilateral actions in Georgia’s restive provinces. In this regard, the 
apparent non-impact of signals sent by Russia through both statements and actions 
is surprising. In early 2008, Russian and Abkhaz leaders made assertive 
statements on the status of the Kodori gorge (the only part of Abkhazia under 
Georgian control at the time), with the Russian air force shooting down a Georgian 
drone flying over the area.96 By the spring of 2008, Russian fighter jets and UAVs 
had started undertaking incursions over the South Ossetian ceasefire line.97 On 
April 16 2008, Vladimir Putin signed a decree for the establishment of direct 
diplomatic and political links to Georgia’s separatist provinces.98 This move 
undermined the prospect of their reintegration to Georgia through a negotiated 
settlement. Russian reinforcements were also dispatched to Abkhazia in April 
under the peacekeeping agreement, consisting of an air-borne battalion, thereby 
significantly upgrading the province’s war fighting capacity.99  
The July 2008 escalation did not appear to affect Georgian perceptions. On the 
contrary, in the run up to August 8, Georgian calculations seemed consistent with 
pre-crisis perceptions. Before mid-July, for instance, various military divisions in 
Russia expressed their readiness to provide support to Russian peacekeepers if the 
Georgian army escalated.100 In June and July 2008, members of the Russian 
                                                          
96 Cornell, S. (2008), “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,” Current History, 107:711, p. 310. 
97 Pataraia, “Democratic Control over the Georgian Armed Forces since the August 2008 War,” p. 9.  
98 Cornell, “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,” p. 310. 
99 Cohen and Hamilton, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War,” p. 17.  
100 “Commentary Concerning the Situation in South Ossetia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, July 10 2008, available at 
154 
 
military undertook repairs in the railway network of Abkhazia, which would 
enable the rapid deployment of Russian reinforcements.101 On July 8, during the 
visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Georgia, four Russian Su-24 
fighter jets flew over South Ossetia for about forty minutes, an incident that 
Moscow moved to openly acknowledge.102  
The Georgian government did not perceive these indications as a sign of Russian 
resolve. In mid-July 2008, the Georgian President rejected the German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s plan, aimed at de-escalating tensions in 
Abkhazia. The Georgian government made it clear that it would not renounce the 
use of force as long as Russian provocations continued.103 In multiple instances, 
the Georgian government did not hesitate to include the use of force in its range 
of responses if its “red lines” in the separatist provinces were crossed.104 
Finally, some 8,000 Russian troops took part in the exercise “Kavkaz 2008” across 
the North Caucasus in July 2008, including North Ossetia.105 For at least the 
preceding two years before 2008, the Russian North Caucasus military command 
and the Black Sea Fleet conducted exercises in the area under the scenario of 
repelling a Georgian attack on Russian peacekeepers based in Georgia.106 After 
the end of the manoeuvres in the early hours of August 2 2008, Russian forces did 
not return to their barracks, but remained in the vicinity in a state of readiness. 
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Logistic support was, moreover, already in place.107 Concurrently, the Black Sea 
fleet in Sevastopol raised its level of preparedness.108 In the afternoon of August 
7, Georgian forces were mobilized and closed in on South Ossetian borders, 
causing an almost concurrent mobilization of Russian forces located on the other 
side of the Roki tunnel connecting North and South Ossetia.109  
Many analysts consider the deployment of 1,200 Russian tanks within a few hours 
of the onset of hostilities as an indication that Russia’s actions were prearranged. 
While it is unlikely that Russia planned a war, it was certainly preparing for one 
and it was hardly hiding it. The Russian military prioritized improving its capacity 
to manage localized wars and insurgencies in the Caucasus. Two mountain troop 
brigades had been established within the North Caucasus Military District 
(NCMD) and a number of units, mostly comprised of professional soldiers, were 
set on a permanent readiness status.110 Their training activities emphasized joint 
operations with various forces in the region, indicating the Russian desire to 
respond promptly to diverse contingencies.111 It has to be noted that the Dagomys 
Accords ending the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in the early 1990s conferred 
extensive powers to the peacekeeping forces, including “the right to bar the entry 
into the conflict zones of military groups, to use force against violators of the 
ceasefires, and to pursue them beyond the conflict zones.”112 
The variety and strength of signals coming from Russia in the months, weeks and 
days before the outbreak of hostilities would lead observers to sincerely question 
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the salience of the deterrence concept. From statements establishing clear 
intentions to military manoeuvres especially designed to convey credibility, 
Moscow appears to have tried hard to avert the 2008 war. Lebow may have a point 
when he asserts that “Deterrence theorists tend to ignore difficulties that might be 
associated with the actual signalling process…Everyone is thought to understand, 
so to speak, the meaning of fierce guard dogs, barbed wire and ‘No Trespassing’ 
signs. In practice, however, this may not be so.”113 
After 2004, ensuring local superiority against existing forces in the breakaway 
provinces was probably viewed in Tbilisi as both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for success.114 The Georgian security strategy seems to have been 
forged under a firm belief that Russia would not go beyond a concealed 
reinforcement of Ossetian militias. Actions on the ground support this notion, as 
the Georgian army did not hesitate to target lightly armed Russian peacekeepers 
at a Russian base, who apparently did not pose a substantial threat.115 Finally, the 
use of multiple rocket launchers in a densely populated area such as the South 
Ossetian capital was certain to cause a high number of non-combatant casualties. 
Moscow had repeatedly warned Tbilisi that it considered South Ossetians to be 
Russian citizens (Russian passports were being issued to South Ossetians since 
2002) and that action would be taken, should they be targeted.116  
Medvedev accordingly wondered: “Only a madman could have taken such a 
gamble. Did he [Saakashvili] believe Russia would stand idly by as he launched 
                                                          
113 Lebow, R. (1985), “Conclusions,” in R. Jervis et. al. (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence, Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press, p. 205.  
114 Labarre, “Sustainable Armor Capability for Small Powers,” p. 102. 
115 Antonenko, “A War without Winners,” p. 24. 
116 Ibid, p. 23. 
157 
 
an all-out assault on the sleeping city of Tskhinvali, murdering hundreds of 
peaceful civilians, most of them Russian citizens?”117 Russia’s response belied 
Georgian calculations; not only did it sent reinforcements to South Ossetia, but 
also deployed its air force, opened a second front in Abkhazia and mobilized its 
Black Sea fleet, catching Georgia completely unprepared in the process. 
 
8.9: Signals from Allies and Geopolitical Considerations 
Georgia’s overconfidence may have been generated not only by Russian actions, 
(or lack thereof in previous interactions) but also by third party behaviour. It was 
suggested, specifically, that Saakashvili may have held the conviction that either 
NATO or the US would run to Georgia’s aid, should the situation escalate. There 
is little doubt that both the US and NATO favoured Georgia. While in April 2008 
NATO did not accord Tbilisi with a “Membership Action Plan”, the Council118 
affirmed that both Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members and 
that the parties would “now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at 
a high political level.”119 During the crisis of July 2008, moreover, the Georgian 
army along with 1000 U.S. troops and forces from Azerbaijan, Ukraine and 
Armenia conducted an exercise (named “Immediate Response 2008”) in Georgia 
aimed at increasing interoperability for NATO operations.120  
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For some, such statements and actions represented a thinly veiled intention to back 
Georgia’s military foray and a number of Western analysts believe that false 
expectations were generated. Indeed, it was noted that it was “irresponsible, 
unethical and above all contemptible” for NATO to extend security guaranteed to 
states the alliance does not intend to defend.121 Finally, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice appeared on July 10 2008 beside Saakashvili in Tbilisi, and 
asserted “Mr. President, we always fight for our friends.”122 Even though her 
statement was referring to Georgia’s bid for NATO membership, it could have 
been perceived as a tacit encouragement of Georgian actions, if not an 
endorsement of the impending operation and a promise of support on the ground. 
There is a number of indications that Saakashvili did actually anticipate the West’s 
involvement in the Russo-Georgian crisis. The Georgian President certainly 
portrayed the conflict as a war “for the West.”123 However, these public signals 
should not obscure the evidence indicating that Washington had repeatedly 
signalled its opposition to any unilateral Georgian actions. US State Department 
official Matthew Bryza warned the Georgian President hours before the Georgian 
operation that he should not initiate hostilities and fall in the Russian trap.124 
Apparently, the George W. Bush administration had also warned Tbilisi against 
taking action in the separatist provinces125 asserting that American support could 
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not be taken for granted. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs Daniel Fried, also emphasized to the Georgian government that “the use 
of military force, even in the face of provocations, would lead to disaster.”126 
What makes the misperception hypothesis even more plausible is the timing 
chosen by the Georgian leadership to launch its coercive operation, as a number 
of developments between 2004 and 2008 had rendered brinkmanship a highly 
risky strategy. In Russia’s “near abroad,” relations between Russia and Ukraine 
deteriorated rapidly following the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, which brought 
to power the pro-Western government of Victor Yushchenko. Russia’s response 
to what it considered to be a Western encroachment was decisive. Moscow 
temporarily cut off gas supplies in 2006 and increased its pressure through the 
Russian-leaning constituencies of Eastern Ukraine, in an effort to delay, if not 
derail, Ukraine’s path towards EU and NATO membership. Kiev responded by 
submitting a request for a NATO “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) in January 
2008.127 During the NATO 2008 summit in Bucharest, a number of allies, led by 
the UK and Poland, supported the provision of MAPs for both Georgia and 
Ukraine, though a strong opposition, spearheaded by Berlin, blocked the motion, 
as the deepening of relations with Moscow was deemed a priority at the time.128 
The “loss” of Ukraine was detrimental, among others, to Russia’s energy interests, 
as Ukraine had traditionally been part of the route of Russian gas supplies to 
Europe. Moscow’s position was further compromised by the inauguration of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in May 2005, which transports Caspian Sea oil 
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to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, bypassing Russia (Figure 8-D). Finally, US-
Russian relations had also taken a turn for the worse. The Missile Defence plan 
sought to place missile assets near Russian borders, while the declaration of 
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 exacerbated Russian fears of American 
indifference, if not hostility, to “legitimate” Russian concerns. In February 2008, 
during a meeting between Saakashvili and Putin, the Russian President allegedly 
warned his Georgian counterpart: “You know we have to answer the West on 
Kosovo and we are very sorry but you are going to be part of that answer.”129 
 
Figure 8-D: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil pipeline 
        Source:www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/images/locations/caspian/map_pipeline_caspian_594x370.gif 
 
Influenced by adverse dynamics, Russian foreign policy was gradually inclined 
to a more assertive stance, indicated by Putin’s 2007 verbal attack in Munich 
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against what was perceived to be a concerted Western effort to encroach on 
Russia.130 Starting in early 2008, Russian statements regarding the status of the 
Crimean peninsula indicated that Moscow viewed the change of borders in the 
region under an increasingly positive prism.131 On April 16, 2008, Moscow 
authorized direct relations between Russia and South-Ossetia and Abkhazia.132  
Georgian policy makers should at the very least have entertained the possibility 
that Russia’s prior retrenchment from the Caucasus was to be reverted. In this 
regard, Georgia may have provided Moscow with an ideal opportunity to 
effectively draw lines in its periphery133 and establish a stronger presence across 
potential flashpoints. Overall, the four years between 2004 and 2008 had altered 
the set of geopolitical parameters in which decisions were made. And Georgia 
was not a “simple” post-Soviet neighbour anymore but a piece of a wider, 
contested chessboard in which opposing interests clashed. By capitalizing on 
Georgian misperceptions, Russia sent a powerful signal indicating its “red lines” 
within its sphere of influence that would set the scene for geopolitical 
developments in the coming years.  
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Chapter 9: 
 
The Cyprus S-300 Missile Crisis 
 
 
9.1: Introduction and Historical Background 
Cyprus is a strategically located island in the Eastern Mediterranean, located 
90 km. south of Asia Minor and 110 km. west of the Levant. The Republic 
of Cyprus has been a sovereign state since it gained its independence from 
British colonial rule in 1960, with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey 
enjoying the status of guarantor powers of Cypriot independence, security 
and territorial integrity. In 1963, however, Cyprus’s integrity was scarred by 
the beginning of inter-communal strife. Tensions between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities arose, as certain provisions of the 1960 
constitution,1 which sought to establish a consociational democratic system, 
were deemed unacceptable by the Greek-Cypriot majority, which comprised 
77% of the island’s total population.  
The ensuing stalemate was followed by the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots 
from governmental institutions, resulting in a de-facto administrative 
division. This precarious equilibrium lasted until 1974, when the Turkish 
army, in response to a short-lived coup engineered by the junta in Athens, 
invaded Cyprus and established an occupied zone covering one third of the 
island’s territory. Greek-Cypriots living in the north sought refuge in the 
south and Turkish-Cypriots fled to the north, seeking the protection of 
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Turkish armed forces. In 1983, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash 
unilaterally declared independence for the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” (TRNC) which, to this day, remains unrecognised by the 
international community.  
Since the partition of the island in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has devoted 
substantial resources to building its security apparatus. Meanwhile, Turkey 
has established a considerable military presence in the northern part of the 
island. Today, Cyprus, whose population barely exceeds the million mark, 
is one of the most militarized spots in the world. Turkish mainland troops on 
the island are estimated at 36,000, with the Turkish-Cypriot security forces 
numbering 5,000 servicemen (plus a reserve force of 26,000), while the 
Greek-Cypriot National Guard consists of 10,050 servicemen (plus a reserve 
force of 50,000), supported by a Greek contingent of about 2,000 soldiers. 
The United Kingdom retains a significant presence of about 3,500 troops 
stationed at its two sovereign military bases and the United Nations rely on 
an 860-strong peacekeeping force deployed throughout a buffer zone.2  
Ever since the partition of the island, numerous rounds of negotiations failed 
to bridge the gap between the two communities with regards to the modus 
operandi of a united Cyprus, even though the majority of political parties 
across both sides agree that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federated structure 
would constitute an acceptable arrangement. In general, Turkish-Cypriots 
have been seeking a solution based on a loose confederative structure, where 
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they would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, whereas Greek-Cypriots aim 
at a more cohesive, integrated federation. Further differentiations exist, with 
Turkish-Cypriots pursuing a status of political equality between the two 
communities (as opposed to a proportional system) and the maintenance of 
security guarantees based on Turkey’s right to intervene. On their part, 
Greek-Cypriots insist on a full withdrawal of Turkish forces and settlers 
(now comprising a large proportion of the population in the north) and 
prioritize the principle of free movement and the return of property to its 
rightful owners.  
On January 4 1997, the governments of the Republic of Cyprus3 and the 
Russian Federation signed an agreement for the sale of the S-300 PMU-1 
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system4 to Cyprus.5 What ensued were a fierce 
Turkish reaction and a subsequent mobilisation of diplomats and political 
leaders in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia, with the aim of averting a Turkish 
assault on Cyprus, or worse, an all-out war between Greece and Turkey. A 
dangerous leap in a geopolitically overheated region, the deal led to greatly 
heightened tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, which lasted until the 
final days of 1998, when the Cypriot President, Glafkos Clerides, announced 
that the SAMs would instead be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. 
Variously attributed to a multitude of causal factors, the decision not to 
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install the missiles, which marked the end of the crisis, has been the subject 
of speculation and controversy ever since.  
Undoubtedly, the decision of the Cypriot leadership to capitulate and annul 
the delivery of the missiles contributed to regional stability, but the outcome 
of the crisis was widely viewed as a defeat and policy failure by Cypriot and 
external analysts, as Cyprus did not succeed in either enhancing its security 
vis-à-vis Turkey or acquiring diplomatic gains related to the political 
stalemate in the island. On the contrary, the Cypriot gamble left the 
reputation of the government tarnished and endangered a conflagration from 
which Greek-Cypriots were unlikely to benefit. A consensus, however, on 
the exact causes the adverse crisis outcome remains elusive, with highly 
diverse narratives focusing on factors such as the fear of a military strike by 
Turkish forces, the diplomatic involvement of third parties, including Greece 
and the United States, the reinvigoration of the peace process, or even 
domestic political calculations among Greek-Cypriot political leaders.  
In the following sections, the S-300 crisis will be thoroughly assessed, along 
with perceptual factors that may have contributed toward its problematic 
management and eventual outcome. Through evaluating leadership 
perceptions before, during and after the crisis, a novel narrative will be 
advanced, suggesting that it was an accurate re-evaluation of Greek 
intentions that brought about the abandonment of the S-300 endeavour. 
Severe crises, it will be supported, may force leaders to reassess their 
perceptions to more accurately reflect both allied and adversary motivations. 
In that sense, the decision not to proceed with the purchase of the S-300 
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system may have been the result of a rational recalibration of Cypriot 
perceptions, taking into account hitherto unnoticed developments.  
 
9.2: The Crisis 
Following a number of press leaks, Cypriot Foreign Minister Alekos 
Michaelides announced himself the purchase of the S-300 SAM system on 
January 5, 1997. While initially undisclosed, it was later revealed that the 
agreement included the delivery of four firing batteries, each capable to 
carry twelve rockets.6 Turkish officials moved quickly to denounce the sale, 
openly accusing the Cypriot government of aggression, alleging that the 
missiles posed a threat not only to Turkish Cypriots but also to Turkey 
itself.7 Calling on the Cypriot government to annul the deal, Turkish Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan asserted that Turkey would not passively wait 
for the coming sixteen months, the declared time-frame for the missiles' 
deployment.8 At a press conference, then Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller took 
a further escalatory step, by openly declaring that Turkey would destroy the 
SAMs, should they reach Cypriot soil.9  
Turkish analysts perceived the Cypriot initiative as an indicator of future 
aggression against Turkish forces, suggesting that the SAMs would provide 
Greek-Cypriots with a first-strike capability, assumed to be part of a “rapid, 
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concentrated assault… immediately followed by the announcement of a 
ceasefire and a call for international arbitration.”10 Reports also suggested 
that the SAMs could be converted to surface to surface missiles and used 
against targets in Turkey.11 On January 20 1997, Turkey signed a joint 
defence agreement with the unrecognized government of the TRNC.12 Soon 
Ankara would move to internationalize the incident, in an effort to increase 
the diplomatic pressure on Cyprus. Throughout the S-300 crisis, Turkish 
officials emphasized that the Cypriot initiative posed a threat to NATO 
interests. In a telling analogy, the Turkish Ministry of Defence compared its 
obligation to prevent the S-300 deployment with that of the US to stop the 
installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962.13 
Turkey’s diplomatic campaign brought results, with the mobilization of the 
international community in an effort to avert an escalation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. In June 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited the 
leaders of the two communities to New York for face-to-face negotiations 
which took place the following month. In August 1997, the two leaders sat 
at the negotiating table for another round of face-to-face talks in Montreux, 
Switzerland, which came to an abrupt end when the Turkish-Cypriot leader 
refused to negotiate until the EU halted accession talks with the Republic of 
Cyprus.14 Intense diplomatic activity originating from Washington was also 
observed in the meantime, with American mediators shuttling between 
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Nicosia, Ankara and Athens in an effort to convince the Cypriot leadership 
to annul the project, which was perceived by US officials as a “destabilizing 
mistake.”15 American efforts - initially composed of dispatching State 
Department officials on ad-hoc missions - were upgraded in June 1997 with 
the nomination of Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Bosnian Peace 
accords, as a US special envoy to Cyprus.16  
The ineffective diplomatic effort prompted Turkey to flex its military muscle 
in order to coerce the Cypriot leadership. In August 1997, Turkish 
authorities stopped and searched the Egyptian vessel “Al-Qusair”, after 
allegedly receiving information that the ship was carrying (S-300) missile 
parts.17 Russia would soon take a firm stance by offering assurances that the 
system would not only be delivered, but would also be deployed under 
Russian assistance and supervision. Russian military personnel were 
scheduled to escort the S-300 shipment and provide training and follow-on 
support after deployment.18 Georgy Mouratov, the Russian Ambassador to 
Cyprus, stated in October 1997 that any Turkish interference with the 
delivery of the SAMs would be met with armed force.19  
Greek and Cypriot forces conducted large scale military manoeuvres in the 
island in October 1997 (code-named Nikiforos). The Turkish military was 
quick to respond and proceeded with fervour to instill a sense of 
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decisiveness. During the “Toros 97” military exercises, four Turkish 
frigates, three submarines, two gunboats and a landing craft took part along 
with 10,000 Turkish troops in a tour de force aimed at instilling Turkey’s 
determination to prevent the S-300 from reaching the island.20 In the final 
portion of the manoeuvres, Turkish F-4 and F-16 fighters conducted mock 
air strikes on S-300 launch pads at Mevlevi, thirty five kilometres west of 
the divided Cypriot capital of Nicosia.21 The message was intended to be 
loud and clear; Turkey would prevent the missiles from being deployed at 
any cost. For the first time, “cool dogfights” between Greek and Turkish F-
16s took place above Cyprus.22  
Renewed efforts to break the stalemate in the Cyprus problem were 
undertaken during the first half of 1998, with the Cypriot government 
dispatching a proposal for the complete demilitarization of the island to the 
UN, while Turkish Cypriots demanded the formal recognition of the 
“TRNC” in order to return to bilateral talks.23 Despite the rising tensions, 
Greek-Cypriots appeared to support the delivery of the missiles “whatever 
the cost.”24 It soon became apparent that there was a delay to the original 
plan, which foresaw delivery of the missiles in July 1998.25 The Cypriot 
President, however, seemed determined to proceed with the deal, affirming 
that “any postponement, suspension or cancellation of the S-300 order would 
only be raised if certain prerequisites were fulfilled” which entailed a 
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“solution or progress which would definitely lead to a solution. An 
agreement on demilitarization -provided this had the expected results- would 
constitute progress justifying such a course.”26 Meanwhile, Turkey 
contemplated potential responses to developments in Cyprus, among which 
was the development of joint defence structures with the “TRNC.”27 
With the UN negotiations reaching an impasse and the EU seemingly 
apprehensive towards intervening, the Cypriot position was gradually 
eroded. During talks with Greek and Cypriot officials in April and May 
1998, US Cyprus Special Coordinator Thomas Miller and Richard 
Holbrooke attempted to convince the Greek-Cypriots that the purchase of 
the SAMs could trigger a Turkish strike.28 In the meantime, the US 
accelerated its delivery of the ATACMs missiles to Turkey, exacerbating 
fears of imminent hostilities.29 UN Security Council resolutions 1217 (for 
the renewal of the mandate of the UN Peace-keeping force) and 1218 (on 
the good Offices Mission of the UN Secretary General) were welcomed by 
the US and the EU,30 but provided little more than goodwill31, falling short 
of even the most conservative Cypriot expectations. The Cypriot President 
visited Moscow on July 11, 1998 and reaffirmed the deal, as Cypriot military 
officers conducted test fires of the system in a Caspian Sea firing range.32 
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Meanwhile, Greek officials appeared to be on the same page with their 
Cypriot counterparts. “There is no decision to postpone (deployment of) the 
S-300 missiles,” Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis asserted after 
discussions in late August 1998 with the Cypriot President. “They serve the 
defence of Cyprus.”33 In September 1998, however, Ioannis Kasoulides, 
then Cypriot Foreign Minister, met with his Greek counterpart, Theodoros 
Pangalos. During the meeting, Pangalos discouraged Casoulides from 
proceeding with the S-300 deal, allegedly warning that Athens was in no 
position to defend Cyprus, should the situation escalate.34 The Cypriot 
ambassador in Athens allegedly boarded a flight to Cyprus in order to 
personally relay the message to the Cypriot President.35  
When the Cypriot President visited Athens anew on November 27, 1998, he 
came under pressure from the Greek Prime Minister to abandon his missile 
plans because of “fears that Mr Clerides’s brinkmanship could stall 
accession talks aimed at securing Cyprus’s European Union membership in 
the next wave of enlargement.”36 To take the heat off the Cypriot President, 
Athens offered to “borrow” the missiles and advocated the resumption of 
UN-backed talks as a face saving strategy for Clerides, who rejected this 
proposition, threatening to resign rather than cancel the deal.37 
Clerides’s stance would soon change. During deliberations with the heads 
of the Cypriot political parties on December 24, the Cypriot President 
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suggested that a UN resolution on the Cyprus problem was an outcome that 
could allow the cancelation the S-300 delivery, only to face their staunch 
opposition.38 On December 28 1998, the Cypriot President travelled once 
again in the Greek capital in order to reach a final decision.39 On the evening 
of December 29 1998, Clerides announced he had agreed not to install the 
S-300 missiles but to “negotiate with the Russian government on the 
possibility of installing them on Crete.”40 Clerides acknowledged that 
Greece’s support for deploying the missiles on Crete weighed heavily in his 
decision41, adding that he was “not bowing to international pressure or 
blackmail” but believed this decision to be “the best for the national interest” 
of Cyprus and “the broader interests of Hellenism.”42 The Cypriot President 
cited international reassurances for a settlement on the Cyprus problem.43 
He referred to a Security Council resolution calling for reductions of troops 
and armaments, expressing his hope that commitments provided by the US 
President and the British Prime Minister would soon bring results.44  
 
9.3: Evaluating Cypriot Perceptions  
At first glance, one would expect that Cypriots would perceive an 
aggravated potential for the outbreak of hostilities during the crisis, as the 
                                                          
38 Voice of America, 24/12/1998, available at http://fas.org/news/cyprus/981224-cyprus.htm, [accessed 
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pattern of interaction between Turkey and Cyprus appears consistent with a 
“security dilemma,” where the effort of a state to enhance its “own security 
causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.”45 Indeed, the 
line of thinking that Cyprus miscalculated the extent of Turkish reactions 
had a profound impact during, as well as after, the missile crisis.46 The rise 
of security dilemmas explains in numerous instances why in an anarchic 
international system, even nations with “fundamentally compatible goals 
still end up in competition and war.”47 However, the crisis outcome indicates 
that Cypriot threat perceptions must have remained moderated, in spite of 
the tense military activity and escalating rhetoric from Ankara. In retrospect, 
Turkey’s strategy was only natural. In crises involving a fait accompli, 
escalating statements and actions can be part of a compellence strategy 
aimed at coercing the other side to retract from a certain course of action that 
is already unfolding.48  
During the crisis, however, most analysts concurred that Turkey possessed 
both the capabilities and the intention to prevent the deployment of the 
missiles.49 One would thus forgive Cypriot leaders if they feared a strike by 
Turkey, particularly as time progressed. Turkey’s overwhelming superiority 
was, after all, well understood in Nicosia, with, or without, the S-300. 
Excluding the 35,000 Turkish troops stationed in northern Cyprus, 180 
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combat aircraft were stationed in south-eastern Turkey at the time of the 
crisis, within five minutes’ flying time of Cyprus.50 A first strike by Greek-
Cypriots would almost definitely provoke a Turkish incursion to the south, 
with a high probability of success.51 Indeed, the majority of Turkish analysts 
shared the view that the overall regional balance overwhelmingly favoured 
Turkey.52 Finally, in June 1998, the hardliner Necmettin Erbakan came to 
power in Turkey. Erbakan was deputy Prime Minister in 1974 when Bulent 
Ecevit ordered the invasion of Cyprus and was closely associated with 
Turkey’s uncompromising stance on the issue.53  
Nevertheless, the Cypriot leadership did not seem overly concerned that it 
would have to face a Turkish offensive. This could be partly related to the 
specific purchase in question, as Russia’s involvement was thought to pose 
a sufficient deterrent, considering its wider geopolitical implications. 
Following the end of the Cold War, Turkish elites saw an opportunity to 
reinstate the country’s influence within the former USSR and the Middle 
East.54 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the corresponding power 
vacuum in its former periphery opened the door for Turkey to increase its 
relative standing in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, thereby 
reclaiming an important role in Eurasia for the first time since the Ottoman 
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era.55 NATO enlargement, underway in the mid and late 1990s, was 
regarded as a complementary tool to Ankara’s grand strategy.56 Despite 
concerns that expansion might render the alliance’s southern flank less 
important,57 the reach of western security institutions in a region of great 
interest to Turkey (the Black Sea) was anticipated to create a “cushion” 
against Russian resurgence and hence compensate for any potential loss of 
Turkish influence within the alliance. 
Russians regarded Turkey’s rapidly developing cultural and security ties 
with states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively with apprehension. 
The Russian leadership was particularly alerted by Turkish manoeuvres in 
the Black Sea with Ukraine and the unfolding Turkish military cooperation 
with Georgia and Azerbaijan.58 Exacerbating Russian fears, Turkey’s active 
role in the Abkhazian conflict raised concerns of a potentially destabilizing 
Turkish involvement in the separatist Russian provinces of Dagestan and 
Chechnya.59 Turkey anticipated that the exclusion of Russia from Central 
Europe might fuel a more assertive Russian stance in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe.60 That fear was soon to be realized. Russia begun to develop 
and strengthen its security ties to Syria, Iran, Greece and Cyprus, as part of 
a strategy aimed at countering the expanding Turkish influence.61  
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To this end, the supply of advanced weaponry (and missile systems in 
particular) was to become a preeminent policy tool.62 At the time, Russia 
had already deployed Scud-B missiles in Armenia63 and reportedly assisted 
Iran in developing 2,000 km range missiles, while the S-300 system was 
exported to Syria in 1998.64 Thus, the procurement of Russian weaponry 
entailed a strategic component that entailed the provision of political and 
security guarantees, a fact well-known to Ankara.  In late 1997, the Turkish 
General Staff prepared a report for the Turkish government which accorded 
the S-300 system with a central role in what was perceived to be an 
“offensive ring” around Turkey’s coastline, which included strategically 
located assets such as ports and oil pipelines.65 
Therefore, a potential Turkish strike against the Cypriot SAMs would have 
to be evaluated against a wider geopolitical backdrop, which would render 
the choice to escalate an almost self-defeating option. Not only would it be 
unproductive to contemplate a war which could paralyse NATO’s - already 
diminishing in value - southern flank,66 but it is also equally difficult to 
fathom that any power, with the possible exception of the United States, 
would risk to militarize its antagonism with Russia. After the crisis, it was 
revealed that CIA concurred with the estimate that Turkey would not carry 
out its threat to strike the SAMs.67 Allegedly, a Turkish report on the crisis 
also attests that it would be “practically impossible” to prevent the 
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deployment of the missiles due to Russia’s “direct involvement” in the 
matter.68 Under this prism, Cypriot calculations appear to have reflected the 
wider geopolitical realities actors had to face.  Finally, Turkish policy 
planners were contemplating responses (such as the deployment of similar 
missiles on the “TRNC” and the “Wider Horizon” program, aimed at 
disrupting communication lines between the Greek island of Rhodes and 
Cyprus in the event of a crisis) that did not involve striking the S-300s.69  
The above does not completely rule out a limited use of force by Turkey, but 
is intended to qualify the available options to Turkey. Cypriots did, in fact, 
plan for the event that a limited strike against the SAMs occurred. As early 
as February 1997, the Cypriot government was suggesting that Russian 
TOR-M1 systems (Russia's sophisticated mid-range antimissile weaponry) 
would be procured in order to withstand a strike against the SAMs.70 The 
Cypriot line of thinking during the crisis is therefore surprising, considering 
the asymmetrical relationship between Cyprus and Turkey. Indeed, small 
powers rarely pursue a revisionist agenda against a more powerful opponent.  
Preserving the status quo, however, was not the driving force behind Cypriot 
behaviour. All UN sponsored efforts aimed at reuniting the island had been 
unsuccessful due to irreconcilable differences between the two sides and 
Greek-Cypriots were facing the prospect of a status quo that compromised 
both the island’s sovereignty and their security. In any case, Cypriot 
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expectations of Turkish, as well as Russian actions do not appear to have 
taken the Cypriot leadership by surprise at any point during the S-300 crisis. 
The possibility also exists that Cyprus miscalculated the reaction of the 
international community, as it may have expected it to apply more pressure 
to Turkey. International organizations and other great powers, after all, have 
always played a major role in shaping Cyprus’s destiny. The island’s recent 
history, passing from Ottoman occupation to British colonial rule, is replete 
with external interventions. The 1960 constitution, which granted the island 
its independence, reserved for Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom the 
right to political and military intervention. Since 1974, the Cyprus issue has 
known an unprecedented degree of internationalization, due to the conflict 
potential between two NATO allies and the hands-on involvement of the 
United Nations on the ground as peacekeepers and at the negotiating table 
as brokers towards a settlement. The Cypriot government has consistently 
favoured, if not insisted upon, the involvement of the international 
community, adopting a negotiating strategy which upholds international law 
and UN resolutions as a basis for a permanent resolution of the conflict.  
It is unlikely, however, that Cyprus looked at the West for support when it 
decided to purchase the S-300 system. The United States and the United 
Kingdom are traditionally viewed with distrust, if not hostility, by Cypriot 
elites and public opinion alike, perceived to be consistently supporting 
Turkish interests since the end of the Second World War. The United 
Kingdom had additional interests at stake. The powerful “Tombstone” radar 
of the S-300, with its range of over 300 km, would have the capacity to 
monitor Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Jordan, providing 
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Cyprus, a non-NATO member, with intelligence on aircraft movements in 
the region, including incoming and outgoing flights from the British Akrotiri 
Sovereign Base.71 The EU appeared, on its part, wary of the prospect of 
another conflict in Europe, especially when the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
had already exposed its institutional and political weaknesses.  
The Cypriot leadership did not appear to be surprised by the international 
reaction to its initiative. On the contrary, throughout the crisis, Cyprus 
appeared to be well aware of the possibility that the stalemate in the 
diplomatic front continued. Moreover, the Cypriot government did not 
hesitate to endanger its EU accession, with anecdotal evidence pointing to a 
stern warning of a French veto, should the missiles reach Cyprus.72 On 
March 18 1998, the Cypriot Foreign Minister met with the Swedish 
Ambassador in Nicosia (Sweden was one of the more sceptical EU members 
towards the Cypriot membership). After the meeting, the Cypriot Foreign 
Minister stated that “…the question of the Cypriot people’s security and 
their defence is as important as their EU accession course. Therefore the one 
will not be sacrificed for the benefit of the other.”73  
Nicosia had a reason to feel secure about its membership prospects in any 
case. In March 1995, the EU granted the Republic of Cyprus the status of 
candidate with negotiations scheduled to start in early 1998, irrespective of 
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a solution to the Cyprus problem.74 It is a well-known secret in Brussels that 
the Cypriot accession negotiations were a result of a trade-off between 
Brussels and Athens, in order for the latter to accept Turkey’s customs union 
with the EU as well as the Union’s expansion to CEE countries.75 EU leaders 
knew that Greece would exercise its veto rights if the next accession wave, 
to include Central and Eastern European countries, did not include Cyprus.76 
According to the Greek Foreign Minister, it would be “ridiculous” to 
suppose that Greece would not use its veto powers, should the EU deny 
Cyprus the right become an EU member.77 
 
9.4: Non-Perceptual Factors 
At this point, it would be useful to explore the possibility that the missiles 
were merely a bluff aimed at securing political benefits for the Clerides 
administration. There are two relevant scenarios here: that Clerides either 
tried to mobilize the nationalist base of the Cypriot electorate in order to 
secure his re-election in 1998, or that he tried to mobilize the West in order 
to renew efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Both possibilities 
appear to be supported by the crisis outcome: In January 1997, Clerides’s 
initiative appeared to enjoy the overwhelming support of the population, 
with 94% of Cypriots supporting the missile procurement.78 Clerides’s 
unwavering support for the missiles was his prominent commitment during 
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the election campaign, setting him apart from the moderate AKEL-
supported contender George Iakovou.79 Clerides had consistently played the 
“security card” to mobilize support within the domestic political arena as the 
head of the right wing DISY party.80 And in the February 1998 elections, 
Clerides was successful in securing a second term. Throughout the election 
campaign, the issue of security was prominently featured, with the runner-
up Iakovou reluctantly drawn in a public contest measuring the willingness 
of candidates to build the island’s defences.81 
The second scenario appears equally plausible and has received support by 
a number of Cypriot commentators.82 In April 1988, incumbent Cypriot 
President Spyros Kyprianou failed to win a third term in office and was 
replaced by the moderate businessman George Vasileiou (backed by the 
Cypriot left wing AKEL party), who sought to benefit from the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement of the late 1980s in order to reach a settlement with 
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. While bilateral talks resumed for the first 
time in recent years, the enthusiasm did not last long, as the peace talks 
collapsed despite the willingness of Vasileiou to provide concessions in a 
number of politically sensitive issue areas.83 Soon enough, Greek-Cypriots 
began perceiving their approach, primarily based on international law 
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principles and UN resolutions,84 as disproportionately conciliatory, if not 
damaging for their future negotiating position. 
Thus, public disillusionment served to gather support for an increasingly 
assertive stance. Cypriots turned to Europe in search of a renewed 
momentum through the “re-internationalisation” of the Cyprus issue; in 
1990, the Cypriot government filed its application for EU membership. The 
ongoing eclipse of the Cold War and the vision of a strong European Union 
with a common voice in international politics seemed appealing to Greek-
Cypriots, who placed an emphasis on the international standing of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the democratic values shared among European 
states, as opposed to Turkey, which was perceived as an authoritarian 
violator of international law. The “Set of Ideas”, a comprehensive package 
of arrangements prepared after years of consultation by UN representatives 
on both sides, was put forth by the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in 
1992. While optimism was prevalent among UN officials, the “Set of Ideas” 
was rejected by Turkish Cypriots, resulting in a new negotiations deadlock.  
With EU accession on the horizon,85 Greek-Cypriots perceived an 
opportunity to reach a solution which reflected their vision of a strong 
federal state.86 Following its ascension to power in 1993, the DIKO-DISY 
centre-right coalition led by Glafkos Clerides articulated the condition that 
common ground should exist before the resumption of talks.87 The content 
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of that statement would soon be articulated as a comprehensive strategy. 
Officially dubbed the “Active Volcano” strategy, the new Cypriot approach 
sought to mobilise the international community before the situation 
escalated and control became elusive.88 The main idea was to portray the 
status quo as untenable. Official statements indicated this new direction: 
“We are convinced that time is running out for the Cyprus problem,” 
asserted Cypriot Foreign Minister Alekos Michaelides.89  
Thus, while the politically motivated “brinkmanship” narrative gained 
momentum in the years following the S-300 crisis, analysts tend to disregard 
two crucial and interrelated components that cast doubt on the validity of 
such interpretations: The evolution of Cypriot security policy in the 1990s 
and the trajectory of relations between Nicosia and Athens. Starting with the 
Cypriot security policy, one has to note that the “Active Volcano” strategy 
possessed a comprehensive military aspect, under which the Cypriot 
National Guard begun its planning for the creation of a credible deterrent 
force in lieu of Cyprus’s traditional, limited defensive posture in existence 
since 1974. The new military logic was aimed at rendering Cyprus capable 
of withstanding a first strike until reinforcements from Greece arrived. The 
“Active Volcano” was therefore a comprehensive plan which combined a 
diplomatic drive with a more favourable balance of power, taking advantage 
of the historically close military relationship with Greece.90  
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Indeed, a closer inspection reveals that the S-300 initiative was not the 
isolated brinkmanship move analysts had mistaken it for. The Cypriot 
leadership had been considering the acquisition of an air-defence system 
since 1995, as Turkish fighter jets had been frequently spotted over the skies 
of Cyprus. That year, the Turkish military announced the acquisition of 120 
MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) from the United 
States; targets in Cyprus could now be taken out from the safety of Turkey.91  
As the patriot system could not be procured, (the U.S. maintains an arms 
embargo on Cyprus) Nicosia turned to Russia, a long-term supporter of 
Greek-Cypriot positions in the UN, eyeing its S-300 system. The 150 km. 
range SAMs (Figure 9-A) would allow monitoring of the airspace over the 
entire island, while the associated “Tombstone” radar would provide early 
warning of any inbound aircraft. The system was also advertised to provide 
an Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) capability, thereby affording 
Cypriots a countermeasure to the ATACMs procured for the Turkish army.  
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Figure 9-A: S-300PMU-1 Missile Range 
(The wider ring corresponds to the range of the S-300 radar) 
Source: O’ Connor, 2008 
 
Ankara’s pressure was well anticipated by Cypriots, who forged their 
strategy on the basis of a win-win scenario; Turkey would either provide 
concessions towards a settlement on the Cyprus issue (and Turkish Cypriots 
would enjoy the benefits of EU membership), or the S-300 would be 
installed. In either case, Cypriot security, elusive since the island’s partition 
in 1974, would be bolstered. Escalation was therefore not only anticipated, 
but consciously sought by Cypriots as a catalyst for escaping the long-
standing political stalemate. The preferred outcome, a negotiated settlement, 
would soon prove unachievable. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
distanced himself from Cyprus’s EU accession negotiations, threatening to 
annex northern Cyprus to Turkey if Cyprus became an EU member.92 
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9.5: Intra-Alliance Perceptions 
While domestic calculations are always relevant to a certain degree in 
international politics, the Cypriot policy failure in 1998 may have come as a 
result of intra-alliance misperceptions. After all, if the Cypriot leadership 
anticipated, and even benefited to an extent, from the fierce Turkish reaction, 
how can one account for the hasty retreat in the eleventh hour? Clearly, the 
Cypriot strategy failed to deliver in either military or political terms; not only 
was the missile system never deployed, but to this day, the deadlock over 
the Cyprus problem persists despite Cyprus’s EU accession. 
The decisive factor in mismanaging the S-300 crisis and the main cause of 
the Cypriot strategy failure in general seems to be the discrepancy between 
Cypriot expectations and reality with regards to Greek intentions. In 
international politics, small states tend to build their national security 
strategies on the basis of participation in international institutions93 and/or 
military alliances.94 The historical ties between Greece and Cyprus rendered 
the bilateral alliance a natural partnership, understood as a duty in Athens, 
as Greece had disappointed Greek-Cypriots when it proved unable to avert 
the Turkish invasion in 1974. Cyprus, a traditional security concern in 
Athens has, especially since the 1974 partition, been regarded as Greece’s 
strategic Achilles’ heel. In 1974, due to the political turmoil in Athens and 
the fact that the Greek defence apparatus relied mainly on land forces in 
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accordance with NATO operational priorities, Greece proved unable to 
muster an effective response against the Turkish forces. 
In the early 1990s, Greece appeared keen on bolstering its deterrence vis-à-
vis Turkey. The Greek-Turkish arms race was taking its toll on Greek 
finances and it was becoming apparent among decision-makers that Turkey 
would soon militarily outpace Greece by a considerable margin. Kollias 
notes that “in real terms, Turkey’s equipment expenditure had risen by about 
345 per cent in the period 1987–2000. The corresponding increase for 
Greece was about 142 per cent.”95 It was clear that in the long term, Greece 
would be unable to keep up in the arms race against Turkey. In the fifteen 
years following the 1974 Turkish invasion on Cyprus, the Greek defence 
burden averaged 5.35%, the highest among all NATO and EU members.96  
Balancing is the key strategy states employ when threatened by the 
increasing power of a rival. Building up own capabilities (internal balancing) 
is the most secure approach, as it is based on the notion of self-sufficiency. 
States, however, can also compensate by joining or forming alliances and 
coalitions (external balancing) against a rival.97 Greece, in its effort to cope 
with an unfavourably shifting balance of power, had to explore strategies of 
external balancing because “states want to maintain their positions in the 
system.”98 In particular, Greek extended deterrence in Cyprus was becoming 
a complicated affair. Dan Lindley correctly notes that “Greece’s nearest 
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militarily useful islands, Rhodes and Crete, are 300+/- miles away from 
Cypriot shores. Turkey’s relative proximity to Cyprus makes its lines of 
communication more secure, allows for more rapid reinforcement and 
resupply, and facilitates air operations.”99  
A more integrated defence posture between Greece and Cyprus was 
conceived by Greek and Cypriot leaders Andreas Papandreou and Glafcos 
Clerides (with the Greek Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis playing a 
major part in its conception), as a possible solution to this conundrum.100 A 
closer alliance with Cyprus would put additional pressure on Greek 
resources, but act as a force multiplier. Greek defences would be accorded 
strategic depth, exposing southern Turkey to Greek air and naval assets 
stationed on the island. Andreou et al. conclude that “The returns in terms 
of relative security that Greece derives as a result of its alliance with Cyprus 
are considerably higher compared with the benefits of its ally.”101 For the 
Cypriot leadership, a joint defensive doctrine with Greece, combined with 
increased defence spending, would promote the Cypriot goal of increasing 
the security of the island, through an upgrading of Cypriot capabilities. It 
was these developments that led to the creation of the “Integrated Defence 
Space” doctrine (IDS) in 1993.102  
The IDS doctrine was used to describe, according to the Greek Ministry of 
Defence, “a purely defensive dogma, the scope of which is to face any form 
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of offensive action against one or both of the allies. It aims, in addition, at 
defending the strategic and political interests of the two allies in the Aegean 
Sea and the broader East Mediterranean area in an environment of an arms 
race against Turkey.”103 In essence, it is an agreement aimed at coordinating 
military strategy, exercises and equipment between the two allies.104  
Greek-Cypriot leaders overwhelmingly endorsed the new doctrine. 
Indicative of the Cypriot thinking was the statement issued by President 
Clerides in 1998, which read that the Cypriot defence would be bolstered 
“so that if Attila strikes again, he will not face the situation that existed in 
1974. We will be effective, particularly through the implementation of the 
IDS doctrine between Cyprus and Greece.”105 Contingency planning and 
coordination between the Greek Army and the Cypriot National Guard had 
gone on for a number of years. The crucial new element of the IDS, however, 
was the public acknowledgement and thus the signalling of Greece’s 
commitment to the defence of “Hellenism,” which included the Greeks of 
Cyprus, as opposed to the defence of the territory of the Greek state alone.106 
The IDS doctrine spearheaded a qualitative leap in Cypriot defensive 
capabilities, leading to a comprehensive military modernization program, 
anticipated to cost USD 3.4 billion by 2001.107 The fact that the Cypriot army 
lacked air and naval components meant there was an urgent need for 
equipment complementary to Greek contributions, such as mobile radars, 
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command, control and communication systems as well as anti-aircraft 
systems. Without delay, Cyprus initiated the procurement of critical material 
and created the necessary infrastructure in order to ensure the effectiveness 
of Greek military support. 
 It was under these terms that advanced weapon systems such as T-80 
tanks108 and French Exocet anti-ship missiles were procured, while reports 
indicated that Cyprus intended to purchase KA-50 attack helicopters from 
Russia.109 The S-300 missiles, ordered in early 1997, presented for the first 
time the potential to “overturn Turkish air superiority on the island.”110 Their 
specific tactical purpose was to provide air cover for a naval base on the 
island’s southern city of Larnaca and the newly constructed airbase 
“Andreas Papandreou” on the western city of Paphos (completed in March 
1998), designed to host, resupply and refuel Greek F-16s.111  
Cypriot calculations delineate, under this framework, a cohesive strategy. It 
is unlikely that the “Active Volcano” policy would have been conceived or 
implemented without the military pillar provided by the IDS doctrine. 
Emboldened by the strong wording of the pact which states that “Greece will 
provide air, naval and ground support to Cyprus in the event of Turkish 
aggression,”112 the Cypriot leadership aimed at manipulating escalation 
dynamics to serve its core security imperatives. Would the international 
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community mobilise to support Greek-Cypriot positions, a settlement should 
render armaments unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the diplomatic 
deadlock persisted, Greek-Cypriots would attain a historically elusive sense 
of security through the operationalization of the IDS doctrine.  
The S-300 purchase was therefore another step in the realization of a 
comprehensive grand strategy. In an interview with an Athenian daily, 
President Clerides provided a clear indication of the true thinking behind the 
S-300 procurement, when he asserted that “Even without the missiles, the 
Paphos airport is protected by other systems that have been deployed.”113 
His statement echoes prior assessments of the Cypriot leadership, indicating 
from early 1997 that the missiles were aimed at countering the advantages 
provided by the close proximity of Turkish forces.114 
 
9.6: Tracing Cypriot Misperceptions 
Cyprus completed payments for the S-300 to Russia, taking all necessary 
steps for the deployment of the system, including provisions for training the 
Cypriot officers who would man and operate the system. Russian personnel 
even travelled to Cyprus and constructed two sites for the missile systems 
and an additional site for the associated radars, with all infrastructure 
designed under the premise that Turkish forces would try to bomb the 
installations.115 But while Cypriot leaders were carefully managing their 
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risk-prone strategy, they failed to grasp the divergence of Greek and Cypriot 
priorities, until the Greek government was “forced” to reveal its preferences. 
It is now widely recognised that Greece initiated and later consolidated a 
decisive foreign policy adjustment after 1996, following a Greek-Turkish 
crisis over the status of the Aegean islets of Imia. By means of EU and 
NATO encouragement, Athens adopted a more conciliatory approach 
towards Ankara, ranging from military confidence building measures to the 
December 1999 relinquishment of the Greek veto to Turkey’s bid for EU 
accession. Turkey’s endorsement of democratic norms and values was 
viewed by Greek elites as a potential catalyst for the abatement of Turkish 
“aggression.”116 This policy shift was a combination of idealism (a desire to 
see Greek-Turkish affairs as a positive-sum game) and pragmatism, as in the 
mid-1990s Greece struggled to cope with its relevant capability decline. 
To redress the deteriorating balance of power, Greece announced in 1996 a 
five-year, USD 17 billion-worth military overhaul program, the biggest 
procurement program in the history of the Greek armed forces.117 In 
appearance, the Greek stance over Cyprus appeared to be unaffected, as the 
IDS was considered to also promote Greek interests by enhancing the 
country’s deterrence. Cyprus would have few reasons to question the 
validity of its existing arrangements with Athens. Excluding the fact that the 
IDS was conceived by Greek policy-makers, the object of the crisis, the S-
300 system, had been proposed by the Chief of the Cypriot National Guard 
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General Nikolaos Vorvolakos, who was selected from the ranks of the Greek 
armed forces.118 The potential for miscommunication appeared to be 
minimal. The resignation, on January 1997, of Greek deputy Foreign 
Minister Christos Rozakis, who opposed the IDS pact, acted as an additional 
signal that Greek intentions had remained unaffected.119 
Nevertheless, the IDS pact was beginning to be regarded in Athens as 
militarily unsustainable and diplomatically counter-productive, especially 
after the 1996 Imia crisis.120 In this regard, Cypriot leaders may have 
overlooked a number of indications that were delineating a gradual 
disengagement of Athens from its commitments. The doctrine of “flexible 
response,” adopted by the Greek military after the Imia crisis,121 could have 
posed a first indication that something was about to change in Greek-Cypriot 
security relations. Emphasizing joint operations between service branches, 
an increased reliance on rapid reaction forces and the procurement of 
modern weapon systems, the novel Greek posture envisaged a proportionate 
reciprocation of hostile actions.  
By adopting the doctrine of flexible response in lieu of a deterrence doctrine 
based on unpredictability and escalation, Greek strategists hoped to respond 
more effectively in future crises, without facing the daunting dilemma of 
retreat or an all-out war.122 Retaliation via Greek forces in Cyprus would 
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undoubtedly lead to a dramatic escalation and that was meant to be avoided. 
The IDS was thus rather incompatible with the new Greek security posture, 
which may also explain the absence of IDS-relevant purchases, such as 
AAW frigates and refuelling aircraft from all new Greek defence 
procurement programs since 1996.  
In March 1997, soon after the beginning of the S-300 crisis, the Greek 
government accepted NATO Secretary General Havier Solana’s confidence 
building measures in the Aegean, including the extension of an existing 
exercise moratorium between Greece and Turkey.123 Around the same time, 
Greece surprised Ankara by supporting the Turkish bid to become an EU 
member, opposing European voices that tried to prevent a Turkish EU 
accession bid. In April, Greece and Turkey agreed to set up a committee, 
under the auspices of the EU, in order to study bilateral issues and propose 
possible solutions and arrangements.124 The 1997 “Madrid Declaration” was 
the result of a consistent effort by both countries and the mediation of the 
US State Department, which affirmed that unilateral actions undermining 
peaceful relations would be avoided by both sides in the Aegean Sea. 
The Greek government exerted strenuous efforts to derail the deployment of 
the S-300 missiles after a certain point. During a visit to Washington D.C. 
in March 1998, the Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pagalos suggested to 
William Cohen, (then Secretary of Defence) the enactment of a no-fly zone 
over Cypriot air-space guaranteed by NATO forces in exchange for the non-
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deployment of the missiles. His proposal was deemed unacceptable by both 
Turkey and the United States, even though American officials appeared 
eager to discuss the possibility of a NATO-supervised moratorium.125 While 
no statements were released from the Cypriot government on the matter, its 
stance towards a moratorium/no-fly zone had consistently been firm in that 
this could only be part of an interim arrangement during negotiations.126  
Nevertheless, safeguarding the hard-earned credibility of extended 
deterrence provided Greek policy-makers with an incentive to appear 
adamant on their commitment to the IDS. Moreover, the highly sensitive 
nature of the Cyprus issue on the collective conscience of Hellenism meant 
that Greek policymakers would have to face serious domestic political costs 
should they be viewed as responsible for the abandonment of Cyprus. After 
all, the political cost of the Greek-Turkish low intensity war had already 
proven heavy for the Greek government. Costas Simitis had been on the 
spotlight following the Imia crisis and his political competitors were eager 
to benefit from any potential “loss” in the realm of Greek-Turkish affairs. 
The Greek electorate, historically sensitive in issues of national security, had 
from the early days of the Simitis government shown its distrust towards his 
capacity to defend Greek interests in the Aegean Sea. This seems consistent 
with the finding of Guisinger and Smith who maintain that domestic publics 
tend to punish leaders who are caught bluffing.127 Combined with reassuring 
statements by Greek officials, the potential for misperception of Greek 
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intentions appears to have been high, if not inescapable. Statements 
following the end of the crisis point to this direction, after all.  
In 2010, Clerides revealed that during the final meeting with Costas Simitis, 
he was led to believe that Greece had no intention of intervening in case of 
escalation, as this would endanger Greece’s bid to join the European 
Monetary Union.128 Years later, the Cypriot Foreign Minister at the time of 
the crisis, Yannis Kasoulides, assessed that “After the Imia Crisis, the Greek 
government decided that there should be no pretext provided for a new 
armed conflict with Turkey. Greek Ministers Pangalos and Kranidiotis asked 
me to relay the decision of the Greek government that the missiles are 
installed in Crete as opposed to Cyprus.”129 According to press reports, 
Simitis warned Clerides that should he insist, the Turks would either attack 
the Dodecanese islands or march through free Cyprus.130 Clerides concluded 
that “Nicosia should always consult with the Greek government so that 
reckless actions that could involve Greece in conflict are avoided.”131 
According to Kasoulides, the late President Clerides assumed responsibility 
for the S-300 fiasco because he did not want to undermine the IDS.132 
Nevertheless, throughout the unravelling of the crisis, one can find no traces 
of disagreement on the issue of Greek intentions; Greek support, in case of 
escalation, was presumed to be a certainty. The fact that the entire Cypriot 
elite did not even question the Greek stance seems puzzling, especially when 
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taking into account the ambiguous signals sent by Greece in the latter half 
of 1998. With the unequivocal Greek military support constituting the 
cornerstone of Cypriot calculations, however, any incompatible signals were 
prone to be distorted or dismissed as unreliable.133 After all, Greek 
governments had exerted strenuous efforts after 1974 to ensure that Greek-
Cypriots considered Greece as a reliable ally. The alleged reaction of the 
Cypriot President during the last meeting with the Greek Prime Minister, 
citing that this would not be the first time Greece would abandon Cyprus,134 
indicates that this hard-earned trust may have been shattered in 1998. Crises 
may therefore not only be a contest for measuring power135 and resolve,136 
but a process through which specific beliefs about both can be improved.  
 
9.7: Cypriot Perceptions after the S-300 Crisis  
The decision not to install the SAMs caught the entire island by surprise. 
According to a January 1999 opinion poll, 71% of Greek-Cypriots still 
wanted the missiles to be installed in Cyprus rather than Crete.137 Many 
Greek-Cypriots reportedly declared to local radio stations that they would 
refuse either to be drafted for their military service or pay the 4% defence 
levy.138 Similar responses were pervasive within the Cypriot elite. The 
reaction of Vassos Lyssarides, leader of the Cypriot socialist (and 
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government partner) EDEK party, indicated a strong element of surprise; he 
went to publicly denounce the decision, stating his party would decide 
within hours whether to withdraw support from the government coalition.139 
Lyssarides stated that he was given reassurances from Athens that Greece 
would support Cyprus in the event of escalation.140 On January 4 1999, 
Defence Minister Yannakis Omirou, who labelled the decision a “defeat 
without a fight,141” joined Education Minister Lycourgos Kappas142, who 
resigned his post in protest. Omirou appraised in his letter of resignation the 
outcome as a “serious blow to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.”143 
While evidence points towards a perceptual adjustment, the pertinent 
question is whether the “updated” set of perceptions can be considered to 
have been a better reflection of Cyprus’s strategic environment. In 
retrospect, this seems to be the case, as the Cypriot government returned to 
its former national security strategy of autonomous, though limited in 
operational scope, defence. In the crisis aftermath, Cypriot leaders adopted 
a cautious stance that has allowed for the stabilization of relations with 
Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots, concentrating on a diplomatic settlement.  
That was not easy and certainly not the sole strategy available, as Greece’s 
intentions regarding the IDS remained unclear. In early 1999, for instance, 
the Greek and Cypriot governments clarified in numerous occasions that 
they regarded their decision to install the missiles in Crete to be of a tactical 
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nature, with no repercussions for the diplomatic efforts towards a solution 
of the Cyprus issue or the validity of the IDS doctrine. Greek Prime Minister 
Costas Simitis publicly reaffirmed Greece’s commitment to Cyprus, 
asserting that “Greece guarantees the right of Greek Cypriots to live in 
security and will continue to defend that right by all means available.”144  
The Cypriots, however, indicated that they “read” the signs, whether military 
or diplomatic; the coverage, for starters, provided by the SAMs in Crete was 
of limited value to both Cyprus and Greece (Figure 9-B). The transfer of the 
12km-range Russian TOR-M1145 short-range SAMs from Greece as a 
substitute for the S-300146 provided Cyprus with only a marginal air-defence 
capability. Crucially, without the protection of at least a medium-range SAM 
system, the Greek Air Force would be unable to effectively aid Cyprus in 
the event of conflict. A study conducted prior to 1997 determined that 
Cyprus was in need of a surface-to-air system with a range of over 70km, 
with conservative estimates downsizing the range to 35 km.147  
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Figure 9-B: Greek air defences in 1998,  
including the S-300 SAMs in Crete 
 
Source: O’ Connor, 2008 
 
To this day, the Cypriot National Guard has not acquired such a system and 
appears reluctant to do so in the near future. Immediately after the S-300 
crisis, the Cypriot government announced a halt of arms purchases for a 
“reasonable time” to give the United Nations a chance to implement its latest 
resolution aimed at settling the Cyprus problem.148 According to 
government spokesman Christos Stylianides, the president was “not 
speaking of a freeze on armaments,” but was “indicating his good intention 
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to comply with the [UN] resolution.”149 Despite persisting threat 
perceptions, Cypriot leaders chose to de-escalate and adapted to the harsh 
geopolitical realities they had to face. The Cypriot National Guard would 
henceforth be geared towards a limited defence doctrine, aimed at retaining 
its capacity to prevent a further Turkish advance in Cyprus. 
The evolution, however, of the Cypriot defence burden150 is indicative of a 
major policy shift (Figure 9-C). While in the nine-year period between 1990 
and 1998 (the year of the crisis peak), it averaged 5.64% of GDP on a yearly 
basis, it appears reduced by more than 50% in the following decade (1999-
2008), averaging 2.42% of GDP, with the defence effort indicating a sharp 
decrease since 1999. The armaments hiatus, therefore, proved to be 
permanent, as Cyprus moved to effectively freeze its efforts to expand the 
National Guard’s operational scope beyond its capacity to undertake 
defensive ground operations. Up to this day, procurements have been largely 
limited to repair and replacement material, with scarce significant purchases, 
such as the Russian Mil Mi-35P “Crocodile” attack Helicopters in 2001, 
most negotiated and completed in secrecy, so as to avoid a Turkish reaction.  
                                                          
149 Ibid. 
150 The ratio of defence expenditure to the national product, commonly referred to as “defence burden”, is 
particularly useful for cross-national and longitudinal studies, because absolute measures, such as 
millions of USD, cannot capture the relative pressure of defence outlays on the budget and are, moreover, 
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. For an overview of relevant issues see Hartley, K. and T. Sandler 
(eds.) (1995), Handbook of Defence Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland.    
 202 
 
Source: United Nations Statistical Division 
 
The military balance on the island has, in the meantime, swung to Turkey’s 
favour. Analyses indicate that the Turkish forces deployed in Cyprus (XI 
army corps), have, over the recent years, increased their levels of military 
manpower, sophistication and war-fighting capability.151 Approximately 30 
additional M48A5 battle tanks are estimated to have been delivered from 
Turkey, while a substantial number of armoured personnel carriers/infantry 
fighting vehicles was added to the existing 265 known to have been 
operational in the start of the decade.152 
In the years following the S-300 crisis, Greece’s desire to disengage its force 
projection effort from the region was gradually evidenced. The “Toksotis” 
                                                          
151 “Turkey Strengthens Its Forces in Northern Cyprus. But why?,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic 
Policy,  33, November-December 2005.  
152 “Turkey Strengthens Military Deployments on Cyprus,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 
32, November-December 2004. 
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(Archer) military manoeuvres of the Greek Air Force and Navy in Cyprus 
have not taken place since 2000 and the corresponding Cypriot yearly 
exercise “Nikiforos” has been cancelled between 2002 and 2004, only to be 
temporary reinstated between 2005 and 2007. While Greece’s 1996 
comprehensive military overhaul program was almost completed, the 
absence of planning to follow up with acquisitions which could enhance 
force projection over Cyprus has practically rendered the re-enactment of 
the IDS an unlikely scenario. Officially, however the IDS doctrine is still 
included in Greek and Cypriot153 policy documents and is publicly upheld 
as a fundamental component of Greek and Cypriot security strategies.154  
 
                                                          
153 Official webpage of the Cypriot National Guard, available at http://www.army.gov.cy/?page_id=233, 
[accessed 06/09/2014]. 
154 “Meimarakis [Greek Minister for Defence]: The IDS is valid for ever,” (in Greek), Kathimerini 
(Cyprus ed.), 01/10/2009, with additional information from Cyprus News Agency, available at 
http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=6680&show=Y, [accessed 
23/11/2013]. 
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Chapter 10: 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 
10.1: The Impact of Crises on Perceptions: Overview 
The examination of the three case studies points to a number of interesting 
conclusions. Firstly, the cognitive narrative received partial support only in one 
of the case studies (Russia-Georgia). The rest of the crises assessed indicated a 
marked improvement of perception accuracy. This is an important finding, as the 
psychological narrative based on the relevant theoretical tenets suggested a strong 
possibility for exacerbated misperception due to crises, an effect which should be 
pronounced among rivalries due to their specific, psychology-driven 
characteristics. 
Crises among non-rivals have an unclear effect on perceptions, all else being 
equal. This is an important suggestion, considering the strong support of the 
cognitive narrative in the decision-making literature, according to which crisis 
conditions are a major cause of misperception and escalation. The most important 
proposition of this thesis, however, is that crises will actually tend to improve 
perceptions among rival dyads. This is not necessarily a claim that in any given 
case, crises should be expected to improve perceptual accuracy, as the purported 
relationship is modified in international politics by a multitude of factors. 
Variables such as the cognitive traits of policymakers, threat intensity, clarity of 
signals, bureaucratic capacity, cultural affinity and time constraints may severely 
affect the perceptual impact of the incident under study.  
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Future theory development should expand beyond this general hypothesis and 
explore the specific conditions under which crises will induce more accurate 
perceptions or exacerbate biases. Moreover, the possibility of differentiations 
across regions should be entertained. More case studies are necessary to determine 
whether rivals in one region behave differently compared to rival dyads in 
another. Finally, findings suggest that the causes of war between enduring rivals 
may be more complicated than previously thought. If crises between rivals 
actually improve perceptions, the rivalry question in international politics remains 
wide open to novel theorizing, which will modify the problematic assumption that 
hostilities in rivalries can be attributed to crisis-induced biases.  
With regards to specific case study findings, in the Russo-Georgian crisis of 2008, 
escalation did take place and was shown to have been strongly related to Georgian 
biases. These misperceptions, however, concerning calculations on Russian 
motivations, were not generated by the 2008 crisis. The Georgian government 
operated under an inaccurate set of perceptions, derived from a series of 
antecedent crises in 2003 and 2004. These lessons constituted the foundation of 
Georgian biases, bolstered between 2004 and 2008. While it is uncertain whether 
the 2008 crisis exacerbated Georgian misperception, the absence of a rational 
updating process in the period leading to the Russo-Georgian war meant that 
decisions were characterized by biases, leading to miscalculation and conflict. 
Even the 2003-2004 crises, on which Georgian misperceptions were based, led to 
a series of learned lessons which proved accurate and relevant. Inferences on 
Russian motivations, however, were employed by the Georgian leadership in a 
counter-productive manner, establishing and supporting the belief that Russia had 
no intention to fight for either South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Biases persisted and 
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became pervasive in the following years. Until the eventual outbreak of the 2008 
war, signals pointing to a different outlook were either ignored or misinterpreted. 
In that sense, the posited correlation between misperception and conflict in the 
existing literature was empirically supported by the 2008 war. The purported 
connection, however, between crises and misperception can be said to have only 
been partially substantiated.     
Contrary to psychological propositions, crises were shown to be strongly 
connected to an increased accuracy of leadership perceptions. The Aegean Sea 
and the S-300 crises decisively improved policymakers’ perceptions. In both 
cases, perceptions became more accurate, reflecting a better understanding of 
enemy and allied motivations and capabilities. Athens was particularly shocked 
to realize Ankara’s evolving doctrine. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey was 
reluctant to advance its claims through the open use of force in an all-out war for 
supremacy in the Aegean Sea. The Turkish navy had become capable of quickly 
responding to tactical developments and acted in accordance with Ankara’s 
political and legal priorities. The goal was to advance Turkish claims via a 
piecemeal, low-intensity strategy. The Imia crisis induced a perceptual “shock” to 
the Greek establishment which would subsequently adjust effectively to the 
changing nature of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. 
Two years after the Imia crisis, the Cypriot leadership was surprised to 
acknowledge that Greece was no longer willing to risk a war with Turkey over 
Cyprus. Aware of its faltering capacity to project force in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, a Greek retrenchment in the late 1990s would leave Cyprus 
exposed to a growing Turkish presence in the region. Crises can thus bear a 
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clarifying effect on a wider set of relations connected to a dyadic conflict, enabling 
leaders to reach decisions that reflect more accurately external conditions.  
Greece and Cyprus have been long-term allies and possess an indisputable 
political and cultural affinity that should have allowed them to possess accurate 
perceptions of each other. Perceptions associated with the bilateral alliance, 
however, reflected earlier calculations, originating in the early 1990s and the 
strategic imperatives of the “Integrated Defence Space” doctrine. The 1998 crisis 
caused a perceptual shock to Cypriot leaders, forcing the acknowledgement of 
contemporary Greek security priorities, which were detrimental to the existence 
of a Greek-Cypriot alliance built around Greek extended deterrence. The contrast 
between Cypriot and Georgian in-crisis attitudes is striking. Further research 
could explore the conditions under which perceptual, “clarifying” shocks occur or 
do not occur during crises and the extent to which these depend on existing bias 
strength (past) or in-crisis factors such as crisis intensity (present).   
What could these findings suggest about the literature on stress and cognition? 
With regards to individual decision-makers, human biology could swiftly 
compromise the positive effects of increased attention and alertness. The adrenal 
gland secretes cortisol, which at low levels acts supportively in decision-making 
by enhancing mental processes, but impairs cognitive functions at high levels.1 
However, psychologists are not unanimous in their condemnation of high stress 
levels. Mortlock recognises that occasional conditions of extreme stress may 
bolster learning, though individuals will generally tend to avoid such stressful 
                                                          
1 Buchanan, T. and W. Lovallo (2001), “Enhanced memory for emotional material following stress-level 
cortisol treatment in humans,” Psychoneuroendocrinology, 26:3, pp. 307-317. 
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conditions.2 In other words decision-makers are naturally inclined to avoid stress-
inducing situations, but when they are forced to face a crisis, stressful conditions 
may actually promote deep learning. 
Importantly, while human biology may indeed be vulnerable to high levels of 
arousal, security policy decisions are usually reached in environments which are 
specifically designed to counter the adverse effects of emotions. We can thus 
reasonably assume that irrationality is minimised in situations where decision-
making is supported by a multitude of institutions and processes, as is the case in 
foreign policy making. Substantial support from members of the executive, the 
armed forces, intelligence services and diplomats is expected to counter, if not 
alleviate, the danger of decisions being reached under extreme stress or panic.  
At the same time, the “benefits” of stress related to deep learning may still be 
present, as intelligence, military and government officials face the necessity of 
focusing their attention and perhaps re-formulating their perceptions due to the 
imminent threat, which redirects state resources towards addressing the urgent 
problem. Therefore, if applicable to policy-making in security crises, the Yerkes-
Dodson law could be characterised by a much higher threshold of arousal levels 
after which decision-making is compromised. The relationship between emotional 
stress and policy making, overall, is an area which future research could shed 
more light on, as the majority of relevant research has been undertaken in either 
laboratory or classroom environments.3 
                                                          
2 Mortlock, C. (1984), The Adventure Alternative, Milnthorpe: Cicerone Press, p. 41. 
3 Warr, P. and J. Downing (2000), “Learning strategies, learning anxiety and knowledge acquisition”, British 
Journal of Psychology, 91:3, pp. 311-333. 
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In any case, these findings do suggest that crises can bolster deep learning 
processes, as the impact of crises on leadership perceptions was not temporary or 
superficial, isolated to elites and decision-makers associated with the respective 
crisis incident. On the contrary, the effect of crises was shown to be deep and long 
lasting. Major perceptual adjustments took place, with new sets of calculations 
being “internalized” and embedded in subsequent policies enacted, irrespective of 
domestic political developments. In this regard, the assumption that perceptions 
can be considered as a unit level variable finds support, even though individual 
cognitive characteristics still affect the evolution and outcomes of interstate crises.  
This indicates that despite the persistent assumption that wars are far more 
“revealing” events regarding the exposure of both intentions and capabilities of 
parties involved, crises appear to possess the capacity to instil a similarly robust 
and long-lasting change of state-level perceptions. The adjustment effect across 
all case-studies was characterized by a high degree of intensity, certainty and 
prolonged duration. This allows the new set of perceptions to be swiftly integrated 
in state institutions, leading to a corresponding realignment of security strategies.  
Georgia’s post-war security policy is indicative of the aforementioned 
characteristic of major wars. An overview of the relevant evidence indicates that 
Tbilisi became keenly aware of Russian priorities in the region. This is only 
natural, considering that wars have been known for their clarifying effect in 
international politics, as state motivations and capabilities are tested and revealed 
in the battlefield, leaving little room for misinterpretations. Since the 2008 
conflagration, Georgian security policy has been characterised by moderation, 
lower expenditure levels and an emphasis on defensive capabilities, as opposed to 
offensive capacity. Its doctrine is adjusted to reflect a priority for stability and 
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deterrence, avoiding actions that could trigger an escalation, such as the forward 
deployment of forces, or NATO membership steps.4 
The conclusion of the two other crises ushered new foreign and security policies 
which were appropriate to the strategic circumstances of the dyads, as they 
reflected more accurately both the intentions and capabilities of parties involved. 
In Greece’s case, while the capabilities gap between the two countries has 
widened in the ensuing years, the country has managed to both avoid a similar 
escalation and effectively defend its interests in the Aegean Sea, solidifying its 
claims based on international maritime law. Cypriot leaders were extremely 
pragmatic to recognize the new realities, foregoing the deployment of the missiles 
as soon as Greek intentions overcame the perceptual inertia of the island’s 
leadership. The Republic of Cyprus, in the years following the crisis, pursued a 
security policy characterised by a purely defensive doctrine, despite the risks 
associated with this dramatic shift. Considering the past of the island, including 
tensions and the potential for enhanced threat perceptions during the S-300 crisis, 
the Cypriot adjustment can be considered as a testament to the ability of a country 
to rationally adapt to its environment.  
 
10.2: Lessons from the Aegean Sea Crisis 
The 1996 crisis between Greece and Turkey presents the strongest evidence thus 
far that crises can actually bolster rational thinking. Not only did Greek leaders 
succeed in maintaining a well-calibrated set of perceptions throughout the crisis, 
                                                          
4 Khidasheli, T. (2011), “Georgia’s European Way,” International Politics and Society, 3/2011, p. 96, available 
at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/2011-3/09_khidasheli.pdf, [accessed 20/01/2015]. 
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but they were also quick to adjust Greek security policy accordingly following the 
end of the standoff. During the crisis, Greek political and military decision-makers 
possessed a remarkably accurate and nuanced picture of Turkish priorities. 
Maritime jurisdiction issues, disagreements and Turkish goals were closely 
monitored and well understood in Athens, with intelligence officials and political 
figures even converging on the approximate timing of Turkish activities aimed at 
undermining Greek claims. Perceptual accuracy in this regard was boosted during 
the crisis, as a consensus was formed across Greek policy-makers that issues 
related to maritime jurisdiction would henceforth constitute the main issue area 
around which the rivalry would revolve.  
Following the end of the Cold War, a new cause of friction between the two 
countries would transform the historical rivalry, adding a more unstable, yet less 
militarized dimension to the old competition for influence in the Southern 
Mediterranean. Simmering tensions regarding jurisdiction and sovereignty in 
maritime areas would manifest as a fully-fledged crisis.  The Greek reliance on 
the international law of the sea and the UNCLOS treaty in particular, which has 
not been endorsed by Turkey, would exacerbate tensions. Ankara viewed the 
adoption of an international treaty by Athens as a political tool in a historically 
consistent Greek strategy aiming at forming a militarized “cordon sanitaire” 
around Turkey, isolate it from its “natural” rights in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek “lake.5”   
                                                          
5 “Background Note on Aegean Disputes,” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa, [accessed 14/01/2015].  
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The Greek intelligence establishment had taken notice of the Turkish attitude 
towards the Greek claims in the Aegean and its warnings appeared to have been 
appreciated by the country’s political elite.  Even though the widening capability 
gap between the two countries could have amplified Greek threat perceptions, 
there was an initial understanding in Athens that Turkey’s goals would not be 
served by seizing Greek territory. Assessments by intelligence officials even 
mentioned the term “grey zones”, the Turkish approach to bilateral affairs that 
would soon manifest and become the focal point in Greco-Turkish relations for 
years to come. However, before the onset of the crisis there was no consensus that 
“old” threats would subside. Greek fears of territory loss, subversive activities 
related to the northern region of Thrace and potential challenges to Cypriot 
security were all “competing” for primacy in Greek strategic thinking. The Imia 
crisis would thus offer degree of clarity.  
Lessons learned during the crises were subsequently put to test. Turkey soon 
initiated a series of small-scale challenges to Greek sovereignty and jurisdictional 
claims. These ranged from disagreements within NATO mechanisms regarding 
the position of Greek maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea, to challenging the 
status of islets not explicitly mentioned in international treaties that had hitherto 
been unchallenged. Estimates driven from crisis developments were thus highly 
accurate, pointing towards a long-lasting tension which would characterize 
bilateral relations.   
Overall, Turkey’s goals were closely followed and well understood, despite 
uncertainties expected to arise during a militarized incident.  But whereas Turkish 
goals were well perceived, the Turkish strategy to be followed was not properly 
assessed. Doctrinal shifts are not easily understood, particularly in instances when 
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these are not made public. The Turkish reliance on low-intensity warfare was a 
novelty in the rivalry history between the two countries. The Turkish army had 
already undergone a substantial modernization in the preceding years. As a result, 
it possessed the capacity to challenge Greece with sporadic actions aiming at a 
piecemeal erosion of Greek deterrence and the projection of Turkish claims. Even 
though intelligence estimates alluded to challenges pertaining to Greek maritime 
jurisdiction, the Greek political and military establishment did not anticipate the 
operational aspects through which the Turkish strategy would be manifested.  
The main problem was the lack of a compatible operational culture in the Greek 
armed forces. Moreover, the materially and technologically inferior Greek 
military did not possess the assets that would enable it to muster a quick response 
at a commensurate level of escalation. For instance, the Greek coastguard lacked 
modern patrol vessels that could sustain escalation at a level where major naval 
assets are not involved in a maritime incident. Fast transport assets were also 
scarce and obsolete. The crisis can be thus said to have opened the eyes of Greek 
strategists. The adoption of the flexible response doctrine and the procurement of 
corresponding equipment enabled the Greek military to both adjust effectively to 
Turkey’s new approach and avoid another major crisis. Hundreds of militarized 
incidents have taken place in the Aegean Sea since 1996, despite the obvious 
improvement in bilateral relations. Even though some of those incidents raised 
tensions in the area, no major crises have been observed. In this regard, the 
Aegean Sea crisis may have contributed to stability by “forcing” one of the sides 
to realign its perceptions and adjust its strategy.  
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10.3: Lessons from the Russo-Georgian Crisis 
Whereas the Aegean Sea crisis was pivotal in rationally updating Greek 
perceptions, the 2008 crisis in South-Ossetian crisis did not appear to affect prior 
Georgian calculations in any meaningful way. Existing biases persisted, if they 
were not exacerbated during the short-lived crisis and as a result, war erupted. As 
was the case with Greek misperceptions, Georgian beliefs originated before the 
events of 2008 and were shown to have been generated by a series of crises in 
Georgia between 2003 and 2004. During the short-lived 2008 crisis in South-
Ossetia, Georgian calculations appeared to be unaltered until the crisis escalated 
to open war with Russia in August.  
Russian signals pointing to a highly different outlook went unnoticed, despite 
their strength and the credibility of Russian threats, backed by Moscow’s track 
record and its capacity to successfully undertake large-scale military operations 
in its proximity. In a typical case of premature cognitive closure, where decision-
makers cease to accept and rationally process incoming information after a 
decision has been reached,6 Georgian policy-makers ignored signals coming from 
allies as well. Washington’s warnings indicating that escalation would be 
detrimental to the advancement of Georgian interests were disregarded or wrongly 
interpreted as commitments, despite the apparent problems associated with such 
an assessment.  
Both Georgian and Cypriot policy-makers, in the respective case studies, 
appeared to misinterpret allied intentions. Similarities end there, however. The 
                                                          
6 Jervis, R. (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 187-191. 
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Cypriot leadership failed to grasp the intentions of a close ally whose signals were 
ambivalent until the eleventh hour. The Georgians, on the other hand, disregarded 
warnings from all sides, essentially failing to predict who their battlefield foe 
would be, as a Russian attack essentially did not appear to fall within the realm of 
possibility for Tbilisi. The Saakashvilli administration’s overconfidence that only 
a limited war would be waged in South Ossetia is, therefore, a striking element 
that deserves closer scrutiny.  
An examination of the case study found no evidence of military planning towards 
an effective engagement of Russian forces, with the exception of neutralizing the 
lightly armed peacekeeping force in South Ossetia. The Georgians did build an 
anti-aircraft umbrella, however, as Russian air-incursions over Georgian soil had 
been a recurring phenomenon in preceding years. Quite tellingly, the Georgian 
military had not even planned to stop Russian supplies through the Roki tunnel, 
the only avenue through which Ossetian militias could be reinforced in case of 
conflict.  Georgia’s very selective thinking about Russian power stemmed from a 
deep-rooted belief that an encounter with Russia would either not take place, or 
would be of limited nature. 
The thesis evaluated the possibility that Georgians chose to fight a preventive war 
when the crisis escalated. When the outbreak of war is perceived to be inevitable, 
individuals tend to generate biases that exacerbate overconfidence. A Georgian 
commitment to defend the country, assuming a Russian attack was expected, 
could easily lead to pronounced biases. This sequence of events would lend 
credence to the scenario that the crisis itself exacerbated biases by “forcing” 
Georgians to become overconfident. In psychology, dissonance is a form of stress 
that affects the decision-making processes of individuals when faced with a 
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pressing issue. Janis and Mann identified defensive avoidance as a coping 
mechanism aiming at boosting the self-confidence of the decision-maker and 
tackling potential challenges when the decision is announced. A type of defensive 
avoidance involves bolstering the merits and downplaying the disadvantages of 
the decision to which one is committed. This process can lead to a rejection or 
misperception of evidence pointing to the negative consequences or the fallacy of 
the assumptions under which the decision was taken.7  
Nevertheless, the careful assessment of the case study indicated that cognitive 
closure may have occurred earlier. In fact, one could suggest that Georgian 
policymakers operated under heavy biases ever since Georgian policy planners 
“interpreted” the 2003-2004 crises. This is plausible, as the relevant literature 
posits that cognitive closure can be observed from the moment an actor receives 
adequate support for his views and a tentative conclusion is reached.8 Jervis 
concedes to this notion, suggesting that intolerance to contradicting evidence may 
arise long before the decision is materialized or becomes firm. From the 
examination of the preceding crises Georgia faced in 2003 and 2004, it becomes 
apparent that the Saakashvilli administration made few adjustments, if any, to 
conclusions reached at the time. In this regard, the origin of misperceptions can 
be traced back to 2003 and 2004, not the crisis of 2008. Thus, the 2008 crisis 
failed to bolster objectivity in Georgian thinking.   
The Georgian policy failures observed cannot be merely attributed to the use of 
analogies. The 2004 Ossetian crisis never reached the stage of a full-scale war, 
allowing Russia to retain a degree of ambiguity regarding its response in the event 
                                                          
7 Janis, I. and L. Mann (1977), Decision Making, New York: Free Press, p. 205 
8 Jervis, R. (1982), “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security, 7:3, p. 21. 
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of actual large-scale hostilities. From the moment Georgian forces crossed the 
South-Ossetian borders and attacked the capital of the break-away province, past 
analogies would be of limited value. This was terra incognita, as the sole 
successful re-integration of a breakaway province after Georgia’s independence, 
the 2003 operation in Ajara, was a success because of Moscow’s cooperation, not 
in spite of its opposition. Actually, to the extent analogies could be drawn from 
preceding crises, the Georgian military adjusted effectively its tactics and 
equipment to the weaknesses and blunders presented in the 2004 Georgian 
military operation in South Ossetia. The avoidance, however, of contemplating 
different scenarios following the capture of Tskhinvali, by either the Georgian 
military or its political leadership, is indicative of severe cognitive deficiencies 
that go beyond the probabilistic nature of historical analogies.  
There is also little doubt that both Clerides and Saakashvili were risk-prone 
leaders. Theoretically, risk-prone behaviours are not necessarily ridden with 
misperceptions. It is thus important to distinguish misperception from risk 
propensity. Perceptions of intentions and capabilities may be accurate, but an 
elevated risk propensity could have a major impact on the kind of policies 
favoured by decision-makers. Fearon indicated that during a crisis, a smaller 
power may challenge a powerful state if there was a reason to suspect, ex ante, 
that its challenge would be successful. More specifically, he suggested that “the 
key to understanding variation across cases in immediate deterrence outcomes is 
each side's prior expectations about the importance to the other side of the issues 
at stake.”9 The Georgian experience in 2003-2004 led its leadership to believe that 
                                                          
9 Fearon, J. (1994), “Signaling versus the balance of power and interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38:2, 
pp. 236- 269. 
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Russia would avoid open warfare as a measure to defend its protectorates, an 
assumption that may, or may not have been accurate at the time.  
Prospect theory could potentially explain Georgian adventurism, to the extent that 
the Saakashvili administration perceived itself to be operating under the domain 
of loss. According to prospect theory tenets, leaders tend to be risk averse when 
they perceive that they are in the domain of gain and risk–prone when they believe 
that they have lost something of value or see an increased likelihood of major 
loss.10 This is because of the “endowment effect,” a condition in which people 
tend to value more what they already have than what they do not yet possess.  
Anwar Sadat, for instance, operated from a position of perceived loss, when he 
decided to launch an attack against the Israelis, even though Israel retained its air 
superiority deterrent intact. Recapturing the Sinai, lost in 1967, had become a 
reference point for the Egyptian leadership that rendered rational deterrence 
inoperable. Sadat’s behaviour, for this reason, can be labelled extremely risky, but 
acceptable from a utilitarian sense. In Georgia’s case, imminence of hostilities 
from Russia or Moscow’s consolidation of authority in the breakaway provinces 
could place Saakashvili’s actions in an analogous context, especially when taking 
into consideration the strategic and psychological value of these provinces. 
This explanation is equally problematic. In the months leading up to the Ossetian 
conflict, few indications point to any Russian initiative that could inflict a 
considerable loss to Georgia. On the contrary, one could entertain the possibility 
that prospect theory was applicable to Russia. For the first time since the re-
                                                          
10 Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk,” Econometrica, 
47:2, pp. 263-292. 
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emergence of Moscow in the late 1990s, Russian influence was being eroded in 
what was regarded as Russia’s sphere of influence. The constant expansion of the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions and the climax of discussions on a U.S.-led ballistic 
missile defence system had a profound effect on Russian foreign policy. If 
prospect theory is of any relevance, the “loss” of Ukraine, for Russians, may have 
functioned as a trigger for a more assertive stance in Moscow and Georgia’s 
leadership should have paid close attention to such important developments.  
Finally, the lack of dissenting voices within Georgian political and military elites 
is striking, considering the relative openness of the Georgian polity and the 
influence of Western governments and EU institutions in the country. The 
International Crisis Group is a highly visible organization whose reports gain 
considerable publicity and yet, there is little evidence of any debate among 
Georgian policy makers of incoming warnings, despite signals coming from all 
aforementioned directions. U.S. diplomatic efforts to avert the crisis were also 
unsuccessful, failing to generate any concern among Georgian policy planners 
(there could have existed internal disagreements which were never made public).  
As indicated in the detailed assessment of the case-study, the 2008 government, 
formed around hard-line participants in the 2003-2004 crises, may have 
contributed to the establishment of a consistent set of misperceptions within the 
Georgian administration. Dissenters may have simply chosen to stay silent or 
were “converted” somewhere in the process.11 After all, “people’s needs to work 
with others, further their political goals, and live with themselves tap into their 
emotions and drive them to certain beliefs.”12 Overall, the “impenetrability” of 
                                                          
11 Janis, I.  (1972), Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
12 Jervis, R. (2006), “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology, 27:5, p. 652. 
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Georgian calculations deserves closer scrutiny and generally, future research can 
shed light on the determinants of similarly persistent biases during crises.   
 
10.4: Lessons from the S-300 Missile Crisis 
The Cypriot crisis was a highly appropriate case study for the evaluation of in-
crisis perceptions and particularly the intensity and direction of their adjustment. 
This is because the time available to the Clerides administration, a distinctive 
feature of this crisis which lasted for almost two years, allowed for a highly 
detailed mapping of perceptual shifts. Developments were relatively slow for a 
crisis and leaders were in a position to evaluate information on a clearly 
identifiable manner, responding to each new stimulus as they saw fit. State 
resources, however limited, could also be fully used. While a sense of urgency 
was present (thus putting the case study firmly in the international crises 
population), the Cypriot government possessed the luxury to deploy its political 
and diplomatic assets at the international level in its effort to ascertain enemy and 
allied intentions. 
The less pressing time constraints of the particular crisis have interesting 
implications. In behavioural economics, instances in which high-stakes choices 
are involved but the burden of severe time pressures is lifted, individuals are in a 
position to correct their decision-making biases, allowing for rational outcomes.13 
In this regard, one could anticipate that Greek intentions would be thoroughly 
scrutinized by the Cypriot leadership. The additional time available to Clerides 
                                                          
13 Kahneman, D. (2003), “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” 
American Economic Review, 93:5, p. 1468.  
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and the Cypriot elites (most of its members visited Athens on a regular basis to 
consult with their Greek counterparts) could be put to use so as to thoroughly 
evaluate Greek motivations. After all, the IDS doctrine depended firmly on Greek 
commitments.   
The main problem the Clerides had to face, in retrospect, was the ambiguous 
nature of Greek signals prior to the December 1998 escalation. In 1998, the Greek 
government probably viewed its extended deterrence over Cyprus as an 
unnecessary and perhaps unsustainable commitment but the case study revealed 
the Greek rationale for verbally affirming its extended deterrence posture during 
a time of a widening capabilities gap with Turkey. In essence, Greece feared that 
a further erosion of its deterrence in Cyprus would translate to increased tensions 
in the Aegean. The Imia crisis in 1996 had eroded the perception that Greece was 
willing to escalate in order to protect its interests in the Aegean and a further 
capitulation in Cyprus could be detrimental to the effort undertaken by Athens to 
reinstate its deterrence credibility. Mock dogfights, maritime incidents and 
diplomatic exchanges between Athens and Ankara persisted, despite the political 
rapprochement underway and the conscious choice to integrate bilateral relations 
in a European context.  
The credibility of commitments has been shown to affect leadership calculation 
in cases of extended deterrence. This is not due to an often purported robust 
relationship between past behaviour and future crises. Press examined a series of 
crises and found that while perceptions of power and interests influenced decision 
makers’ assessments, past behaviour did not seem to inform credibility 
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assessments.14  Huth and Russett, moreover, studied fifty four cases of extended 
deterrence and also concluded that past behaviour did not seem to affect future 
deterrence crises.15 However, a number of influential scholars maintain that past 
behaviour affects future credibility assessments.16 More importantly, leaders 
themselves have indicated that credibility is a vital consideration in their 
calculations. As Schelling argued, in reference to the Korean War “We lost thirty 
thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United States and the United Nations, 
not to save South Korea for the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it. 
Soviet expectations about the behavior of the United States are one of the most 
valuable assets we possess in world affairs.”17 Similarly, a British official asserted 
that ‘‘If we can’t get the Argentineans out of the Falklands, how long do you think 
it will be before the Spaniards take a crack at Gibraltar?’’18 
Similar dilemmas indicate that commitments related to the provision of extended 
deterrence may bear a particular political weight in the domestic arena. The 
Greek-Cypriot relationship could only amplify such perceptions. There is no 
doubt that the political costs in Athens associated with an “abandonment” of 
Cyprus would be significant. The Greek public opinion has historically been 
sensitive to calls for extending the protection umbrella of the Greek armed forces 
over Cyprus and any effort to undermine what is viewed as a historical obligation 
of Greek governments would have severe repercussions. Finally, the Simitis 
administration had, since its inauguration and the Imia crisis, been trying to 
                                                          
14 Press, D. (2005), Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
15 Huth, P. and B. Russett (1984), “What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World 
Politics, 36:4, pp. 496-526. 
16 For an overview see Dafoe, A. et. al. (2014), “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of 
Political Science, 17:2, pp. 371-393. 
17 Schelling, T. (1966), Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 124-125. 
18 Mercer, J. (1996), Reputation and International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 21. 
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“tame” the “patriotic” wing of the ruling PASOK party, which often attacked the 
Prime Minister and the rest of the moderate party members. The Greek 
administration thus had a robust motivation to keep its preference change hidden 
from the Clerides government. This would complicate, but should not necessarily 
obscure Cypriot assessments of Greek intentions.  
Cypriot leaders, after all, possess a profound knowledge of Greek politics, 
bolstered by a network of contacts in the Greek political, academic and business 
spheres. There is no trace of any attempt to evaluate the impact of the Imia crisis, 
for example, or the Greek military procurement program of 1996-97, both of 
which alluded to a drastic reduction of force projection activities by the Greek 
armed forces in the coming years. The diplomatic détente between Greece and 
Turkey was equally ignored. The rapprochement between Athens and Ankara, 
culminating in the abolition of the Greek veto to Turkey’s EU membership was 
arguably the most important diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries 
after 1974. All evidence however, points to an inexplicable absence of these issues 
from Cypriot calculations. The persistence of biases in long-running crises is not 
an exclusively Cypriot “privilege,” however. David Lake described succinctly 
how surprisingly little debate there was in Washington about alternative strategies 
and cost assessments of a potential conflict in the run up to the 2003 Iraqi war.19  
Similarly to the Russo-Georgian crisis, misperceptions can be traced back to a 
time preceding the onset of the crisis. Cypriot perceptions regarding Greek 
commitments were largely shaped by actions undertaken by former Greek Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou and his Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis in the 
                                                          
19 Lake, D. (2011), “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” 
International Security, 35:3, p. 47. 
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early 1990s. Their commitment to Cypriot security, well-known to the publics of 
both countries since the 1980s, reached a climax when Greece and Cyprus co-
established the IDS doctrine. The impact of the IDS doctrine on Cypriot thinking 
was so substantial, that escalation during the S-300 crisis would reach a critical 
level before any meaningful reassessment was undertaken. Nevertheless, the crisis 
itself was shown to be unrelated to biases, with escalation associated with a review 
of existing calculations.  
Cypriot perceptions of Turkish intentions during the crisis appeared to be 
accurate, stable and consistent with an elevated probability for a limited conflict. 
While the Cypriot persistence to proceed with the S-300 purchase, in light of the 
fierce Turkish response, could question the rationality of Clerides’s decision-
making, risk-taking was an approach espoused by the overwhelming majority of 
the Cypriot elite and the electorate. Quite simply, Greek-Cypriots were very 
dissatisfied with the status quo. In the early and mid-1990s, Cypriots witnessed 
the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany and the gradual integration 
of Central and Eastern European states with the EU. In what seemed to be a 
historical aberration, a political stalemate was consolidating the division of 
Cyprus, while the Turkish military gained in strength at a regional level. Turkish 
Cypriot positions, moreover, were deemed unacceptable by the Greek Cypriot 
majority, which believed that the main goal of Ankara was to maintain a status of 
permanent division between the two communities.  
Cypriot preferences engendered a strong desire to somehow alter the bargaining 
terms with Turkish Cypriots. In this regard, militarized escalation is not an 
unknown tactic in the relevant literature, should one of the sides seek to attain a 
more favourable settlement. Schweller has shown that even lesser revisionist 
225 
 
powers in World War II (such as Japan and Italy) could behave like “jackals” in 
their effort to secure a better distribution of international “spoils.”20 Smaller 
powers such as Cyprus may rarely be capable of a military fait accompli, but given 
the opportunity, they can press for a status quo change. For this reason, besides 
the obvious tool of alliance formation, revisionist states tend to use, as was the 
case in Cyprus, highly visible arms build ups as a tool to demonstrate their resolve 
to change the status quo.21 
The impact of the perceptual shift was, as in the Aegean Sea crisis case, deep and 
lasting. Whereas the alliance between Greece and Cyprus was highly publicized 
and was aimed at bolstering Greek and Cypriot deterrence through costly signals 
of resolve, the Cypriot security strategy after 1998 is characterised by both 
moderation and a high level of secrecy. The Cypriot security doctrine changed 
from a deterrent posture to one emphasizing limited defence. The Cypriot 
National Guard would procure systems associated with quick counter-strikes and 
ground manoeuvres aimed at reversing the results of a potential attack coming 
from the “Green line.” 
A high degree of secrecy was also pursued, so as to avoid escalation from Ankara. 
In the literature mobilizing privately is associated with preparing to fight, rather 
than political bargaining, as the pre-World War II example of Japanese 
mobilization indicates.22 It thus appears that deterrence was deemed unachievable 
by the Cypriot leaderships, as the absence of Greek reinforcements (due to the 
                                                          
20 Schweller, R. (1998), “Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest,” World 
Politics, 51:1, p. 24. 
21 Fearon, J. (1997), “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 41:1, pp. 68-90. 
22 Hybel, A. (1986), The logic of Surprise in International Conflict, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
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demise of the IDS) could not be substituted by purely domestic capabilities. 
Russian Mi-18 attack helicopters and mid-range surface to air BUK-M1 missiles 
were procured but were only revealed to the public years later by the Cypriot 
National Guard. Highly visible manoeuvres were cancelled in favour of small 
scale exercises, most of which were coordinated, but not jointly executed with the 
Greek forces in the region.  
The S-300 crises had a visible and lasting political impact too. The level of 
Cypriot armament procurements remains at an all-time low since the late 1990s, 
following closely the NATO average, instead of mimicking the conflict-ridden 
countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, of which Cyprus has been a historical 
example. Diplomacy would henceforth constitute the backbone of Cypriot efforts 
towards a settlement with Turkey. The accelerated negotiations may have failed 
to deliver a mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem, but its 
“Europeanization” through the integration of the issue in the wider EU-Turkish 
relations and the emphasis on multilateral diplomacy appeared to promote 
stability in the island. While a solution to the Cyprus problem remains elusive, no 
major crises have occurred since 1998. 
 
 
10.5: What did we learn about Enduring Rivals? 
10.5.1: Overview of Conclusions 
Crises, in rivalries, appear to boost the capacity of state leaderships to learn about 
the motivations and capabilities of the other rival, as well as of third parties that 
may be involved in the antagonism. In non-rival relationships, crises increase the 
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accuracy of capability assessments, revealing hitherto unobserved trends, but 
ultimately fail to alter perceptions related to intentions and motivations. This 
crucial finding should place a qualifier in the purported connection of critical 
events to learning processes. In international politics, this type of learning is called 
“diagnostic” and concerns “changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation 
or the preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others.”23 It is 
distinguished from “causal learning” which refers to beliefs about cause and effect 
hypotheses. Both rival and non-rival dyads undertake diagnostic learning when in 
crises, but non-rival dyads tend to ignore or fit into pre-existing beliefs any 
incoming evidence that does not fit into pre-existing expectations regarding 
enemy intentions. Perceptual adjustment, therefore, is fundamentally different 
between rival and non-rival dyads, allowing for exacerbated biases across non-
rival actors, which may lead to erroneous policy choices. This point will be further 
clarified in the following sections.   
With regards to capabilities, crises appear conducive to rational learning processes 
across both rival and non-rival dyads. Of course, the nature of policy adjustment 
in this domain rarely allows for in-crisis initiatives that may affect crisis 
outcomes. After a crisis is concluded, however, all dyads appear to possess an 
improved understanding of the balance of power and the implications of 
underlying doctrinal developments. After the 2003-2004 crises, the Georgian 
military adapted in an exceptional manner to operational challenges associated 
with the secessionist provinces, despite the myopic approach regarding a future 
Russian involvement. The Greek armed forces balanced effectively between a 
                                                          
23 Levy, J. (1994), “Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield,” International Organization, 
48:2, p. 285. 
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resolute response to Turkish actions in the Aegean and the avoidance of 
escalation, following the Imia crisis.  
With regards to the capability component of perceptions, crises should differ 
across rivals and non-rivals solely on the relative intensity of perceptual 
adjustment. By default, the frequent militarized attrition characterizing rivals 
enables them to closely follow developments related to the war-fighting capacity 
of their enemies and associated operational aspects, adjusting their strategies 
accordingly in a gradual manner. Perceptual lags should therefore be 
comparatively more extensive in non-rival dyads, thanks to the infrequent nature 
of militarized interactions between contestants. This implies that capability 
misperception could be more pronounced among non-rivals. For this reason, 
misperception of capabilities can be more influential in decision-making, 
exacerbating the potential for escalation and conflict. 
A more fundamental differentiation of rivals relative to non-rivals is connected to 
perceptions of intentions. During crises, a stronger rivalry identification is 
consistent with a higher probability of an accurate and timely updating of 
perceptions. A rivalry relationship can therefore increase the chances of sound 
policy choices during crises, leading to de-escalation. The Greco-Turkish 
antagonism, an archetypical rivalry labelled as such by all scholars studying the 
phenomenon, was characteristic of the nuanced and level-headed understanding 
of Turkish motivations, despite the presence of an inexperienced administration 
and exacerbated threat perceptions prevalent across the population. The Cypriot 
S-300 adventure showed that even when fundamental grand strategic choices are 
questioned during a crisis, perceptions can change to accommodate new evidence, 
before escalation becomes irreversible.  
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In this regard, interaction between rivals appears to be more “strategic” than 
interaction in non-rival dyads. In the foreign policy literature, strategic interaction 
arises from “the ability of one state to discern the decision-making processes and 
intentions of another state and to formulate its own foreign policy behavior in 
response.”24 A distinct characteristic of rival dyads that sets them apart from other 
conflictual dyads appears to be the capacity of leaders to profoundly empathize, 
during crises, with both enemies and allies, understanding nuanced motivations 
and calculations which affect their behaviour. This allows them to counter any 
biases present or exacerbated by crisis conditions, rendering sound policy-making 
possible. 
 
10.5.2: Empathy as a Distinguishing Feature of Enduring Rivals 
Empathy refers to the understanding of the “other’s” worldview and interest 
definition, including threats to those interests.25 Rivalry conditions, as suggested, 
favour an increased degree of empathy, which may be bolstered during crises. 
That is a logical assumption, considering that rivals devote substantial resources 
in acquiring and processing intelligence and other relevant information related to 
their nemeses (including detailed analyses of domestic political conditions and 
actors).  
Even in peaceful “intermissions,” rivals update their perceptions through 
evaluating incoming intelligence, while leaders keep themselves abreast of 
developments related to their countries’ nemeses. Higher education institutions, 
                                                          
24 Clark, D. (2003), “Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S. Conflict 
Propensity,” The Journal of Politics, 65:4, pp. 1013-1039, p. 1020.  
25 Stein, J. (1993), “Building politics into psychology: The misperception of threat,” in J. Kressel (ed.), Political 
Psychology, New York: Paragon, pp. 371-373.  
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think tanks and the media use their acquired knowledge and channels of 
communication to maintain and expand their competitive edge on “reading” 
historical rivals. During crises, leaders’ attention is focused on their rivals and all 
available knowledge and resources are mobilized and directed towards the upper 
echelons of state institutions. Leaders are therefore in a position to better ascertain 
enemy motivations, anticipate subsequent moves and possible reactions to own 
initiatives.  
Of course, dedicating resources towards understanding the enemy is not a 
privilege exclusive to rivals. Hypothetically, a middle or great power could afford 
to commit extensive assets in the analysis of multiple past enemies and potential 
future challengers. However, empathy is more likely to exist in a context where a 
deep-rooted, interaction-driven familiarity exists between actors involved. This is 
probably related to the richness of past encounters. Irrespective of resources 
dedicated to “assessing” the other in conflictual relationships, rivals experience a 
highly diverse pattern of interactions, with “ups and downs” in their relationship, 
where periods of relative détente and cooperation are followed by escalation and 
exacerbated enmity. 
Accounting for these would require domestic institutions and policymakers to 
establish a nuanced depiction of the rival and thus, a persistence of inflexible, 
stereotypical images and bias-induced beliefs is less likely to occur. 
Consequently, nuanced information from past encounters exists in both 
bureaucratic and cognitive “databases” of parties involved. Despite uncertainty, 
stress and time constraints in crises, this data can be “called up” and integrated in 
leadership assessments as soon as a signal (action or statement) by the rival 
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triggers its re-emergence due to its salience. As a result, reinstating perceptual 
accuracy is a strong possibility in crises.     
Greek assessments of Turkish calculations were elaborate and to a substantial 
degree accurate, both before and during the Imia crisis. During the Aegean crisis, 
the nature of Turkish motivations was perceptually crystallized in the minds of 
policy-makers, who realized that the pre-crisis scenario regarding the nature of 
the Greek-Turkish conflict had been confirmed. The emphasis on symbols of 
sovereignty as opposed to military prowess indicated that Athens had received the 
message. The slow pace of capability adjustment may have prohibited Athens 
from successfully managing the crisis, but the realization of the shifting bilateral 
balance was adequate to deter Greek policy-makers from escalating to war.  
Rationality was also bolstered during the S-300 crisis. While Cypriot leaders were 
oblivious to changes in Greek calculations, the gradual escalation of the crisis led 
to a more focused appraisal of the situation. The Cypriot-Turkish relationship is 
not unanimously accepted as a rivalry case, but Cypriot calculations of Turkish 
reactions appeared to be consistent with the observed motivations and constraints 
of Ankara. The S-300 gamble was a risky undertaking, but it appeared to be 
commensurate with Cypriot goals and the wider balance of capabilities between 
Turkey and the Greek-Cypriot alliance. Misperceptions in the Cypriot case 
primarily revolved around Greek intentions and the crisis led to a deeper 
understanding of the changes Greek foreign policy was undergoing.  
It is of interest to note that this re-appraisal was undertaken first by Cypriot 
diplomats and later by the Cypriot political leadership, despite the abundance of 
warnings directed to Clerides and his Foreign Minister. This may have happened 
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because the IDS doctrine was not simply a tactical decision of limited value and 
duration, but a fundamental pillar of the Cypriot grand strategy. Psychology 
suggests that tactical beliefs are much more receptive to new (and contradicting) 
information compared to fundamental assumptions at the highest level. Beliefs 
are thus considered to be organized hierarchically and comprised of three different 
levels, (fundamental beliefs, strategic policy beliefs and tactical beliefs) with 
corresponding levels of “inertia” attached.26 When incoming information 
contradicts beliefs, theory posits that tactical beliefs are adjusted first, with 
strategic beliefs realigned if discrepancies persist. The re-evaluation of 
fundamental assumptions comes last and is so difficult to undertake that is usually 
associated with the coming to power of individuals who are not associated with 
(and thus psychologically committed to) old expectations.27 
A comparison, however, between the Cypriot and the Georgian cases points to the 
sharp differentiation of rival from non-rival dyads with regards to perceptual 
shifts. Georgian leaders were also oblivious to American warnings about 
escalation, despite the stern nature and intensity of these signals. In Cyprus’s case, 
the Clerides administration reconstructed its entire set of expectations in a matter 
of weeks (if not days). This adjustment took place with signals from Athens that 
were, at the very least, ambiguous, if not contradictory. Cypriots, however, were 
eventually capable of cutting through the “noise,” bringing about a much-needed 
change of course. Whereas the Georgian government appeared reluctant to debate 
a tactical expectation (the potential of a Russian counter-strike), the Cypriot 
government not only adapted to the new fundamental assumptions, but also 
                                                          
26 Tetlock, P. (1991), “Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: In search of an elusive concept,” in G. 
Breslauer and P. Tetlock (eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 28-31.  
27 Ibid.  
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“internalized” them, by integrating them fully and swiftly in its doctrinal 
development. Tacitly espoused by subsequent administrations, these lessons had 
been “learned” by all current and future leaders, irrespective of the degree of their 
participation in the incidents or political affiliation.  
 
10.5.3: Rational versus Psychological Learning 
The preceding discussion would lead us to surmise that learning processes about 
intentions are at the core of the distinction between rival and non-rival dyads. The 
literature has extensively debated the nature of learning in international politics 
and more specifically in international conflict, with rational and psychological 
approaches competing against each other, supporting their relevance across case 
studies. However, little attention was given to the possibility that the salience of 
each approach may be contingent on 1) whether lessons are related to intentions 
or capabilities and, more importantly, on 2) whether the parties involved belong 
to a rivalry dyad or not. A general overview of conclusions is thereby offered:  
1) Crises promote learning, with perceptions of power balances and capabilities 
becoming more accurate across both rival and non-rival dyads. The effect, 
however, should be more pronounced for rivals, as their frequent “saber rattling” 
enables them to adjust their strategies in a more precise and timely manner 
compared to non-rivals. 
2) For rivals, crises present an “opportunity” to rationally update the resolve and 
motivations of enemies, as well as of potential third parties involved. Learning 
approximates rational processes, despite the presence of restricting crisis 
conditions. This is because past interactions have imbued the relationship with a 
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robust degree of empathy, which allows rivals to rationally process information 
and counter biases, reinstating accurate perceptions.  
3) In non-rival dyads, existing misperceptions about enemy and allied intentions 
persist throughout crisis episodes. Information is either ignored or appears to fit 
pre-existing expectations, as a lack of empathy between contestants prevents 
stimuli from reinstating clarity. Even though their dynamics “feed on” existing 
cognitive shortcomings, crises do not appear to generate misperceptions.  
Learning in non-rival dyads appears to fit the cognitive approach. There is an 
influential literature which suggests that learning is a psychological process, 
characterized by heuristics and biases. 28 This narrative suggests that leaders may 
derive specific conclusions from events in international politics, isolate them from 
their wider strategic environment and use them as analogies for future 
circumstances.  These lessons prescribe, what should be done in specific 
situations. They may either be positive (“repeat this success”) or negative (“avoid 
this failure”).29 They are internalized, persist through socialization and may 
influence future policies.30  
The shallow, compartmentalized understanding of non-rival adversaries appears 
to approximate this process. This view renders these lessons little more than 
generic analogies, which are then “enriched” by biases and preconceptions that 
manipulate them to fit the psychological needs of the leadership. Finally, “since 
these events seem clear in retrospect, much of this certainty is transferred to the 
                                                          
28 See for example Khong, Y. F. (1992), Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
29 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 234.  
30 Khong, Analogies at War. 
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current situation.”31As a result, these lessons lead to arbitrary and inaccurate 
conclusions.  Learning then becomes superficial as, individuals “pay more 
attention to what has happened than to why it has happened.”32  
Georgian assessments followed closely this model. Saakashvili’s administration 
oversimplified reality when Russia did not respond to the 2004 Ossetian crisis. 
These lessons were transplanted to another situation in 2008 without properly 
assessing the new strategic environment Tbilisi had to face. These “rough” 
analogies derived from incidents such as crises have been shown to be important 
in defining future strategies. Empirical studies suggest that crude analogies may 
be important in determining future policies. Leng’s study on serial crises, based 
on a sample of eighteen crises that took place between six different dyads, 
provided strong evidence that crisis outcomes are related over time.33 Specifically, 
the use of coercive strategies in previous conflicts increases the war-proneness of 
actors, to the point that by the third time a crisis erupts, war has been rendered 
highly probable.  
Conversely, learning in rivalries approximates Bayesian updating processes, 
synthesizing evidence from incidents such as crises with a nuanced understanding 
of the enemy. Learning from crises in a rivalry context, therefore, does not appear 
to be a cognitive process, marred by biases, but approximates a deeply rational 
process, in which actors make optimal use of available information. The 
possibility for such rational learning processes has already been suggested in the 
                                                          
31 Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” p. 21. 
32 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 228. 
33 Leng, R. (1983), “When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 27:3, pp. 379-419.  
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literature.34 This project shows that learning may take both forms, depending on 
the type of the dyadic relationship between contestants.    
Finally, the “management” of the rival relationship through learning may increase 
the potential for de-escalation but it does not necessarily reduce tensions. 
Constantly adjusting to each other’s strengths, weaknesses and mistakes, rivals 
may be in a position to prolong their conflict. This rivalry feature allows us to see 
past research efforts under a new light. McClelland argued, for instance, that 
recurrent conflicts could reduce uncertainty and the probability of escalation.35 A 
similar proposition was advanced by Larson, who argued that during the Cold 
War, the superpowers learned how to avoid conflict from each other’s behavior 
during successive crises.36 Ironically, therefore, reinstating perceptual accuracy 
could actually prolong conflict and postpone conflict resolution. In this manner, 
rivals could render themselves exposed to a prolonged competition, additional 
crises and more wars than non-rivals, accounting for their persisting belligerence 
and thus importance in world affairs.   
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